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Abstract
This dissertation studied the conflict associated with National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) elections from the perspective of employers. Using systems and structural
violence theories, the influences that foment conflict were identified and solutions were
proffered through the lenses of both theories. This mixed methods study contributed to
the scholarship of NLRB campaign messaging and tactics by incorporating the
heretofore-omitted voice of the employer, through quantitative correlational analyses of a
300 NLRB elections database as well as a survey of over 30 employer representatives. A
third portion of the study incorporated qualitative thematic analysis of semi-structured
interviews of seven subject matter experts who provided insight into winning NLRB
election campaign messaging and tactics. Key findings for employers included the
importance of stipulating or contesting the petitioned-for unit of employees as well as
extending the campaign duration. For communication of campaign messages employers
experienced greater success with group meetings and 1-on-1 supervisor/employee
meetings as well as with letters to employees’ homes. Employers also benefitted from
explaining the collective bargaining process and the use of strikes, and by providing
comparisons of employee pay and benefits offered at unionized companies. These
findings enabled development of the Voice of the Employer: Winning NLRB Elections©
model graphically illustrating evidence-based winning campaign messaging and
communication tactics. Keywords: NLRB elections, campaign messaging, appropriate
unit size, campaign duration, collective bargaining, persuaders, semi-structured
interviews, thematic analysis, correlational analysis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research Study
The objective of this study was to develop a model to assist employers for what is
arguably the most contentious conflict that can exist in the American workplace: a
workplace representation election, supervised by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). The intent of a workplace representation election is to determine whether a
petitioning union has sufficient support to unionize a unit of employees within a
workplace. This research study developed a model to assist employers in assessing the
efficacy and success of election-related messages and communication tactics, in order to
achieve an increase in votes in favor of the employer and a successful election outcome.
This research study builds upon previously published findings on the topic of
conflicts inherent within workplace representation elections. While much has been
studied about why employees join unions and why unions are successful in workplace
representation elections, little research exists regarding employers’ successful strategies
during workplace representation elections. Moreover, as detailed below in Chapter Two,
most research that has addressed employer strategies was not sourced from the employer
but rather from secondary, tertiary, or other far-removed sources of information. Indeed,
prior studies detailing employers’ election messaging and other tactics exclusively
sourced their data directly or indirectly from the union organizer rather than from
employers. Studies utilizing NLRB allegations of unlawful activity filed by the union
typically are based upon the perspective of the union organizer filing the charges.
This study in contrast sought out the voice and opinions of the employer in
workplace representation elections. Data obtained and analyzed by the researcher
provided the basis for a proposed model detailing the multivariate influences on winning
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workplace representation elections, from the important and heretofore often omitted
perspective of the employer.
The Impact of the Workplace Representation Election System
As detailed in Chapter Two, the literature review conducted for this study of
conflict within workplace representation elections examined the perspectives of scholars,
researchers, labor relations practitioners, and most importantly, of employees and
employers. The literature review examined prior studies on election outcomes conducted
from the perspective of the union organizer. These prior studies exist in contrast to this
research study’s findings that analyzed both quantitative and qualitative data collected to
include light on the employers’ viewpoint.
The researcher conducted a systems theory analysis of the workplace
representation election system, as well as a review of the parties’ interests that may
foment conflict during such elections. A systems theory analysis of the workplace
representation election system relies on its description as outlined in the regulations for
the National Labor Relations Act (1935); the government agency therein tasked with the
responsibility of regulating workplace representation elections is the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).
In April 2015 the system for conducting workplace representation elections was
significantly overhauled at the urging of unions, despite their 60%-plus win rate
(McConville, 2015). One firm that has long represented management before the Board
characterized the 2015 revisions as the “most significant changes in election practice in
the history of the [National Labor Relations] Act—and the most controversial” (Bloom,
Rosen, & Walsh, 2018, p. 1). As detailed further in the literature review below, the 2015
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revisions also introduced greater complexity and conflict associated with the revised
election system process. In recognition of the complexity of the 2015 revised system, the
NLRB itself has sought to resolve criticisms of those changes. Recently on December 18,
2019, the NLRB published a new set of revised regulations—with a initially scheduled
effective date of April 16, 2020—that altered many of the April 2015 election revisions.
In this research study these new revisions will be designated the 2020 revisions.
Unions’ Reliance Upon Workplace Representation Elections
Labor organizations and unions utilize representation elections as their primary
mechanism for achieving increased membership. Union membership is the primary, if not
the only, source of revenue for organized labor as an ongoing entity. This revenue occurs
in the form of union dues; a review of Department of Labor (DOL) Labor Management
(LM) reports accessible online reveals that union dues typically equal 1½ to 2 hours of
wages per month and are paid directly to the union (Union Reports, n.d.). Most often
union dues are deducted directly from an employee’s paycheck in what is referred to as
dues checkoff. This process of payroll deduction ensures that unions receive their
monthly payment without having to rely upon the employee writing a personal check.
The employer incurs the full administrative costs to process the dues checkoff revenue on
behalf of the union.
According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics report of October 18, 2017, the median
annual average wage rate for all jobs (union and non-union) in the United States is near
$44,148 (bls.gov, 2017). The corresponding hourly rate of pay is approximately $20 per
hour, which can yield nearly $500 in dues per employee per year. Obviously the larger
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the unit of employees represented by a union, the more dues obtained—and the greater
costs to employers to administer the dues processing.
In the same way that corporations are constantly in pursuit of increased sales and
revenue sources, unions continually seek to increase their membership through the use of
the workplace representation system regulated by the NLRB. As a result, as compared to
employers, unions are much more adroit at messaging and communication tactics in the
highly contentious conflicts associated with workplace representation elections. Since
unions participate in workplace elections so much more frequently than any employer,
their skill at winning elections far exceeds that of employers.
The election win rate is the percent of the time when the union receives a majority
of the vote; or when the employer receives either a tie or a majority of the vote in a
workplace representation election. As seen in Bloomberg Law’s graph of union win rates
(purple line) over time as reproduced in Figure 1 below, the win rate for unions under the
April 2015 revised election system is near 70%.

Figure 1. Union win rates in NLRB elections, 1988-2019.
Source: https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-decelerationdefines-2019-state-of-the-unions (see Combs, 2020).
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Conversely the win rate for employers under the April 2015 revised election
system is near 30%. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2 below, a Labor Relations Institute
(LRI) 2015 analysis of union win percentage by campaign days—for elections during the
previous decade—shows that the shorter the election period, the greater the union win
rate. The less time an employer and its employees have to campaign in an election, the
greater the likelihood the union wins and the employer loses, as do those employees who
seek to remain union free.

Figure 2. Union win rates by campaign days, elections 2004-2014.
(LRIOnline.com, 2015). LRI’s analysis shows that in election campaigns lasting just two
weeks, the union wins nearly 90% of the time.
A union win rate of 70% indicates that the win rate for employers is only
approximately 30%. In the private sector, more than 93% of all workers are not unionized
and therefore not represented by a labor union. According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics
2018 report on union density, the union representation rate for private employers is now
less than 7% and 13% when combined with government workers, as shown below in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3. U. S. union membership, 1973-2019.
Source: https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-decelerationdefines-2019-state-of-the-unions (see Combs, 2020).
Consequently, most all employers will never experience a single workplace
representation election and thus will not develop sophistication regarding the workplace
representation election process. Instead employers faced with an election largely rely
upon expensive consultants and persuaders.
The NLRB election win rate for employers in comparison with the union win rate
ably illustrates that there is a vast difference in sophistication between the parties of the
election. For the union, success is defined as an election win enabling the union to
intervene between the employer and the employee at the expense of the interests of the
company and instead to the benefit of employees and unions. For the employer, success is
defined as an election win that maintains a direct relationship with its own employees
without the intervention of a union in its relationship with its employees—in other words,
remaining union-free. Given their lack of sophistication it is fortunate that relatively few
employers will undergo a workplace representation election supervised by the NLRB; as
previously noted, NLRB data indicates most employers will lose their election (nlrb.gov).
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The Representation System Process
Analysis of the election representation process begins with the recognition of
some conflict in the workplace, conflict often fomented by both parties that escalates to
extremes during the workplace representation election. Again, both direct and structural
violence manifesting in a contentious spiral are a byproduct of the win/lose system as
required by the NLRB.
In its simplest form the workplace representation election system is the system by
which a union comes to represent employees at an employer’s worksite. The system is
described at length on the NLRB website (https://nlrb.gov/). Unions typically are familiar
with the NLRB election system as it is the primary mechanism for unions to increase
their membership and finance their operations through union dues of new and existing
members. Most unions maintain an organizing department that identifies employer
organizing targets and develops campaign strategies, including messaging and
communication tactics to persuade employees that there is a need for their respective
union to intervene in the relationship between the employees and their employer. An
example of the duties and responsibilities of a typical organizing department can be found
at Boston Teachers Union job advertisement, retrievable at:
https://btu.org/wp-content/uploads/BTU_DirectorOfOrganizing_Job_Description.pdf
Unions prompt a representation election by collecting employee signatures on
authorization cards from at least 30% of an appropriate unit of employees. An appropriate
unit is typically found on a shift, a department, or other means of illustrating a
community of interest among a group, a unit of employees. The union then files a petition
for election with the NLRB requesting an election to unionize [represent] a group of
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employees, otherwise known as “an appropriate unit” of employees. The petition for
election must be accompanied by a statement that at least 30% of the select employees
have signed authorization cards extending the right for the petitioning labor organization
[union] to represent the employees for the purposes of collective bargaining and
workplace representation. The petitioning union must also then notify both the employer
and the NLRB to begin the formal process.
Once notified, the employer’s first decision of the election process is to decide
whether to agree (or not) to the union’s assertion regarding which selected employee
unit(s) are scheduled to vote. This decision has the potential to either speed the election
period (number of days before the vote), or lengthen the election period if the decision is
to “contest” the election. The employer’s decision results in either a “stipulated” or
“contested” election, meaning the employer has agreed or instead contests the union’s
petitioned employee unit. According to the NLRB, in 92% of all elections conducted
under the April 2015 election revisions, a stipulated agreement between the employer and
the union occurred. Therefore, in only 8% of all elections was the union’s petition for
election contested (National Labor Relations Board, 2019, n. 2).
If the employer does contest the composition of the union’s petitioned unit, both
parties are required to participate in a representation hearing to determine those job
classifications that will be eligible to vote as an employee unit, otherwise known as the
potential bargaining unit. This hearing is typically held in a Regional Office of the NLRB
and is facilitated by a hearing officer who is an employee of the NLRB. Under the 2015
revisions, the hearing could occur as early as the eighth calendar day following
notification to the employer that a petition for election has been filed. According to
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attorney C. Thomas Davis, the April 2015 “ambush” election regulations attempted to
speed up the entire process of scheduling a union election by shortening the time between
the date a union filed its petition and the date on which the pre-election hearing (in which
disputes related to the election details are theoretically resolved) was scheduled to open.
Under the “ambush” rules, the pre-election hearing was generally scheduled to begin
eight calendar days from the Notice of Hearing. Under the 2020 newly revised rules, the
pre-election hearing would generally be scheduled to open 14 business days from the
Notice of Hearing (Davis, 2019).
Since the union initiated the process, its position on the desired unit would be
known. If that position is contested (typically 8% of the time), the employer is required to
provide a “Statement of Position” detailing what it believes is an appropriate unit of
employees. Under the 2020 revisions, the NLRB introduced a new requirement that the
petitioning union must respond in writing to the Statement of Position filed by the
employer. In this new 2020 requirement (referred to as the Responsive Statement of
Position), the petitioning union must respond to the issues raised within the employer’s
Statement of Position. In this 2020 revision, the NLRB “serves the purpose of
transparency by removing any impression that the Board is imposing an onerous pleading
requirement on the non-petitioning parties without extending a similar requirement to the
petitioner” (National Labor Relations Board, 2019).
To assist the hearing officer and the union in the hearing, the employer is required
to provide a list of voters within the unit requested by the union. The list of voters must
include a list of names and other personal contact information regarding each member of
the union’s proposed employee unit, along with a similar list of any alternative proposed
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employee unit by the employer. This personal contact information must include cell
phone or home phone numbers if available to the employer, as well as personal email and
physical home addresses of each employee in the proposed units. This list is referred to as
the “Voter List.” Bloomberg Law reported that the NLRB’s Chairman John Ring
announced at the American Bar Association conference in March of 2020 that more
changes are in store for the voter list requirements (Iafolla, 2020b).
There is significant case law and regulatory guidance to identify the community
of interests for hearing officers to assist the NLRB Regional Director in rendering the
decision on an appropriate bargaining unit. The NLRB Regional Director’s decision
determines which job classifications will be eligible to vote in the workplace
representation election. The NLRB Regional Director also establishes a date, time,
location and method for the election in what is referred to as the Decision and Order [to
Election]. Most often the location of the vote is held on the premises where the
employees work, though other options might include mail ballots or other voting
locations. During the pandemic of 2020, the NLRB changed its balloting practice. From
April 1 to May 5, 2020, the Board directed that 16 elections be held. In contrast to past
practice, 15 of those 16 elections will be held using mail ballots rather than an in-person
election (see Kanu, 2020a).
An example of a Decision and Order for a workplace representation election can
be found at
https://bloximages.chicago2.vip.townnews.com/helenair.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/edi
torial/0/8a/08a43382-8249-5229-8744-0778d09c8ac4/56a0652411f73.pdf.pdf
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Once in receipt of the decision by the NLRB hearing officer, the employer’s
messaging and communication tactics formally begin in order to win the employees’ vote.
Bloomberg Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) reports that historically the cycle time for
these workplace representation elections from the date of the petition filing to an actual
vote by employees have ranged from a high of 42 days to its 2018 average of 24 days
(Combs, 2020; Ferguson, 2018). In December of 2019 the NLRB updated the election
cycle time data stating that in FY14, the last full fiscal year under the former rules, the
median number of days from a petition to an election was 37 days in cases where the
parties reached an election agreement, 59 days in contested cases, and 38 days overall. In
FY16, the first full fiscal year in which the April 2015 amendments were in effect, the
median number of days from a petition to an election was 23 days in cases with an
election agreement, 36 days in contested cases, and 23 days overall (‘‘Median Days from
Petition to Election,” retrieved at https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphsdata/petitions-and-elections/median-days-petition-election; see National Labor Relations
Board, 2019, p. 69528, fn. 15). The literature review described below in Chapter Two
demonstrates that the most impactful of the April 2015 changes to the election system
was a shorter time period for employers to campaign.
Traditionally the workplace representation election is referenced as a conflict
between the employer and the petitioning union. This overly simplified characterization
of the workplace organizational conflict ignores the wrenching conflict among employees
themselves. A review of the elections in this study demonstrates that in 95% of the 305
elections, employees were in conflict with each other in their desire on whether to
unionize or remain union-free.
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The campaign messaging exemplifying this conflict follows what Wilmot and
Hocker (2011) would describe as an escalatory contentious cycle, as both the union and
employer communicate persuasive messages to the employees to influence their vote.
Additionally, employees’ desire for unionization, or their desire to avoid unionization,
also prompts communication among employees supporting or railing against the
messages of the union or the employer. In one of the most popular union songs Pete
Seeger characterized the conflict with a refrain asking, “Which side are you on, boy,
which side are you on?” (Pete Seeger, 1967).
In selecting messages and communication tactics, unions typically possess an
advantage as they participate in numerous elections throughout the year and have honed
and tested their messages for optimal success. As previously noted, most unions are
supported by an organizing department that specializes in the system of organizing
workplace representation elections. Such is not the case for a particular employer who
lacks the experience, background, and competence to excel in this contentious conflict
environment. Instead employers typically rely upon a small cottage industry of
consultants and persuaders who support employers who may lack both knowledge about
the process and a model for election success. Recently, on December 11, 2019, the
Economic Policy Institute published a study by Celine McNicholas and colleagues of
3,620 election campaigns and what was referred to as the “union avoidance consultant”
industry (p. 13). Their review of the Department of Labor reports for the study yielded
the calculation that employers spent over $338 million per year on workplace
representation consultants in 2016 alone; McNicholas and colleagues surmised that the
$338 million spent by employers per year on “union avoidance consultants” is an
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underestimate. Dividing this estimate of the $338 million spent on union avoidance
consultants each year into the number of elections held annually yields an approximate
cost of $186,740 spent by employers per election, without regard to a win or loss.
With less than a 7% union representation in the private sector, nearly all
employers lack experience interacting with unions in the workplace. This lack of
awareness and familiarity with unions, coupled with the financial ramifications of losing
an election, create the need for advice and guidance on how to respond in the conflict
with the union during the election. The data of the referenced study by McNicholas et al.
(2019) indicated not only that it is expensive for employers to participate in an NLRB
election; it is even more expensive for the employer to lose.
The costs associated with losing an election can increase an employer’s labor
costs significantly. In Union Proof: Creating Your Successful Union-Free Strategy, author
Peter Bergeron (2008) noted that “it is generally accepted that administrative costs are
25-35% higher in the unionized facilities” (p. 12). Because of both these financial
ramifications and a general lack of competence on the part of employers, there is a need
for this mixed methods research study to provide guidance for successful employer
responses to the workplace representation election process.
In Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies, editors Bronfenbrenner
and colleagues (1998) acknowledged numerous studies focusing primarily on worker
attitudes towards unions and union organizing success. Wheeler and McClendon (1991)
noted that most studies focused on primary factors, such as job satisfaction attitudes
towards unions, individual characteristics, campaign characteristics, and the organizing
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climate. Although older, these early studies still form the basis for much of the
philosophical tone and research designs of today.
Bronfenbrenner and colleagues (1998) in Organizing to Win: New Research on
Union Strategies and others (e.g., Youngblood et al., 1984) have criticized these earlier
studies as reflecting voter intent rather than results of the election. As further detailed in
Chapter Two, studies conducted since then addressing workplace elections also typically
reflect the strategies, messaging, and communication tactics of the union without regard
to the same options for the corresponding employer in the midst of the election conflict.
Employers face a problem—with strong financial consequences—of a lack of structured
guidance for their own strategies for this very costly workplace representation election
system. This mixed methods study was designed to address that problem as summarized
below.
Problem Statement
The financial consequences of a failed campaign, coupled with an employer’s
lack of NLRB election sophistication and experience, complicates an employer’s
selection of messages and tactics for use in the conflict inherent within the workplace
representation election system. Employers’ lack of experience and competence in the
confliassociated with workplace representation elections make them an easy target for
real or fomented conflict. More often than not employers are left to rely on consultants
and persuaders to respond in this contentious conflict environment, rather than attempting
to devise their own untested communication strategies. The messages and tactics utilized
by campaign consultants are driven by anecdotal and qualitative rather than quantitative
information supporting the likelihood of campaign success. There is a need for
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quantitative and qualitative data to knowledgeably inform employers’ consideration of
useful and effective messages and tactics in a workplace representation election.
Purpose Statement
This mixed methods research study developed a conceptual model to provide
guidance that would assist employers’ decisions regarding messaging and communication
tactics during conflicts associated with workplace representation elections.
Research Questions
This study’s five research questions (RQ) asked:
RQ1 – Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in
NLRB elections?
RQ2 – Do contested or stipulated elections favor employers in NLRB elections?
RQ3 – What type of messages result in an increase of the vote in favor of the
employer in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections?
RQ4 – What modalities of communication tactics result in an increase of the vote
in favor of the employer in NLRB elections?
RQ5 – Does relying on a campaign consultant increase the vote in favor of the
employer in NLRB elections?
Null Hypotheses: There is no significant predictor for NLRB election votes in
favor of the employer by election periods, contested or stipulated elections, type of
messages, modalities of communication tactics, or use of campaign consultant.
Nature of the Study
Informed by prior studies as discussed in Chapter Two, the investigator selected a
mixed methods research design. According to Creswell (2013), in order to more fully
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understand a particular topic of study, mixed methods research valuably combines the
advantages of two approaches, those of qualitative research methods to explore a specific
phenomenon, and those of quantitative methods that can provide statistical information
informing causality, prediction, or generalizability. For this study of worker
representation elections conflict the investigator conducted an explanatory sequential
research design (Creswell, 2013), utilizing first quantitative and then qualitative
analytical processes. Specifically, as diagrammed below in Figure 4 this study’s
explanatory sequence research design consisted of: 1) a quantitative analysis of over 300
elections, 2) supported by a detailed analysis of a survey of messages and communication
tactics in 32 of said elections, and 3) further informed with qualitative interviews of
subject matter experts.

Figure 4. Voice of the Employer© study's mixed methods research design.
The independent variables identified as employer messaging and communication
tactics were informed by prior research featured within the literature review. These
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messaging and communication tactics, identified as the independent variables, were then
included in both the survey and the interviews of the subject matter experts, to assess
their impact on the identified dependent variable, election outcome. Specific steps taken
to conduct and integrate this study’s triangulation of research components are further
detailed in Chapter Three.
Definitions
There are a substantial number of phrases as well as legal and technical jargon
that are unique to the workplace representation system. A list of these terms along with
operational definitions are included in a glossary within Appendix A.
Assumptions
The study assumed that the inclusion of a third-party labor organization [union]
inserted between the employer and its employees acts to escalate conflict, as it is the
workplace conflict itself which justifies the third party’s inclusion. Consequently, it was
assumed that the third-party labor organization seeks to foment workplace conflict in
order to justify its existence and create added value in the workplace. This circular loop
of fomenting and resolving conflict can be a continuing outgrowth of an employer loss in
a workplace representation election.
The study also assumed that the employer representative responding to the survey
had knowledge of the workplace representation election in question and followed
instructions included within the survey or interview. It was also assumed that the
employer is the foremost authority to explain the employer’s actions during a workplace
representation election. Finally, this study assumed that all parties within the workplace
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representation election will act within their own self-interest to achieve an election
victory.
Scope and Delimitations
The focal period of this study of workplace representation elections was limited to
April 14, 2015 to May 1, 2017. This period represents the major portion of the effective
period of the 2015 election rule; the defined studied period occurred prior to the
announcement of the Dec 18, 2019 revisions to the current election system.
There are many decisions which employers must make during the workplace
representation election process; under the April 2015 election system revisions employers
had very little time to do so. Along with messaging and communication tactics, the
employer must also decide whether to employ consultants and lawyers to guide the
employer’s campaign decisions. Deciding whether to hire consultants or lawyers has
important consequential financial ramifications; this research study’s collected
quantitative and qualitative data contributes insight into the employers’ related election
campaign decisions. This study also yielded data providing insight into whether an
employer’s election outcome is influenced by the duration of the election itself, as well as
the employer’s decision whether to stipulate or contest the union’s proposed bargaining
unit.
Significance of the Study
Given the potential costs associated with an employer’s loss of a workplace
representation election, the potential significance of this study’s proposed evidence-based
conceptual model to guide employer messaging and communication tactics and thereby
win workplace representation elections is invaluable, if not incalculable. The study’s
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incorporation of the employer’s perspective enabled the researcher’s findings and
recommendations that will contribute to knowledge for scholars, policy makers, and labor
relations practitioners alike, in anticipation of ample opportunities for testing of the
study’s contributions in future elections.
Summary
The National Labor Relations Act (the Act) was passed in 1935, and its
regulations have been the subject of some of the most violent and intense workplace
conflict for over 80 years. The Act has been revised in only a few instances with the most
significant revision occurring in April 2015, and again recently on December 18, 2019.
As detailed below in Chapter Two, while there is substantial research and literature
supporting and informing employees’ and unions’ election decisions, unfortunately they
have not sourced reliable data from employers regarding NLRB election messaging and
communication tactics. This research study’s findings contribute to the academic body of
knowledge by including an ignored perspective, that of the employer. Additionally, the
findings developed in this study were designed to assist employers in their allocation of
dollars to efficiently and effectively achieve election victories. The researcher believes
that the cost savings to employers associated with awareness and implementation of this
study’s findings and recommendations are significant.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This study addressed the organizational conflict inherent within workplace
representation elections, which determine whether a union will intervene in the
relationship between an employer and its employees. The purpose of this study’s research
design was to utilize a mixed methods approach to gather and analyze data, thereby
providing guidance that would assist employers’ decisions regarding messaging and
communication tactics during conflicts associated with workplace representation
elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board or NLRB (hereinafter, a.k.a.
“NLRB elections”).
The foundational theories, data, and practical information upon which this
research study relied are contained in this literature review of previously published
findings on the topic of conflict inherent within workplace representation elections.
While much has been studied about why employees join unions and why unions are
successful in workplace representation elections, relatively little research exists on the
employers’ successful strategies during workplace representation elections. A review of
the available literature revealed that information regarding employer strategies relied
upon therein was not sourced from the employer, as discussed below.
This literature review synthesizes the perspectives of scholars, researchers,
practitioners, and most importantly, both sides’ perspectives on the conflict within
workplace representation elections. A review of the literature details the system
associated with the workplace representation election procedures as outlined in the
regulations for the National Labor Relations Act (nlrb.gov; see Higgins, Jr., 2019). The
government agency tasked with the responsibility of regulating these workplace
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representation elections is the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), formed in 1935
by the National Labor Relations Act.
In June of 2011 the University of California Berkeley Labor Center published an
article entitled “New Data: NLRB Process Fails to Ensure a Fair Vote,” declaring that the
NLRB’s workplace election system—in place since 1947—was biased against unions.
The article summarized Kate Bronfenbrenner’s 2009 study entitled “No Holds Barred:
The Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing,” among others, and succinctly
noted that “the current NLRB election process fails to ensure that workers can freely
form unions” (Logan, Johansson, & Lamare, 2011, p. 1). In response to the
Bronfenbrenner 2009 study and many other calls for reform, in April 2015 the system for
workplace representation elections was significantly overhauled at the urging of unions,
which at the time enjoyed a 60% plus win rate (McConville, 2015). The 2015 revised
election rules were met with much derision by employers, and the 2015 revised election
system began to take on the moniker of “ambush elections” (Iafolla, 2020a, para. 7),
since unions now could determine whenever and however long they would like to start
campaigning to unionize. Once the union decided to notify the employer formally
through a petition for election, an election could in theory be held within 10 calendar
days (Kanu, 2018a; Yager, 2015).
Employers have contended the 2015 “ambush” election system prioritized the
speed of the election in order to limit the time employers have to respond to the union’s
campaign, which has no time constraints since a union can file a petition whenever filing
is convenient for the union. After changes in the political party leading the executive
branch of the federal government in 2016, the NLRB switched from a majority of
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Democrat members to a majority of Republicans. This Republican composition of the
NLRB sought to overturn many of the revisions made in the prior Democratic
administration (Detrick, 2017). In December 2017 the NLRB published a notice
accepting public comment on revisions to the election system revised in 2015. Over
7,000 different comments were received, providing advice and guidance on whether
change was needed and what changes should occur (Iafolla, 2018). One employer
organization summarized the 2015 “ambush election” amendments as follows:
This rule was designed to ambush both workers and employers in an effort to tip
the scales in favor of unions at the expense of open debate. The rule degrades the
election process by blocking employers’ due process rights and workers’ ability to
hear from both sides during an organizing drive. The NLRB now has an
opportunity to undo this inappropriate rulemaking and reestablish balance in
representation elections. (Coalition for a Democratic Workplace, 2018, p. 1; see
also Hayes, Duffield & Kisicki, 2018)
Despite the interests of employers and those of over 7,000 commenters, the
NLRB in 2018 prioritized changing the 2015 election system as sometime in the “long
term agenda” in order to prioritize other matters (Kanu, 2018b, p. 1). Nonetheless and to
the surprise of many, the NLRB on December 18, 2019 issued a final rule revising the
April 2015 system. This literature review outlines both the 2015 election system as well
as the relevant significant changes for representation elections announced December 18,
2019, initially effective April 16, 2020. The status of the effective date of the revisions
may however be in doubt, as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) recently filed a lawsuit on March 6, 2020, in the U.S. District
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Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the NLRB violated administrative law by
issuing the election revisions without utilizing the rulemaking process (Iafolla, 2020c).
Once a review of the literature revealed the established rules, regulations, and the
winners and losers in the workplace conflict here studied, the researcher examined
theories that support victories for the employees and their union as well as those theories
that support victories for the employers. The literature reviewed included the only
textbook offering strategy, messaging, and communication tactics for employers: Don
Wilson’s (1998) Total Victory! The Complete Management Guide to a Successful NLRB
Representation Election. The literature reviewed also featured prior quantitative studies
on election outcomes, comprised of data gathered and analyzed from the perspective of
the union organizer(s). This data was the subject of comparison with this dissertation’s
collected data, gathered and analyzed to reflect the employers’ viewpoint.
Governing System for Workplace Representation Elections
Much of the research and general explanations for the rules governing workplace
representation elections were available online and in the literature as provided directly by
NLRB regional directors. However, the most detailed information came directly from the
regulations as published by the NLRB and available to the public on its website
www.nlrb.gov. A fact sheet and the published request for information can also be found
at: https://www.nlrb.gov/news-publications/publications/fact-sheets/nlrb-representationcase-procedures-fact-sheet. A visual flowchart diagram of the NLRB workplace
representation system is included below as Figure 5, for an overview of how union
representation is approved or denied by voting employees.
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Figure 5. NLRB representation case system process flow.
Source: https://mysullys.com/elecction-flow-chart/the-nlrb-process-nlrb-6/
The system described in Figure 5 has been in existence for decades; it is the system under
which many labor relations professionals were trained and have become accustomed to
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navigating. The 2015 revisions upended that system with the net effect of speeding up the
election process (Ferguson, 2018).
Because both the 2015 and the December 2019 election procedures are relatively
recent, there existed very little corresponding research on representation elections in peerreviewed journals. There was, however, a substantial amount of information published by
law firms, consultants, professors, and other practitioners in the labor relations
profession. This literature review included information from these practical applied
sources as well as information directly from the NLRB itself. A chart published by the
NLRB on its website, here reproduced as Table 1, provides a comparison of the election
system in place before and after the 2015 changes.
Table 1
Comparison of Pre-2015 and Revised 2015 Procedures
Pre-2015 Procedures

New 2015 Procedures

Election petitions, election notices and voter
Parties cannot electronically file election
lists can be transmitted electronically. NLRB
petitions. Parties and NLRB regional
regional offices can deliver notices and
offices do not electronically transmit
documents electronically, rather than by
certain representation case documents.
mail.
The parties and prospective voters
receive limited information.

Parties will receive a more detailed
description of the Agency’s representation
case procedures, as well as a Statement of
Position form, when served with the petition.
The Statement of Position will help parties
identify the issues they may want to raise at
the pre-election hearing. A Notice of Petition
for Election, which will be served with the
Notice of Hearing, will provide employees
and the employer with information about the
petition and their rights and obligations. The
Notice of Election will provide prospective
voters with more detailed information about
the voting process.
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Pre-2015 Procedures

New 2015 Procedures

The parties cannot predict when a pre- or The Regional Director will generally set a
post-election hearing will be held because pre-election hearing to begin 8 days after a
practices vary by Region.
hearing notice is served and a post-election
hearing 21 days after the tally of ballots.
Non petitioning parties are required to
identify any issues they have with the
petition, in their Statements of Positions,
generally one business day before the preThere is no mechanism for requiring election hearing opens. The petitioner will
parties to identify issues in dispute.
be required to respond to any issue raised by
the non-petitioning parties in their
Statements of Positions at the beginning of
the hearing. Litigation inconsistent with
these positions will generally not be allowed.
The employer is not required to share a
list of prospective voters with the
NLRB’s regional office or the other
parties until after the regional director
directs an election or approves an
election agreement.

As part of its Statement of Position, the
employer must provide a list of prospective
voters with their job classifications, shifts
and work locations, to the NLRB’s regional
office and the other parties, generally one
business day before the pre-election hearing
opens. This will help the parties narrow the
issues in dispute at the hearing or enter into
an election agreement.

The purpose of the pre-election hearing is
clearly defined and parties will generally
litigate only those issues that are necessary
Parties may insist on litigating voter
to determine whether it is appropriate to
eligibility and inclusion issues that do not conduct an election. Litigation of a small
have to be resolved in order to determine number of eligibility and inclusion issues
whether an election should be held.
that do not have to be decided before the
election may be deferred to the post-election
stage. Those issues will often be mooted by
the election results.
Parties will be provided with an opportunity
Parties may file a brief within 7 days of
to argue orally before the close of the hearing
the closing of the pre-election hearing,
and written briefs will be allowed only if the
with permissive extensions of 14 days or
regional director determines they are
more.
necessary.
Parties waive their right to challenge the Parties may wait to see whether the election
regional director’s pre-election decision if results have made the need to file a request
they do not file a request for review before for review of the regional director’s pre-
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Pre-2015 Procedures

New 2015 Procedures

the election. This requires parties to election decision unnecessary and they do not
appeal issues that may be rendered moot waive their right to seek review of that
by the election results.
decision if they decide to file their request
after the election.
Elections are delayed 25-30 days to
allow the Board to consider any request
for review of the regional director’s
decision that may be filed. This is so
even though such requests are rarely
filed, even more rarely granted and
almost never result in a stay of the
election.
The Board is required to review every
aspect of most post-election disputes,
regardless of whether any party has
objected to it.
The voter list provided to non-employer
parties to enable them to communicate
with voters about the election includes
only names and home addresses. The
employer must submit the list within 7
days of the approval of an election
agreement or the regional director’s
decision directing an election.

There will be no automatic stay of an
election.

The Board is not required to review aspects
of post-election regional decisions as to
which no party has raised an issue, and may
deny review consistent with the discretion it
has long exercised in reviewing pre-election
rulings.
The voter list will also include personal
phone numbers and email addresses (if
available to the employer). The employer
must submit the list within 2 business days
of the regional director’s approval of an
election agreement or decision directing an
election.

Note. https://www.nlrb.gov/news-publications/publications/fact-sheets/nlrbrepresentation-case-procedures-fact-sheet
While the NLRB again elected to provide an overview of the 15 major changes
included within its 302-page lengthy revisions of December 18, 2019, the Board did so in
narrative form rather than in a chart, as was provided for the 2015 revisions (NLRB,
2019):
1. The pre-election hearing will generally be scheduled to open 14 business days
from notice of the hearing, and regional directors will have discretion to
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postpone the opening of the hearing for good cause. Under the prior rules, preelection hearings were generally scheduled to open 8 calendar days from the
notice of hearing. The additional time will permit parties to more easily
manage the obligations imposed on them by the filing of a petition and to
better prepare for the hearing, thus promoting orderly litigation. The
additional time is also necessary to accommodate changes to the Statement of
Position requirement (summarized below); in conjunction with those changes,
the additional time will also help facilitate election agreements and further
promote orderly litigation.
2. The employer will now be required to post and distribute the Notice of
Petition for Election within 5 business days after service of the notice of
hearing. The prior rules required posting and distribution within 2 business
days. The additional time will permit employers to balance this requirement
with the other obligations imposed on them by the filing of a petition, and—in
conjunction with the additional time between the notice and opening of the
hearing—will guarantee that employees and parties have the benefit of the
Notice of Petition for Election for a longer period of time prior to the opening
of the hearing than is currently the case.
3. Non-petitioning parties are now required to file and serve the Statement of
Position within 8 business days after service of the notice of hearing, and
regional directors will have the discretion to permit additional time for filing
and service for good cause. Non-petitioning parties were formerly required to
file and serve the Statement of Position 1 day before the opening of the pre-
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election hearing (typically 7 calendar days after service of the notice of
hearing). The additional time will permit non-petitioning parties more time to
balance this requirement with the other obligations imposed on them by the
filing of a petition, and it will also permit them slightly more time to prepare
the Statement of Position, which will in turn promote orderly litigation.
4. The petitioner will also be required to file and serve a Statement of Position
on the other parties responding to the issues raised by any non-petitioning
party in a Statement of Position. The responsive Statement of Position will be
due at noon 3 business days before the hearing is scheduled to open (which is
also 3 business days after the initial Statement(s) of Position must be
received). Timely amendments to the responsive statement may be made on a
showing of good cause. The prior rules required the petitioner to respond
orally to the Statement(s) of Position at the start of the pre-election hearing.
Requiring the response in writing prior to the hearing will facilitate election
agreements or result in more orderly litigation by narrowing and focusing the
issues to be litigated at the pre-election hearing.
5. Although acknowledging that the primary purpose of the pre-election hearing
is to determine whether there is a question of representation, disputes
concerning unit scope and voter eligibility—including issues of supervisory
status—will now normally be litigated at the pre-election hearing and resolved
by the regional director before an election is directed. The parties may,
however, agree to permit disputed employees to vote subject to challenge,
thereby deferring litigation concerning such disputes until after the election.
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The prior rules provided that disputes “concerning individuals' eligibility to
vote or inclusion in an appropriate unit ordinarily need not be litigated or
resolved before an election is conducted.” The final rule represents a return to
the Board's procedures prior to the 2014 amendments, and it will promote fair
and accurate voting as well as transparency by better defining the unit in
question prior to the election. Further, by encouraging regional directors to
resolve issues such as supervisory status prior to directing an election, the
final rule will give better guidance to the employees and parties and will help
avoid conduct that may give rise to objections or unfair labor practices. At the
same time, expressly permitting the parties to agree to defer litigation on such
issues continues to honor the Act's fundamental interest in encouraging
agreement between parties where possible, which promotes promptness and
efficiency. The choice is theirs, not mandated by the Board.
6. The right of parties to file a post-hearing brief with the regional director
following pre-election hearings has been restored and extended to postelection hearings as well. Such briefs will be due within 5 business days of the
close of the hearing, although hearing officers may grant an extension of up to
10 additional business days for good cause. Under the prior rules, such briefs
were permitted only upon special permission of the regional director.
Permitting such briefs as a matter of right after all hearings will enable parties
more time to craft and narrow their arguments, which will in turn assist the
regional director (and the hearing officer, in post-election proceedings) in
focusing on the critical facts, issues, and arguments, thereby promoting
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orderly litigation and more efficient resolution of disputes. Extending the right
to file post-hearing briefs to post-election proceedings also promotes
uniformity.
7. The regional director's discretion to issue a Notice of Election subsequent to
issuing a direction of election is emphasized. The prior rules provided that
regional directors “ordinarily will” specify election details in the direction of
election. Reemphasizing the regional directors' discretion in this area will
eliminate confusion that may have led to unnecessary litigation and may
facilitate faster issuance of decisions and directions of election in some cases,
although the Board anticipates that regional directors will still “ordinarily”
include the election details in the direction of election.
8. The regional director will continue to schedule the election for the earliest
date practicable, but—absent waiver by the parties—normally will not
schedule an election before the 20th business day after the date of the
direction of election. As explained in item nine below, this period will permit
the Board to rule upon certain types of requests for review prior to the
election. The prior rules simply provided that the regional director “shall
schedule the election for the earliest date practicable.” The final rule is largely
consistent with Board procedures prior to the 2014 amendments, which
provided that the regional director would normally schedule an election 25 to
30 days after the issuance of the direction of election. Permitting the Board to
rule on disputes prior to the election will reduce the number of cases in which
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issues remain unresolved at the time of the election, thereby promoting
orderly litigation and fair and accurate voting.
9. Where a request for review of a direction of election is filed within 10
business days of that direction, if the Board has not ruled on the request, or
has granted it, before the conclusion of the election, ballots whose validity
might be affected by the Board's ruling on the request or decision on review
will be segregated and all ballots will be impounded and remain unopened
pending such ruling or decision. A party may still file a request for review of a
direction of election more than 10 business days after the direction, but the
pendency of such a request for review will not require impoundment of the
ballots. This represents a partial return to the Board's procedures prior to the
2014 amendments, which removed the provision for automatic impoundment.
By reinstating automatic impoundment in these narrow circumstances, the
final rule promotes transparency by removing the possibility for confusion if a
tally of ballots issues but is then affected by the Board's subsequent ruling on
the pending request for review. Consistent with the 2014 amendments,
however, parties remain free to wait to file a request for review until after the
election has been conducted and the ballots counted. By preserving this
option, which encourages parties to wait to see whether the results of the
election moot the issues for which they would otherwise seek review, the final
rule also continues to promote efficiency.
10. Formatting and procedural requirements for all types of requests for reviews
have been systematized. All requests for review and oppositions thereto are
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now subject to the same formatting requirements. Oppositions are now
explicitly permitted in response to requests for review filed pursuant to
§ 102.71. And the practice of permitting replies to oppositions and briefs on
review only upon special leave of the Board has been codified. All of these
provisions are consistent with the Board's longstanding practice and promote
transparency and uniformity.
11. A party may not request review of only part of a regional director's action in
one request for review and subsequently request review of another part of that
same action. The prior rule was not clear whether parties were permitted to
proceed in such a fashion. Disallowing such a piecemeal approach promotes
orderly litigation, administrative efficiency, and more expeditious resolution
of disputes.
12. The employer now has 5 business days to furnish the required voter list
following the issuance of the direction of election. Under the prior rule, the
employer had only 2 business days to provide the list. Permitting additional
time for the voter list will increase the accuracy of such lists, promoting
transparency and efficiency at the election and reducing the possibility of
litigation over the list.
13. In selecting election observers, whenever possible a party will now select a
current member of the voting unit; when no such individual is available, a
party should select a current nonsupervisory employee. The prior rules simply
provide that parties may be represented by observers. Providing guidance for
the selection of observers promotes uniformity and transparency and will
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reduce litigation over parties' choices of observers and thus promote
administrative efficiency.
14. The regional director will no longer certify the results of an election if a
request for review is pending or before the time has passed during which a
request for review could be filed. Under the prior rules, regional directors
were required to certify election results despite the pendency or possibility of
a request for review; indeed, in cases where a certification issued, requests for
review could be filed up until 14 days after the issuance of the certification.
As a result, a certified union would often demand bargaining and file unfair
labor practice charges alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain even as the
Board considered a request for review that, if granted, could render the
certification a nullity. By eliminating the issuance of certifications until after a
request for review has been ruled on, or until after the time for filing a request
for review has passed, the final rule eliminates confusion among the parties
and employees and promotes orderly litigation of both representation and
consequent unfair labor practice cases. To promote transparency and
uniformity, the final rule also provides a definition of “final disposition.”
15. The final rule also makes a number of incidental changes in terminology, and
updates internal cross-references, consistent with earlier changes that were
effective on March 6, 2017(see 82 FR 11748). In addition, for the sake of
uniformity and transparency within the representation case procedures, the
Board has converted all time periods in subpart D to business days, and it has
also updated § 102.2(a) to define how business days are calculated, including
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clarification that only federal holidays are implicated in time period
calculations (NLRB, 2019)
Since 1947 there have been three methods by which a workplace is unionized:
1. Most employees vote to be unionized through a workplace representation
election overseen by the NLRB, the subject of this research study;
2. A majority of employees sign cards authorizing the union as their
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining, and the employer
recognizes the union’s majority status voluntarily (Schwartz, 2003); and
3. By acquiring a previously unionized workforce, where the acquiring employer
becomes a successor employer and is required to recognize the union. (see
NLRB v. Burns, 1972)
Of the foregoing listed methods, the most complicated is unionization through a
workplace representation election overseen by the NLRB. To petition for an election, a
group of employees, or a union, must obtain authorization card signatures from at least
30% of an appropriate unit within the workplace to authorize the union as their
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining. To obtain authorization cards
from the required minimum of 30% of an appropriate unit within the workplace, it is
necessary for the union to solicit employees’ signatures. Figure 6 is an example of an
authorization card utilized by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers union:

36

Figure 6. Example of union representation authorization card.
Source: http://ibewlu363.org/htdocs/index.html
There is not now nor has there ever been a requirement that unions notify
management that an organizing campaign of authorization card signing is underway.
Most unions attempt to conduct their organizing without the employer’s knowledge, in
what employers typically refer to as an “ambush election” (Hayes et al., 2018). Reclaim
Democracy, an organization opposed to corporate influence, published Walmart’s
guidance to managers for responding to union organizing. In “Walmart: A Manager’s
Toolbox to Remaining Union Free,” Walmart advises its managers that: “Most union
organizing will begin as ‘covert’ (undercover) activity. By keeping all union activity
covert, the organizer is hoping management will not be alerted to his/her organizing
efforts” (http://reclaimdemocracy.org). In his book A Troublemaker’s Handbook: How to
Fight Back Where You Work and Win, author Dan La Botz (1991) extensively addressed
the strategies and procedures for influencing employees to sign union authorization cards.
Numerous additional literature sources provided insight into the tactics that
unions use to obtain signatures on authorization cards. In one example, Professors Ruth
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Milkman of UCLA and Kim Voss of UC Berkeley (2004) wrote Rebuilding Labor:
Organizing and Organizers in the New Union Movement to provide specific guidance to
unions on organizing messaging and tactics to obtain the required 30%. The first chapter
featured Kate Bronfenbrenner’s 2004 study “Changing to Organize: A National
Assessment of Union Organizing Strategies”, which prophetically summarized the future:
The coming years will be a period of enormous risk and challenges for the
American labor movement. Almost all unions, locally and nationally, understand
that both their political power and their bargaining power will be severely
undermined unless they organize on a massive scale across every sector of the
economy. (Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, 2004, p. 53)
This literature review conducted for this study primarily focused on what occurs
after a sufficient showing of interests (a minimum 30% of an appropriate unit) is
obtained. Often it is only after the petition is filed publicly with the NLRB that an
employer first becomes aware of the union organizing campaign. In her article “Three
Lessons for Winning in November and Beyond: What Union Organizers can Teach
Democrats,” Jane McAlevey (2018) noted that the workplace representation election
system “makes people associate the unionization election itself with the pain and
discomfort of the polarized, harsh language coming at them from all sides: ‘The sooner
the election goes away the better they will feel’” (p. 1). The language McAlevey used to
describe the election process validates the notion of organizational conflict inherent
within representation elections. Pain, discomfort, polarized and harsh language—all are
descriptions which Galtung (1967) himself might characterize as both direct and
structured violence.
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Understanding that the company will likely campaign against unionization, most
unions file their petition with well over 30% of an appropriate unit. A study by Mehta and
Theodore (2005) entitled Undermining the Right to Organize: Employer Behavior During
Union Representation Campaigns found that in over 91% of the workplace representation
elections studied, the union filed its petition for election with over 50% of the workers
having signed authorization cards denoting their interest in authorizing the union to
represent their interests in collective bargaining.
Companies vary in the extent of their acceptance of the unions’ right to organize
the employer’s employees. Some employers have a reputation for fighting stringently
against employee unionization (Greenhouse, 2015). In one example, Gizmodo magazine
analyzed Amazon’s “anti-union” tactics in a 45-minute video. Illustrating Amazon’s
“anti-union” approach, according to Gizmodo, the video quotes Amazon as saying: “We
do not believe unions are in the best interest of our customers, our shareholders, or most
importantly, our associates. Our business model is built upon speed, innovation, and
customer obsession—things that are generally not associated with unions” (Menegus,
2018, p. 1). Similarly, John Mackey, the co-founder and CEO of Whole Foods, described
his opinion of unions: “The union is like having herpes. It doesn’t kill you, but it’s
unpleasant and inconvenient and it stops a lot of people from becoming your lover”
(Keller, 2013, p. 1). Robert Slater (2003), author of the The Wal-Mart Decade: How a
New Generation of Leaders Turned Sam Walton's Legacy into the World's #1 Company,
claimed that “[Sam Walton] would not permit anyone to unionize a store, passing word
that he would rather close the place than accept unions” (p. 33). It is perhaps the
vehement assertions of Walmart’s founder that act as a catalyst to organizing activity, and
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for many, it is personal. As the largest private business in the world, Walmart is indicative
of employers’ response to organizing activity, and therefore attracts union organizing
campaigns from multiple unions (Hemphill, 2008).
According to union organizing consultant Jason Mann (2012), unions:
… aim to have at least 60% of cards signed prior to filing a certification
application. Generally, through employer interference, [unions’] support level will
drop by 10 percentage points. To have a shot at getting 50% of the vote [unions]
can’t go in with less than 60% of cards signed at the application [for a petition for
election]. (p. 11)
A 2005 study of workplace representation elections revealed that in 31% of the
elections studied, the union and workers abandoned their organizing campaign after
management became aware of the organizing effort, which then prompted the union to
withdraw their petition without a vote (Mehta & Theodore, 2005).
Much of the strategy of collecting signatures for authorization cards is conducted
by what Cornell University professors Fletcher and Hurd (1998) referred to as volunteer
internal organizers. These are typically unpaid organizers who are employees of the
subject employer. Their chief objective is to obtain as many signed authorization cards
without the knowledge of the employer (Bronfenbrenner, 1998). Figure 7 presents an
example of guidance provided to organizers from the Laborers International Union,
explaining the need for organizing secrecy and advising them to “Keep it Quiet.”
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Figure 7. Laborers' union advice on ambush organizing: Keep it quiet!
Source: http://www.liunalocal1290pe.com/Local1290PE/Organizing
It is this secretive and non-transparent approach to workplace organizing that is
most onerous to employers. A systems theorist might suggest a solution requiring unions
to publicly register their card-signing campaign with the NLRB, thereby enabling
employees and the employer to campaign simultaneously. The NLRB subsequently could
prohibit elections in circumstances where the card signing period was not publicly
announced to employers and employees and other stakeholders. This would resolve the
problem of a lack of transparency by unions. In the current system a union can campaign
indefinitely without the knowledge of the employer, and the signed authorization cards
are good for approximately one year (Knuth, 2017). Consequently, the union can
campaign secretly; once it is both the most optimal time for the union and the most
disadvantaged time for an employer’s business operations, the union can file a petition
for election and “ambush” the employer with a short election period.
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It is the unions’ ability to disadvantage the employer with the unscheduled
distraction from the organizational mission that potentially has been the cause of the
union’s tremendous election success rate. Petitioning for a union election just before
Christmas or Black Friday is an ideal strategy for unions attempting to organize retail
employers. A system theorist might suggest a strategy for equilibrium that mandates
elections must be spread out or available during only certain portions of the year. Unions
themselves recognize the value of this system control, as evidenced by the common union
practice that only allows members to withdraw their membership from the union for just
one specified month per year (Wallender, 2019). This system control enhancement would
create efficiencies within the system, as it eliminates surprise and creates more
transparency and predictable demands upon the election system and the actors within it.
This forces the employer to reprioritize its business operations as was required by the
2015 revisions, since it must respond to the election within two days and the election vote
can occur within as little as 10 days (Yager, 2015).
In its response to the NLRB’s Request for Information regarding the 2015 revised
election procedures (Griffin & NLRB, 2015), the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) solicited Craig Becker, a former
member of the NLRB’s five member board, who admitted that “the [2015] amendments
shortened the time between petition and election” (Becker & Rhinehart, 2017, p. 3). In
the AFL-CIO’s most recent study of workplace representation elections, John-Paul
Ferguson (2018) analyzed 2.5 years of data collected both before and after the 2015
amended election system was revised. In a report entitled “Assessing the Impact of the
April 2005 [sic] Amendments To the NLRB Representation Case Procedures,” Ferguson
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found that “it becomes immediately obvious there was a major reduction (nearly half) in
election lag (elapsed time between petition and vote) in the immediate wake of the rule
change. The reduction happened quickly and persisted for the rest of the study period” (p.
2).
Understanding that it is one of the most significant decisions a worker will make
in their entire career, companies seek to provide as much information about unions as
possible during the short period of what employers refer to as the “ambush” election
system. A systems theorist would lengthen rather than shorten the time to allow for an
election. If the mark of a righteous argument is one comfortable with scrutiny, then the
system should allow for robust debate on what may be the most important decision a
worker will make in their career. Put succinctly, once an employer becomes aware of the
card-signing activity, an employer response is imminent (Hurd, 2004; Hurd & Uehlein,
1994). A systems theorist might suggest a minimum 42-day election period to create
equal input by both sides of the election conflict. The 2015 election system enabled one
party—the union—to obtain a system advantage by capitalizing on a lack of transparency
of its campaign, followed by a quickie election. A minimum 42-day campaign, the
average of the election cycle time prior to the 2015 revised election system, provided a
historically adequate electioneering period, even though unions won in excess of 60% of
the elections. The 2020 revisions to the election system add greater transparency to the
election by extending the time period for electioneering by all parties (see National Labor
Relations Board, 2019, p. 69525).
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Election Messaging by Employers
Much has been written regarding the content, tone, pace, and structure of the
employer’s response to the union’s petition for election. There are few accounts of
campaign tactics as bombastic as those of the self-described unethical union buster
Martin Jay Levitt. His co-authored book Confessions of a Union Buster was a hot seller
among union circles and contains a compendium of “dirty tricks” he employed in his 18year career as a consultant to employers during workplace representation election
campaigns (Levitt & Conrow, 1993).
Perhaps one of the most successful organizations providing consultation to
employers involved in workplace representation elections is the Labor Relations Institute.
Its founder Donald P. Wilson in 1998 literally wrote the book on how employers should
respond. Entitled Total Victory! The Complete Management Guide to a Successful NLRB
Representation Election, Wilson’s approach truly does cover all facets of the election
process. The majority of the employers’ messaging and communication tactics identified
and examined as independent variables in this research study are listed in Wilson’s 1998
book.
Once a group of employees or a union files a petition for election, the NLRB
requires the union to submit its minimum 30% sufficient showing of interest to process
the petition for election. In the interim, the NLRB requires the union to then notify the
employer that a petition for an election has been filed. Then the NLRB seeks the
employer’s position on whether it stipulates (agrees) or contests the union’s petitioned
appropriate unit of employees. Specifically, the NLRB seeks to know whether the
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employer accepts the list of job titles of employees who should vote in a workplace
representation election on whether to accept union representation.
If the employer and the union agree on the appropriate unit, an “uncontested” or
“stipulated” election is then scheduled (NLRB, 2016). If the employer and the union do
not stipulate to the appropriate unit, a contested election will occur. This means that it is
necessary for the NLRB to determine the appropriate unit of employees. To do so, the
NLRB will conduct what is referred to as an “R Case” (representation case). As described
in the NLRB’s Casehandling Manual (2017) in section 11428, the NLRB takes testimony
and evidence from both the union and the employer to decide which employees will be
eligible to vote in an appropriate unit. Typically, these R Case hearings are held at the
office of the NLRB and can last anywhere from a portion of a day to several weeks. After
the last portion of testimony is taken, both parties historically each could submit a written
brief outlining legal support for its position. However, the 2015 revised rules did not
require the hearing officer to allow post-hearing briefs from the parties. Again, a systems
theorist would suggest that the adjudicator of the election conflict should not
disadvantage either’s system input and consequently should be required to enable both
parties to the hearing to submit post-hearing legal briefs. The December 2019 revised
rules did exactly this and adopted a systems theory approach, creating equilibrium
through increased rather than decreased information for the decisions that are to be made
during elections.
The NLRB’s Casehandling Manual (2017) states that the NLRB will then
consider the testimony from the hearing, along with written briefs if appropriate, and
render a decision on the appropriate unit (Section 11430). This decision is referred to as a
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Decision and Order (Direction to Election) and is explained in detail in Section 11436.
The NLRB’s decision also includes notification regarding the date on which the election
will be held as well as the manner of the vote (e.g., voting on the premises, mail ballot). A
systems theorist would suggest that all elections be held on the premises of the employer
where the employees work. This enables the NLRB personnel that remains on the
premises for the vote to monitor the election and electioneering behavior. Such controls
do not exist with mail ballots. Before the 2015 revised election rule changes, the goal was
that the election would be held within 42 days of the petition for election filing. Since the
2015 revised election rule, the time allowed for employers to campaign has been cut
nearly in half (Ferguson, 2018). The newly revised 2020 rules will certainly allow more
time for all parties to campaign during the election.
After the Decision and Order (Direction to Election) is issued, the NLRB provides
the employer with posters in the workplace to notify the voters within the appropriate unit
of the election location and date. Most of the time this election is held on the employer’s
premises, often in training rooms, conference rooms, or even warehouses. The hearing
officer has the discretion though to order alternative means to vote, including mail
ballots.
Once the Decision and Order (Direction to Election) has been issued by the
NLRB, both parties—the union and the employer company—begin their campaigns in
earnest (Bergeron, 2008).
On the day of the election, to coordinate the election the NLRB seeks the
assistance of observers that are designated by both the employer and the union. These
observers are required to be employees of the employer and they serve as the first point
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of contact when a voting employee enters the voting area. The voting employee will
approach the observers, who review the list of names within the appropriate unit to
determine the eligibility of the voting employee. If either the union or the employer’s
observers feel that the voting employee is not eligible to vote, each can challenge the
ballot of the voting employee. If the voting employee is to vote a challenged ballot, the
employee receives a ballot from the NLRB (see Figure 8 below) and then walks to the
voting booth.

Figure 8. Sample NLRB official secret ballot.
Source: http://sternburgerwithfries.blogspot.com/2015/02/seiu-uhws-dave-regan-losesanother-nlrb.html
After marking their ballot, the voting employee then places the ballot in an envelope
rather than in a ballot box, and provides this envelope to the Election Coordinator from
the NLRB. The coordinator ensures the envelope is sealed correctly and places the ballot
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envelope inside the box under the watchful eyes of the voting employee and all
observers.
As is evident in Figure 8, the ballot itself is a simple one. The wording on the
ballot is different for every election, as it includes the unique name of the company and
the union. Nonetheless every ballot simply asks one question, whether the voting
employee seeks to be represented by the union, allowing for a YES or NO vote. Beneath
the representation question are two boxes, one for marking YES and the other for NO.
(see e.g., https://www.google.com/search?q=NLRB+Election+Ballot&client=firefox-b-1d&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj63pWixszgAhVGmuAKHerQCyUQ
_AUIDygC&biw=1366&bih=604#imgrc=7vsjvUbaGYWTGM). While voting is
underway, only voting employees, the observers (both union and company observers),
and the NLRB representatives are allowed in the voting area. The NLRB does not allow
electioneering in the voting area or while individuals are in line waiting to vote.
Once the voting period has expired, regardless of whether any or all employees
have voted the voting portion of the election is completed. As it is often necessary for the
observers and election coordinator to leave the voting room for brief periods of time after
the polls close, the ballot box is sealed to prevent tampering. The process for sealing the
ballot box is an elaborate one that requires the observation of all election observers.
Typically, the box is taped shut; seams joining the sides of the cardboard box are taped
strongly to close any crevice or opening. The observers sign the tape covering the seams
to enable anyone to determine if the tape was replaced, thus indicating an adulteration of
the security of the ballot box. Once the ballot boxes are secured to the satisfaction of the
observers and the NLRB Election Coordinator, the voting room location is opened. It is
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only after the polls close that the employer’s representatives and the union’s
representatives are allowed in the voting room. Often the ballots are counted immediately
after the closing of the polls.
To count the ballots, the observers monitor the NLRB Election Coordinator who
opens the ballot box and removes the ballots. Sometimes the ballots are dumped into a
pile and sometimes the NLRB Election Coordinator neatly stacks each ballot. With all
parties watching, the NLRB Election Coordinator reads aloud the ballot indication, either
a Yes or No. The observers then affirm the NLRB Election Coordinator’s decision on the
voter’s intent. In those circumstances when a ballot does not allow the determination of
the voter’s intent, such as when both the Yes and No choice contain marks of some kind,
the NLRB on May 14, 2020, determined that such ballots will be designated void and not
included within the ballot count (see Bloomberg Law, 2020; Kanu, 2020b).
After all votes are tallied, if the petitioning union receives the most ballots cast, it
becomes the employees’ elected representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.
In other words, the union won the election. The challenged ballots, placed separately in
individual envelopes within the ballot box, are not counted as part of the initial tally.
However, if the number of challenged ballots is determinative of the outcome of the vote,
it becomes necessary to resolve the challenge for each ballot. The forum for resolving
these challenges is a hearing typically held at the regional office of the NLRB.
Once a determination is made on the challenged ballots, meaning it is determined
that they are either in the appropriate unit or not in the appropriate unit, it then becomes
necessary to ascertain the intent of the challenge ballot. The tally of the challenged ballots
is added to the tally of the non-challenged ballots to arrive at the election outcome, either
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a win for the union or the company. Both sides have seven calendar days to challenge the
results of the election by filing objections with the NLRB. If no objections are filed, the
election ballot tallies are certified (Higgins, Jr., 2012). Prior to the 2015 revisions, on
average this process historically took from 42 to 38 days (Dowd, 2012). Many unions
claimed, however, that the workplace representation system took too long and was
manipulated by employers. As a result the system was revised in 2015, resulting in far
less time for employers and employees to campaign. Again, a systems theorist would
suggest returning to a minimum of the 42-day average for campaigns; the 2020 revisions
will likely accomplish this objective.
Princeton University’s Henry Farber (2015) conducted an extensive quantitative
analysis of over 140,000 workplace representation elections coordinated by the NLRB
between 1973 and 2009. Farber (2015) contended that a deteriorating [election]
environment prompts unions to focus on larger potential bargaining units and on elections
where they have a larger probability of winning. It was the deteriorating election
environment that prompted the NLRB in 2015 to change its long-standing workplace
representation election procedures (Walsh & Rosen, 2015).
Changes in Workplace Representation Elections
Understandably, given the relative newness of the revised election procedures—
those occurring in 2015 as well as those effective in 2020—there is little research on
workplace representation elections in peer-reviewed journals. There is, however, a
comparably substantial amount of information published by the federal government, law
firms, consultants, professors, and other practitioners in the labor relations field. Since the
focal period of the elections in this study occurred during the active period of the 2015
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election revisions, it is important to understand the details of the system and structural
violence of the 2015 revised election system.
On April 14, 2015 the NLRB changed its rules and procedures governing the
elections it oversees to determine workplace representation by unions. It was perhaps the
biggest overhaul of the election process since the formation of the NLRB on July 5, 1935.
The most significant change to the new election system was the reduced cycle time from
the petition for election to the tally of the ballots (Ferguson, 2018). Under the prior
election procedures, the cycle time was decreasing from 42 to 38 days. However, the
2015 revised regulations resulted in a cycle time of a mere 23 days (Becker & Rhinehart,
2017; Hardie and Murphy, 2016; National Labor Relations Board, 2019). In theory an
employer faces the possibility of a workplace representation election vote within 10 days
(Yager, 2015). Along with a change in political leadership at the NLRB, it was the
overwhelming criticism of the business community which may have prompted the Board
to revise the election system in 2019 to lengthen the cycle time of electioneering.
Systems Theory and the Workplace Representation Election
Workplace representation elections are a fulfillment of the democratic process.
Former NLRB Regional Director Bernard Samoff (1968) succinctly stated that the
workplace representation system enables workers a process for self-determination on
whether a majority of voting employees seek or reject union representation. The end
result is a recognized and certified vote which reflects the wishes of the voting
employees.
While systems theorists seemingly view life and all within it as systems process
flows, the workplace representation system maintained by the NLRB lends itself readily
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to analysis within systems theory. The foundation of systems theory is its focus on stock
and flow. It is a simple theory dealing with physical exponential growing systems, in
which a reinforcing loop drives system growth, and a balancing loop constrains the
growth in order to achieve systems process equilibrium (Meadows, 2008). A systems
stock is the present status of the flow within the system. It is the number of elections
existing without a finalized certified vote result.
Systems process anomalies occur when process flow is insufficient, and an over
accumulation of stock occurs. Disruptions in the process flow can occur for a number of
reasons. An increase or decrease in the number of petitions for elections in the NLRB
system flow can occur based upon general economic conditions, as well as on the
collective behavior of either unions or employers. Perhaps most influential are the
changes in regulations, making it easier or more difficult for one or all parties to the
election system. Navigating the system regulating the behavior of unions and employers
during the workplace representation system process is a complex process requiring the
expertise of experienced campaigners. Lawyers are an important resource to both
understand and utilize the process flow within the system (Elite Lawyer, n.d.). Major
regulatory changes to the election system, particularly after decades of system stability
without major change, can have a confounding effect on all parties seeking to navigate
the system process. Such changes can inhibit the input to the system process flow.
Similarly, such regulatory instability can also slow or speed the processing of the stock
(elections).
The workplace representation system is directed through a five-member
regulatory agency which is subject to political influence. This influence can change
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dramatically depending upon which political party oversees the executive branch of the
federal government. Some view that political oscillation as amplifying its impact on the
flow of the workplace representation election system. This effect was lamented by Labor
Law Professor Samuel Estreicher (1985) writing in the American Bar Association’s
Administrative Law Review:
The NLRB (NLRB) has made the labor law professor’s job a nightmare. A labor
law professor’s dream, like that of any other serious academic, is to deal with a
relatively inert body of law, to be able to read the decisions and statutes once—
and only once—and then work up a fairly decent set of notes which can be used
year after year, leaving time for the more worthwhile pursuits of life. This federal
agency simply won’t let us be. These days the BNA [Bureau of National Affairs]
labor service treats us to a reversal a week by the NLRB.
While Estreicher’s heartfelt complaint was widely shared in 1985, the actions of the
NLRB in 2015 that revised the regulations impacting the stock and flow of the workplace
representation election system have been similarly denounced by employers claiming the
reduced cycle time of allowable campaigning inhibits employees’ ability to participate
fully in the election system (Bernstein & Vickery, 2019; Hayes, Duffield, & Kisicki,
2018; National Labor Relations Board, 2019).
This reduced cycle time meant the median election period for employers to
campaign was reduced to an average of 23 days since the revised election rules were
made effective in April 2015. A history of the election cycle time is vividly demonstrated
in the NLRB’s own election data, as shown below in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. NLRB election cycle time, 2009-2018.
Source: https://screenshots.firefox.com/OOUM8lifxPLw3OWu/www.nlrb.gov
It is a central tenet of systems theory that there are natural and physical limitations
on the growth of any system (Meadows, 2008). However, unnatural influences,
anomalies, and oscillations can be readily introduced by those overseeing the system,
which can tilt the stasis in favor of one of the parties to the conflict. With unions winning
nearly three of every four elections, it is no wonder that employers sought the overhaul of
the 2015 workplace representation election system. Kuhn and Hacking (2012) suggested
that:
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If an anomaly is to evoke crisis, it must usually be more than just an anomaly.
There are always difficulties somewhere in the paradigm-nature fit; most of them
are set right sooner or later, often by processes that could not have been foreseen.
The scientist who pauses to examine every anomaly he notes will seldom get
significant work done … We therefore have to ask what it is that makes an
anomaly seem worth concerted scrutiny. (p. 82)
The April 2015 major changes to the workplace representation election system were
viewed by employers as just such a system anomaly warranting “concerted scrutiny.”
Bernstein and Vickery (2019) further characterized the 2015 revised regulations as having
removed long-standing due process rights that had been available to employers, shrinking
the election timeframe and limiting employers’ ability to educate workers on the facts
surrounding union representation.
Given the rising win rate for unions within the shorter cycle time of the workplace
representation election process, it was reasonable to believe that more petitions for
elections would have been filed by unions thus increasing their membership and dues
collection. Absent the 2020 regulatory revisions, the expedited cycle time for elections
and resulting failure from an excess flow of elections could have had dire consequences
to the actors within the system. A popular episode of I Love Lucy depicts her productivity
on the candy manufacturing assembly line which is insufficient to process the speed and
flow of the assembly line. In the YouTube video I Love Lucy: Candy Factory, comedy
ensues as Lucy attempts to mitigate the bottleneck of the assembly line by eating the
chocolates on the fast-moving line. This attempt to eliminate the excess flow is a
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common response by actors in a nonfunctioning system. Employers may be concerned
that they were the chocolate on the NLRB assembly line.
Ideally successful equilibrium is created when the system stock and flow are free
of bottleneck, equilibrium is established, and the stock and flow move as designed.
Employers argued that the April 2015 major changes to the system were the equivalent of
expediting elections without regard to allowing employees the full benefit of a campaign
of information sharing. Reversing the 2015 election revisions will return the election
system to a closer state of equilibrium. It is important to remember that the actors within
the system are critical in determining the process flow. However, author Donella
Meadows (2008) reminded us that “the bounded rationality of each actor in a system may
not lead to decisions that further the welfare of the system as a whole” (Meadows &
Wright, 2008, p. 110). It is reasonable to believe that the employer actors sought to act
and influence the NLRB to act in the interests of the employer and at the expense of
unions or employees. It is reasonable to expect that the unions will similarly seek to
revise and overturn the 2019 election revisions and return to the 2015 revisions.
Unlike the humor of the I Love Lucy episode, the 2015 major changes in the
workplace representation election system created system process complications, such as:
•

Employees voting with less information otherwise shared in a longer
campaign;

•

A perceived inequity of the process by all actors effected within the systems;
and

•

An unstable flow of elections as actors advance through the learning curve of
the revised election system.
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From a system theory perspective, several solutions that can create system homeostasis
include:
•

The greater transparency resulting from the NLRB having revised the April
2015 election system on December 18, 2019;

•

Congress should amend the National Labor Relations Act requiring that every
workplace election campaign period enable affected employees a minimum of
42 days from petition to vote for consideration of the representation issue;

•

The NLRB should accept petitions for election only during a short period of
time in any one NLRB Region. For example, in NLRB Region 10 petitions
should be accepted only during a particular month, with Region 12 accepting
petitions the following month;

•

The NLRB should create systems revisions to spread out the elections held
during the year by eliminating year-round acceptance of election petitions;

•

Unions should create additional transparency in the system by registering their
intent to organize on a public clearinghouse website maintained by the NLRB
and viewable by all, in order to enable all actors within the system to avoid the
surprise or ambush of an election;

•

In order to change whether a unit of employees is unionized or not, the NLRB
should require a majority of all unit employees’ support, not just a majority of
those voting; and

•

A myriad of additional recommended employer solutions can be found in the
CDW’s response to the NLRB’s request for information (see Hayes, Duffield,
& Kisicki, 2018).
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Winning and Losing Parties in the Election Conflict
To better understand the context for this workplace conflict it is necessary to
understand the winners and losers in the 2015 revised election system. It is the elections
held during the active period of the 2015 election system that were the focus of this study,
as further detailed in Chapter 3.
Prior to April 14, 2015, unions were winning in excess of 60% of workplace
representation elections. However, the economy was growing at rates faster than the
percentage of elections that were both filed and won by organized labor (Multinational
Monitor, 2003). Consequently, unions gained more dues-paying members, although not at
the rate the rest of the union-free economy was growing. While the labor movement’s
percent of the workforce which is unionized (known as union density) declined from
1955 to today, union leadership salaries remained substantially above those whom they
represented (Sherk, 2015). Additionally, in order to demonstrate their efforts to support
workers, unions negotiated for provisions in contracts which limited the flexibility of
companies and their ability to compete (Sherk, 2009). Notably, during the decline of
unions American companies became increasingly more regulated by the federal
government and undertook workplace improvements to remain competitive to recruit and
hire (Zickar, 2004). Over time the collective actions of employers have decreased the
demand for workplace representation elections. In order to compensate for their
decreased representation, unions have sought to disadvantage employers by eliminating
the employers’ ability to campaign about whether their employees should obtain union
representation.
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Theories on Employee Vote Influencers
A portion of the literature review presented in Chapter Two examined system
theory and other theories associated with an employee’s decision to vote on behalf of the
union rather than the employer. The literature review conducted also focused on
leadership theories applicable to the conflict within workplace representation elections. A
workplace representation election is one of the most significant conflict events that can
occur in an organization’s history. The election itself demonstrates a loss of trust and faith
in executive leadership. American leadership scholar Warren Bennis stated: “Trust is the
lubrication that makes it possible for organizations to work” (Newhouse, 2014, p. 36).
University of Minnesota Professor John Fossum (2012) has chronicled the labor
movement that declined since 1955 when union membership was near 35% of the
American work force. Today’s membership—approximately 10.3% of the combined
government and private workforce—represents a dire circumstance for the future of
organized labor (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). Fossum contended that as a
result unions have come to the realization that their decline was supported by legislation
that inhibited unions’ ability to organize. In the foreword of his book The Twilight of the
Old Unionism, Leo Troy (2004), an economics professor at Rutgers University, suggested
that the basis for the decline in union density is neither management exploitation of rules
nor an unfavorable political and legal climate. Economist Troy instead suggested the
unions’ steady erosion of union representation density is “largely due to market forces
and competition rather than managerial resistance” (p. xi); he further termed this decline
“Old Unionism” (p. xi).
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A Pew Research Center study in 2018 noted the long-term decline of unionization
has affected most parts of the U.S. economy, but not uniformly. Pew further noted the
biggest declines in unionization are in industries that were and still are “the foundations
of the American labor movement” (DeSilver, 2018, para. 3). The decline of unionism
however is not uniform throughout the nation. A more recent comparison of workplace
representation elections by Bloomberg Law’s Robert Combs and Gayle Cinquegrani
(2018) observed that the first half of 2018 showed the win rate for unions was 68.9%, a
slight decline behind the 2017 union win rate of 70.8%. Additionally, the authors noted
that the win rate in states without right-to-work laws had a union success rate of 71.1%,
in comparison to the 64.1% union win rate in states with right-to-work laws (Devinatz,
2015).
Structural Violence
Organizational conflict researchers note there is structural violence associated
with the conflict within workplace representation elections that results in changes in
union density. Any actor who has participated within the workplace representation
election system recognizes there is much conflict involved in the system. Technically in
this modern era relatively few employees are victims of direct violence, as Johan Galtung
(1969) defined the term in Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. His article defined four
distinctions of violence.
The first distinction is between physical and psychological violence. It is the
distinction involving somatic hurt to human beings and can include violence against the
soul – brainwashing, indoctrination, and threats, etc. The second distinction is between
negative and positive approaches to influence; it is simply the tendency to reward or
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punish noncompliance. The third distinction is whether or not there is an object that is
hurt. Galtung (1969) notes that the mere threat of violence is sufficient to constitute
“structural violence” (p.171). The fourth distinction is the most important one and hinges
upon whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts (see pp. 169 -170). Galtung
referred to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as
personal or direct. This is the type of violence most consider when defining violence –
physical violence. Violence where there is no such actor is structural or indirect violence
(see p. 170).
Johan Galtung (1969) is recognized as a preeminent theorist on peace research.
He developed two typologies of peace – positive and negative peace. He defined negative
peace as the absence of violence, absence of war, the absence of direct violence. He
defined positive peace as the integration of human society. Galtung defined peace as
something attainable rather than a utopian construct. Few however would suggest that the
absence of a workplace representation election within any particular workplace denotes
positive peace. Most would prefer the term “labor harmony” rather than Galtung’s
positive or negative peace. He suggested peace is not only the absence of personal
violence but also the absence of structural violence, which he defined as the cause of the
difference between the potential and the actual. To illustrate, Galtung used the example of
a death of tuberculosis in the 18th century, which would not result from structural
violence. However, in the 21st century, given our ability to prevent tuberculosis, a
corresponding death would constitute structural violence. With the difference between the
potential and the actual defined as structural violence, the very violence associated with
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workplace representation elections—whether structural or direct—itself epitomizes
structural violence.
All actors in the workplace representation system seem resigned to accept the
existing process with its tendency for violence. Galtung (1969) might suggest that each of
the actors in the workplace representation election system is a participant in the structural
violence associated and perpetuated by the NLRB and the election system it regulates.
To eliminate the structural violence inherent within the existing workplace
representation election system, structural violence theorists might suggest the elimination
of any and all advantages either party possesses when implementing their strategies
within the system. A structural violence theorist would develop a system to represent the
interest of all employees without the violence associated with a workplace representation
election system. Such solutions would include:
•

Creating greater transparency of information within the election system;

•

Requiring any union seeking to represent [unionize] a group of employees to
register their interest on the NLRB’s website, which is publicly available to all
actors within the workplace representation system; and

•

Revising the National Labor Relations Act to mandate that any change in
representation status within a workplace require a majority vote of all
employees within an appropriate workplace unit, rather than a majority of
those voting.
Strategies Employed by Unions and Employers

The literature reviewed in this chapter provided insight into the traditional and
successful strategies utilized by both unions and employees to achieve victory over
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employers in workplace representation elections. This information forms the context for
the corresponding counter-strategies identified for use by employers which were the chief
focus of this research study. The literature reviewed featured several professors’ prior
research regarding employers’ strategies used during the election. However, this
researcher supports the notion that it is biased to collect data from secondary, tertiary or
other actor/observers far removed from the actual employer itself. It is equally inaccurate
to collect data on the unions’ strategy, not from the union but from the employer. This
study addressed the described data collection insufficiency evident in the literature of
utilizing union organizers’ perceptions of the employers’ actions while omitting the
employer’s perceptions.
One of the most preeminent, prolific, and prominent researchers in the field of
labor relations is Kate Bronfenbrenner. Most labor relations practitioners are familiar
with her work: she is recognized for her decades of research on workplace representation
election behavior and strategies. Her research and opinions are continuously sought by
academics, practitioners, and journalists, and she is a featured columnist or media
commenter on seemingly a near-weekly basis. Her work over the last 30 years continues
to frame the analysis of workplace representation elections. As recently as December 11,
2019, researchers at the Economic Policy Institute recreated her significant 2009 study
entitled No Holds Barred; The Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing
(Bronfenbrenner, 2009; see McNicholas et al., 2019).
Kate Bronfenbrenner is Director of Labor Education Research and a senior
lecturer at Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, where she
teaches and conducts research on union and employer strategies in organizing and
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bargaining in the global economy. Bronfenbrenner has also done extensive research on
the impact of trade policy on employment, wages, and unionization. Prior to joining the
Cornell faculty in 1993, Bronfenbrenner was an assistant professor in labor studies at
Penn State University; she worked for many years as an organizer and union
representative with the United Woodcutters Association in Mississippi and with Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) in Boston, as well as a welfare rights organizer in
Seattle, Washington.
Bronfenbrenner, who received her Ph.D. from Cornell in 1993, is the co-author
and editor of several books on union strategies, including Global Unions: Challenging
Transnational Capital Through Cross Border Campaigns (2007); Union Organizing in
the Public Sector: An Analysis of State and Local Elections (1995); Organizing to Win:
New Research on Union Strategies (1998); and Ravenswood: The Steelworkers' Victory
and the Revival of American Labor (2000). She also has published numerous articles,
book chapters, and monographs on labor policy, employer and union behavior in public
and private sector organizing and first contract campaigns, comprehensive campaigns,
union leadership development, women and unions, and global trade and investment
policy. Her most recent study on the timing of employer serious unfair labor practices—
"Election Timing, Employer Free Speech, and Unfair Labor Practice Occurrence: Whose
Rights are at Risk?"—played a central role in informing the NLRB's 2015 election
revisions (see Bronfenbrenner, 2016, para. 2).
Because of her expertise in contemporary labor issues and her research on union
and employer behavior in certification election campaigns, Bronfenbrenner has been
brought in to testify as an expert witness at Labor Department and Congressional
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hearings and is frequently quoted in the major news media. An example of her
contemporary impact is provided by Mark Gruenberg (2016), who reported on
Bronfenbrenner’s lobbying the NLRB to prohibit management’s unilateral use of captive
audience meetings where workers sit in closed meetings to hear what Bronfenbrenner has
referred to as antiunion rhetoric. Bronfenbrenner noted that unions get no right of reply,
and such meetings can often contain explicit or implied threats of closure of the plants
and loss of jobs. Gruenberg further reported that her 2016 study found that nine of every
10 union organizing drives are subjected to what Bronfenbrenner referred to as
intimidating and one-sided captive audience meetings by employers.
Bronfenbrenner’s 2016 study also found a 73% union-win rate in representation
elections without captive audience meetings, and a 47% union-win rate in campaigns that
did include them (Gruenberg, 2016). As a result, Bronfenbrenner’s findings were
included in a January 15, 2016 proposal to the NLRB that unions should be given equal
time and an equal voice at employers’ so-called “captive audience” meetings that are used
in a workplace representation election campaign; the proposal was authored by
Bronfenbrenner and 106 other labor law professors asking that the NLRB engage in rulemaking to level the playing field.
Bronfenbrenner’s early involvement in the study of organizing tactics was
influenced by a study funded by the AFL-CIO of 189 union election campaigns in units
of over 50 eligible voters between 1986 and 1987. Unfortunately, the AFL-CIO sample
excluded or underrepresented several major unions, especially those organizing in the
service sector (Bronfenbrenner, 1991a). In a two-part study entitled Successful Union
Strategies for Winning Certification Elections and First Contracts - Report to Union
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Participants, Bronfenbrenner (1991a, 1991b) in cooperation with the AFL-CIO surveyed
100 chief negotiators regarding the unions’ election victory and first contract status. The
quantitative study resulted in quantifiable guidance to union organizers to maximize their
success in workplace representation elections. The study generated the following
pertinent findings and recommendations (see Bronfenbrenner, 1991a, p. 13, Table 5) for
union organizers with regard to organizing variables:
Impact of Organizing Survey Variables on Election Outcome in Favor of Unions
Variables showing strongest positive impact on election outcome
1. Number of days between election and petition
2. Other units of the employer unionized
3. Percent minority in unit
4. Lead organizer on international staff
5. Union had representative organizing committee
6. Percent of units sign up on cards when petition was filed
7. Majority of unit house called before the election
8. Solidarity days used
9. Bargaining committee chosen before election
10. Union focused on issues such as dignity, discrimination and quality
Variables showing moderate positive impact on election outcome
1. Percent unemployment rate
2. Percent union density
3. Unit average wage $5.00 or less
4. 60% or more of the unit is female
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5. Organizer has 1-5 years rank- and-file experience
6. Union used small group meetings
7. Percent of units surveyed regarding contract before the election
Variables showing slight positive impact on election outcome
1. Employer offered good benefit package before the election
2. Lead organizer female or minority
3. Rank-and-file volunteers from other unionized firms did house calls
Variables showing strong negative impact on election outcome
1. Number of eligible voters in unit
2. Average age of unit
3. Company profitable before the election
4. Organizer has a college degree
5. Company gave wage increase during campaign
6. Company made promises during the campaign
7. Company used anti-union committee
8. Number of captive audience meetings by company
9. Number of union letters mailed
Variables showing moderate negative impact on election outcome
1. Stipulated or board ordered unit different than unit union petition for
2. Company had participation or QWL plan before campaign
3. Number of company letters during campaign
Variables showing no statistically significant impact on election outcome
1. Unit in manufacturing sector

67
2. Organizer class background
3. Management consultant used
4. Workers discharged for union activity, not reinstated before the election.
The results of this two-part study by Kate Bronfenbrenner were published in
1991; it remains still today one of the most significant and important studies conducted
on strategies for unions’ winning workplace representation elections. However, the
limiting factor of the study was the unilateral collection of data from only one party to the
workplace representation election: the union organizer. Additionally and as previously
noted, Bronfenbrenner has addressed the fact that the union organizer is not granted equal
access within the workplace and therefore is dependent upon others’ descriptions of
developments occurring within the campaign. Most often those reporting such employer
actions are not labor relations professionals; consequently, data corruption is a potential
result. Again, another hallmark of Bronfenbrenner studies is the failure to directly contact
employers regarding their own messaging and tactics employed during the campaign and
an overreliance on, at best, second-hand information as reported by the union organizer.
Bronfenbrenner published another survey in 1994 involving a random sample of
261 NLRB workplace representation elections with 50 or more eligible voters that took
place between July 1986 and June 1987. The study was reported in a chapter entitled
“Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-contract Campaigns:
Implications for Labor Law Reform” (Bronfenbrenner, 1994). This 1994 study
documented the union organizers’ perceptions of the pervasive nature of aggressive
employer antiunion behavior during organizing campaigns. Again, the described study
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unfortunately relied exclusively on representations made by the lead union organizer for
each campaign.
With a dependent variable of “union win rate” the 1994 Bronfenbrenner survey
study considered several independent variables (see Bronfenbrenner, 1994 [2001
electronic], p. 79, Table 5.1):
1. Number of days from petition election
a. 60 days or less
b. 60 – 180 days
c. 180 days or more
2. Percent sign the cards
a. More than 50%
3. Pre-campaign participation plan
4. Unit changed after petition
5. Management consultant used
6. Discharge is not reinstated
a. All units with discharges
7. Company gave wage increase
8. Company made promises
9. Antiunion committee used
10. Number of captive audience meetings
a. No captive audience meetings
b. 20 or more meetings
11. Number of company letters
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a. No company letters
b. More than five letters
12. Supervisor campaigned one on one
13. ULP charges filed
a. Complaints won on charges filed
This 1994 study of the union organizers’ responses found that more than 75% of
the employers engaged in active antiunion tactics. These tactics included discharging
union supporters, captive audience meetings, supervisor one-on-one meetings, wage
increases, promises of improvements in wages benefits or other working conditions,
antiunion committees, and letters. The study found that each of these independent
variables resulted in statistically significant impacts on the election outcome.
Bronfenbrenner’s 1994 study also found that 71% of the employers in the sample
utilized a labor relations consultant during the election campaign. Under the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, a labor relations
consultant is defined as “[a]ny person who for compensation, advises or represents an
employer, employer organization, or labor organization concerning employee organizing
or collective bargaining activities” (Public Laws, 1959). Ironically the win rate for unions
in which the employer used an outside consultant was 40%, in comparison with a union
win rate of 50% in campaigns where no employer outside consultant was used. The
independent variable of the use of an external consultant was not statistically significant;
the researcher surmised that it was a result of employers hiring such competencies inhouse or relying on staff, rather than outsourcing to an external consultant. The future for
outsourcing the labor relations support for employers may increase though, as the union
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density continues to decrease in the American workplace. Outsourcing solutions, instead
of hiring or maintaining in-house labor relations specialists, is one strategy accounting for
the decreased number of available labor relations jobs. In September of 2019 the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics forecast that the available number of labor relations specialist
jobs will decrease by 8% from 2018 to 2028 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.).
In April 2019 Ruth Mayhew published an article on the advantages of employing
labor relations professionals, alleging that there is a relationship between which party is
leading the country and the potential increase in union organizing, which in turn drives
the demand for hiring labor relations professionals. If Mayhew is correct then low union
density rate today (less than 7% in the private sector) bodes poorly for those labor
relations professionals seeking in-house jobs. Employers instead are likely to hire such
consultants only when needed, as in an NLRB election.
An earlier study of the use of labor relations consultants predated the
aforementioned 1994 Bronfenbrenner study. Thomas Patrick Frazier’s 1984 dissertation
study entitled Consultants, Unions, and NLRB Elections chronicled the use and efficacy
of consultants in workplace representation elections held during 1982, noting that their
use resulted in increased success for employers. His study relied on data collected by the
AFL-CIO, which again sourced its information from union organizers. Frazier’s work
foreshadowed the weakness of most studies that would follow, noting the data collected
from the union organizer “reflect the subjective judgments of the field organizer involved
in the election. Obviously, care should be taken in any interpretation of results based
upon these subjective judgments” (p. 28).
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The previously noted and recently published 2019 study by McNicholas and
colleagues analyzed, among other topics, employers’ use of workplace representation
election campaign consultants. While the study did not address the percentage of
elections featuring a consultant, it estimated that over $338 million was spent by
employers annually during the span of the 2015 revised election rules.
Employer Tactics to Win Elections
According to the lead union organizers surveyed in the Bronfenbrenner (2009a,
2009b) study, union supporters in 30% of the workplace representation election
campaigns were terminated from their employment during the campaign. Interestingly,
however, charges were filed in 87% of the earlier referenced 30% of campaigns. Of that
87% of the 30%, the NLRB rejected 57% of these charges. It is noteworthy that the
author could have reported after the above-mentioned statistics that only 11.6% of all
campaigns contained the termination of a union supporter during the campaign.
The more recent aforementioned study by McNicholas and colleagues (2019)
examined unfair labor practices (ULP) allegations, charges, and filings; the authors found
employers are charged with illegally firing workers in nearly a third (29.6%) of all NLRB
supervised elections. Unfortunately, it is not until a late-appearing footnote that the study
notes “the filing of a charge itself is not a determination of a violation of the National
Labor Relations Act” (p. 14, fn. 2). The lead union organizers reported that employers
granted wage increases in 30% of the workplace representation election campaigns, and
made promises to improve wages, hours, and working conditions in 56% of the
campaigns. Both of these actions are unlawful. The study indicated that the number of
captive audience meetings and number of company letters sent also significantly
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impacted the union’s ability to win the workplace representation election. Union win
rates declined dramatically as the number of employer captive audience meetings and
employer letters to employees’ homes increased. This resulted in a 40% union win rate
for campaigns in which no captive audience meetings were held or letters sent, down to
an 18% union win rate when the employer held 20 or more captive audience meetings
and a 37% union win rate where the company sent more than five letters during the
campaign (see Bronfenbrenner, 2001).
In 2004 Cornell University published a study by researchers Satish Deshpande
and Christina Stamper who similarly studied a set of variables influencing union win
rates in workplace representation elections within the hospitality industry. With the
dependent variable of a union win rate, their study identified the following independent
variables that most affect the election outcome:
•

union involved;

•

number of unions on the election ballot;

•

the number of days from petition filing for the election until the election is
held;

•

whether the employer is in a Right-to-Work state;

•

size of the prospective bargaining unit; and

•

percentage of eligible unit members who vote in the election (turnout).
(p. 198).

The researchers studied 190 workplace representation elections occurring between
January 1999 and December 2001, and research findings were published in the Cornell
Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly on May 1, 2004. For each of the
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identified independent variables studied, researchers found that there were two factors
predominantly impacting the union success rate: 1) the size of the prospective bargaining
unit, and 2) the presence of more than one union on the ballot seeking to represent the
employer’s employees. The study’s authors presented their findings for each of the
independent variables identified. For unit size, of the 190 elections studied the average
unit contained 56 employees. Unions won 54% of the elections with an average 77% of
the votes. The researchers found that multi-union elections were positively correlated
with union victories. Interestingly, of the 190 elections studied the researchers found that
the ballots were counted on average 61 days after the filing of the petition for election
and that voter turnout averaged 88% (Deshpande & Stamper, 2004).
On May 20, 2009, the Economic Policy Institute published perhaps the most
significant Bronfenbrenner (2009a) study, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of
Employer Opposition to Organizing. This study included a random sample of 1,004
workplace representation elections with 50 or more employee voters conducted January
1, 1999 to December 31, 2003. Bronfenbrenner again surveyed lead union organizers
only, using mail, phone, email, personal interviews; she correlated her findings with
NLRB charges [of unlawful conduct] and election data. Bronfenbrenner reported her
study provided "a well-documented portrait of the legal and illegal tactics used by
employers in NLRB representational elections" (Bronfenbrenner, 2009a, p. 2).
The findings of this Bronfenbrenner (2009a) study are routinely reported even
today. A notable excerpt in said findings stated: “Employers threatened to close the plant
in 57% of elections, discharged workers in 34% and threatened to cut wages and benefits
in 47% of elections… In 63% of elections employers used supervisor one-on-one
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meetings to interrogate workers about who they or other workers supported, and in 54%
used such sessions to threaten workers" (p. 2).
Ironically Bronfenbrenner (2009a) anticipated criticism of her study's data
collection methodology that focused on the lead organizer's supposed knowledge of
others’ experiences in the workplace. She acknowledged some critics have raised
questions as to the reliability of union organizers as a data source. Her response was that
university institutional review boards would not approve any study of employees due to
risks to the worker. Additionally, she suggested that "it is simply not possible to use
employers as an alternative source" (p. 5). She elaborated:
As we have demonstrated in previous studies, the overwhelming majority of
employers are engaging in one or more illegal behaviors (at minimum 75% of the
employers in the current sample are alleged to have committed at least one illegal
action). Not only would it be next to impossible to get employers to complete
surveys in which they honestly reported on illegal activity, but that kind of
question would not be permitted by university institutional review boards.
(pp.5-6). Bronfenbrenner defined such illegal activity by the allegations and charges filed
by the lead organizers or representatives. An accusation of an unlawful act is not proof of
its existence, however.
An ongoing criticism of the Bronfenbrenner (2009a) study is again the sole
reliance on only one side to the conflict within workplace representation elections. The
suggestion that employers would not respond to surveys in opposition to their interests is
seemingly not considered as a driver of behavior for both sides of the conflict.
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Nonetheless, even with their shortcomings Bronfenbrenner’s studies remain today among
the most significant workplace representation election analyses ever conducted.
On March 26, 2014, Jonathan Lepie published a study entitled “Is There a
Winning Formula for Union Organizing” as an extension of the Bronfenbrenner studies
conducted between 1995-2004. Lepie asserted that no other literature was as influential
on union strategies as the Bronfenbrenner studies. Bronfenbrenner sought to provide
union organizers with tactics that would increase their win rate by interviewing union
organizers and learning what worked and what did not. Lepie stated that Bronfenbrenner
"claimed to have discovered a winning formula for certification elections” (p. 138). Chief
among the winning strategies included house calling or the process of unannounced visits
to the homes of employees who will vote in the workplace representation election.
However, Lepie pointed out that even after Bronfenbrenner's widely-read study, union
win rates declined (p. 138).
Lepie (2014) reminded readers that three years later Bronfenbrenner and Juravich
(1998) further refined their formula in “It Takes More Than Housecalls: Organizing to
Win with a Comprehensive Union-building Strategy.” After a continued decline in union
win rates, he noted, Bronfenbrenner again refined the union organizing formula in 2004
with a co-authored chapter entitled “Changing to Organize: A National Assessment of
Union Strategies” (Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, 2004). Again union win rates were not
improved with the release of this 2004 study. Lepie noted that Bronfenbrenner and
Hickey interviewed hundreds of organizers, identifying their tactics and quantifiable
correlating tactics with election wins. Lepie stated "nobody claimed to have detected
flaws in Bronfenbrenner's methodology” (p. 138).
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Lepie (2014) spent the bulk of his career as a union organizer and retired from the
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as Director of Organizing in 2001. Lepie
sought in his own work to advance the Bronfenbrenner studies but again elected to
interview only the union organizers for perspective. His rationale for doing so would
seem to hinge upon his adversarial perception of management. As a result, he interviewed
10 and only 10 union organizers as the basis for his study. Lepie deliberately limited his
2014 study to ten organizers to ensure he captured the opinions of only lead organizers
with more than ten campaigns and who had won at least one campaign opposing a
professional “union buster” (p. 140). The phrase “union buster” is typically a reference to
a consultant hired by the employer to consult and manage the employer's response to a
workplace representation election. Union organizers presume that union busters seek to
eliminate unions, although ironically doing so would eliminate the "union busters'"
profession. Lepie's use of the “union buster” phrase provides insight into his perspective
as a researcher.
Not surprisingly, Lepie's 2014 study of lead union organizers found that the
number one predictor of organizing success is the quality and skill of the organizer.
However, Lepie did critique Bronfenbrenner's formulaic approach to unions’ winning
strategies in workplace representation elections. He noted that elections are two-party
contests, so studying the strategy of one player to the contest without assessing the
context of the other is ineffective. He suggested the context of an election should drive
the determination of the union's campaign strategy. However, Lepie’s characterization of
the election as a two-party contest fails to acknowledge the important role that employees
themselves have in campaigning amongst themselves. Employees are effectively the most
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important actors in the election system. They are not only the sole party to vote;
employees themselves also campaign to persuade other employees to join or not join a
union.
Lepie (2014) noted another problem with Bronfenbrenner's model is that it
assumes not only that employers behave the same, but also that voting employees behave
the same in workplace representation elections. Lepie concluded by noting
Bronfenbrenner's dissatisfaction with national union leadership for failing to adopt her
formulaic list of tactics that she correlated with union success in workplace representation
elections.
Lepie (2014) suggested that union success in workplace representation elections
hinges on placing greater value on the cooks rather than the cookbook. However, a more
recent example illustrates the frustration of unions and their distaste for employers’ use of
management consultants. In October of 2018 a majority of the 1,400 employees at
Luxottica Group’s McDonough, Ga., distribution center voted against the union in the
workplace representation election (Wallender, 2019). The employees are part of the
world’s largest eyewear company, which owns brands that include Ray-Ban, Oakley and
others. The Milan-based company released a statement on October 22, 2018, declaring
their support for the employees’ decision to eschew union representation. Edgar Fields,
president of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union Southeast Council, stated
that the employer “had consultants there around the clock talking to employees, and it
worked” (Wallender, 2018, p. 1).
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Summary
The National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935 and its regulations have
been the subject of some of the most violent and intense workplace conflict ever since.
There is substantial research and literature supporting employees’ decisions to vote in
favor of unions, unfortunately without regard to reliable data on the employers’ strategies
and messaging. As indicated in the review of the literature discussed, an employer’s
viewpoint has been largely ignored in academic research studies on winning strategies for
workplace representation elections coordinated by the NLRB. The general premise of the
prior studies examined is that employers had a vested interest in justifying the legality of
their actions. This of course presumes that employers are individually and collectively
disingenuous. Such a subjective assertion cannot be proved. However, to completely
ignore the perspective of the employer creates and extends a gap in credible research. It
can also be said that the source of information in prior studies, the union organizers
themselves, share the same potential for bias. This dissertation research study contributes
to the existing academic and professional bodies of knowledge by including an ignored
perspective, that of the employer. While the ultimate value of this research is admittedly
difficult to predict, it is believed that this mixed methods study may aid and assist
employers in reducing the conflict associated with an NLRB election loss.
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology
This mixed methods research study developed a conceptual model to further
inform contentious workplace conflict of representation elections supervised by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB elections). As previously noted, the intent of a
workplace representation election is to determine whether a petitioning union has
sufficient support to unionize a unit of employees within a workplace. Such a unit might
include a department, job classification or any other means of identifying a group of
employees sharing a community of interest.
This dissertation research study built upon previously published findings on the
topic of conflict inherent within workplace representation elections. While much has been
studied regarding why employees join unions and why unions are successful in
workplace representation elections, there is little research on employers’ successful
strategies during workplace representation elections. There has not been a study yet
representing the perspective of the employers; that perspective is the central focus of this
research. As noted in Chapter Two, information related to employer strategies was not
sourced in previous studies from the employer but instead from secondary, tertiary, or
other far-removed sources of information. Specifically, prior studies detailing employers’
election messaging and tactics exclusively sourced their data from the union organizer
rather than the employers themselves. This study therefore included the heretofore
omitted voice of the employer to identify multivariate influences upon winning
workplace representation elections.
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Research Rationale & Design
As described below in each section of this chapter on methodology, for this study
the researcher systematically collected and analyzed information from three sources in
order to triangulate their meaning and implications for a model that could assist
employers to understand key factors that influence the percent of the vote in their favor
during workplace representation elections.
Mixed Methods Research Design
The selection of the research design in this study involved a mixed methods
approach, employing both quantitative and qualitative methodology to answer the
research questions identified, as those questions are further detailed below. Mixed
methods was selected as an appropriate research design for the instant study because the
researcher determined that both quantitative and qualitative data, together, provided a
better understanding of the research problem than either type by itself (see Creswell,
2008). A mixed methods approach was appropriate here to build from previous study
phases by following up quantitative research qualitatively, to obtain more detailed
information (see Creswell, 2012).
For the researcher’s investigation of variables affecting the outcomes of worker
representation elections, understanding their aspects from the perspective of the employer
was facilitated by a particular design within the mixed methods approach, that of
triangulation. The term ‘triangulation’ was originally coined by two quantitative
psychological methodologists, Donald Campbell and Donald Fiske (1959), who used the
term to advocate for the use of additional measurement instruments to capture
psychological traits (Kelle, Kühberger, & Bernhard, 2019). Qualitative social researcher
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Norman Denzin (1977) took up this idea and expanded the concept in his monograph The
Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods, explaining that
methodological triangulation would involve “a complex process of playing each method
off against the other in order to maximize the validity of field efforts” (p. 310).
One way to understand the concept of methodological triangulation is as a
“combination of methods and/or data with the aim of describing a research field or a
topic more comprehensively and explaining it better with the help of different but
complementary results” (Kelle et al., 2019, p. 11, citations omitted). In triangulation
research design the results obtained through different methodologies can be viewed in
combination to provide a richer or more accurate description of the phenomenon being
studied. By mixing both quantitative and qualitative research and data, this researcher
gained understanding in breadth and depth of aspects of the subject phenomenon more
accurately by approaching it from different vantage points.
Successful triangulation required careful analysis of the type of information
provided by each method, including its strengths and weaknesses. The combination of the
advantages of each methodology applied in the instant study and outlined in this chapter
(e.g., large sample sizes for both quantitative research efforts, rich contextual explication
gleaned from qualitative structured interviews of experts) greatly worked to overcome
disadvantages of each (e.g., information limitations of NLRB database, survey response
rate, or the relative size of the expert pool consulted). Those advantages and
disadvantages will be addressed in the analyses for each methodological component as
discussed in Chapter 4.
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As first introduced and visually presented in Figure 4 in Chapter One, the
methodological processes followed for this mixed methods study allowed for the
compilation, analysis, and triangulation of information on workplace representation
elections available from three different sources. The specifics of the explanatory
sequential (Creswell, 2013) methodological steps followed for the study are here more
fully described. First, the researcher collected information from the literature reviewed to
identify and then quantitatively analyze independent variables in an existing
governmental database available on the National Labor Relations Board website
(https://www.nlrb.gov/; hereinafter NLRB database) that permitted specific focus on
information available for elections in certain jurisdictions over a certain period of time.
The researcher next developed, piloted, and administered an original survey instrument
that gathered data on campaign messaging and communication tactics, yielding detailed
information regarding the campaign messages and communication tactics in 32 elections.
The study finally utilized qualitative methodology to conduct semi-structured interviews
of subject matter experts in campaign strategy, regarding their perspectives on employer
campaign messaging and communication tactics, in order to then conduct thematic
analysis of the interview responses and contribute those findings to this study’s enhanced
understanding of the examined topic.
Quantitative Methodology
Two quantitative research methodologies were applied to investigation of the
subject phenomenon: correlational research and survey research.
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Correlational Research Methodology
Informed by the review of the literature as described in Chapter Two, an analysis
of those independent variables (IVs) existing within the governmental database described
below (specifically, 305 elections contained therein) was conducted using quantitative
analyses, including correlation coefficient analysis. Certain IVs for which data was not
available within the 305 elections database were addressed separately in the design of the
original survey entitled Voice of the Employer Survey©, discussed below in the section on
survey research.
Population. The population for this study’s quantitative research included the 305
representation elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in
Regions 10, 12, 15 and 16 for private non-government employers’ workplaces. The
population is the southeastern portion of the United States, which constitutes the largest
percentage of states that allow right to work, itself an important demographic population
to be studied. In states allowing right to work, employees cannot be compelled to join a
union as part of their employment terms and conditions. If the employee is employed in a
unionized workplace, the employee also cannot be required to financially support the
union (Wallender & Smith, 2019).
As is evident from data in Figure 10 reproduced and described below, since 2008,
across the entire United States on average 1,434 NLRB supervised elections occur each
year. The number of elections actually held is approximately one-third less than the
2,108-average number of elections annually requested (petitioned). These elections are
conducted under the auspices of the Regional Directors of the NLRB within each of the
26 regions of the NLRB (www.NLRB.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices). Employees or a
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union may file a petition for a representation election (RC) after collecting signatures
from at least 30% of workers in the potential bargaining unit. Petitions that are not
withdrawn or dismissed result in an NLRB-conducted election. A simple majority of
votes decides the outcome, and in order for the petitioning union to win the election it
must have a majority of the votes cast. Conversely if an employer receives a majority or
even a tie in number of votes cast, it results in a win for the employer. On its website
(https://www.nlrb.gov), the National Labor Relations Board publishes the database of all
workplace representation elections for a ten-year period. It should be noted that some
petitions filed in a given year may not have had an election until a subsequent year; the
number of petitions thus may not equal the total number of dispositions in a given year.
Table 2 charts workplace representation election activity for every single NLRB region
across the United States and its territories for the recent decade of fiscal years 2008-2017.
Table 2
NLRB petitions, elections, and results, FY 2008-2017
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/data/petitions-elections/representation-petitions-rc
Fiscal
Year
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17

Petitions
Filed
2418
2082
2380
2108
1974
1986
2053
2198
2029
1854

Elections
Held
1614
1335
1571
1398
1348
1330
1407
1574
1396
1366

Won by
Union
1028
915
1036
935
868
852
952
1120
1014
940

Lost by
Union
586
420
535
463
480
478
440
480
401
375

Petitions
Petitions
Dismissed Withdrawn
48
784
46
657
37
725
43
667
38
597
27
607
24
586
39
663
38
610
29
493
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The National Labor Relations Board website provides a listing of the employer
and union involved in all of its supervised workplace representation elections. This study
in particular focused its election outcome inquiries on data available for elections within
National Labor Relations Board Regions 10, 12, 15 and 16, specifically stakeholder
employers experiencing elections during the period of April 1, 2015 through May 1,
2017. These NLRB Regions represent the southern portion of the United States and
include 305 elections during the period of study. The dates of the period of the study
coincide with the April 2015 enactment date of the major changes to the NLRB election
process as described in Chapter Two and include two years of election activity.
Figure 10 illustrates the four regions’ jurisdictional coverage in the maps below.

Figure 10. Map of NLRB Regions 10, 12, 15, and 16.
Source: https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices
According to the NLRB’s website, Regions 10, 12, 15, and 16 serve the states of Florida,
Georgia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Louisiana,
Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Missouri, Texas, Georgia, North Carolina,
Alabama, and Tennessee (https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices). As noted,
for the regions considered during the time period described, the size of the population
studied numbered 305 elections.
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Correlational Research Results. In the quantitative data that was available for
this research study, it was the size of the population and sample, 305 elections, that
readily lent itself to the study of the relationships among available variables and
specifically to correlation coefficient analysis. This methodology afforded quantitatively
identifying the strength of the relationships of the variables. This in turn enabled the
testing of a null hypothesis for research questions 1 and 2:
RQ1 – Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in
NLRB elections?
RQ2 – Do contested or stipulated elections favor employers in NLRB elections?
Correlational Research: Null Hypothesis Testing
The importance of null hypothesis testing cannot be overstated. Null hypothesis
significance testing is a widespread method for assessing any hypothesis or theory. One
hypothesis suggests that an effect exists (the alternate hypothesis) and the other says the
effect doesn’t exist (the null hypothesis). This testing is accomplished by creating a test
statistic that represents the alternative hypothesis, and then calculating the probability that
one would get a value as big as the one obtained if the null hypothesis were true. If the
probability is less than .05 we reject the null hypothesis and represent that a statistically
significant finding exists. If the probability is greater than .05 we do not reject the null
hypothesis and represent that a non-statistically significant finding exists (Field, 2013).
In Hypothesis Testing and Sampling, Peter Rogerson (2001) suggested studies
should begin by establishing a null hypothesis. In this study the null hypothesis was:
H0: The percent of election vote is not influenced by any identified independent
variable, the election period, voter turnout, or the size of the unit.
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There are two results that this study relied upon:
•

The null hypothesis is true, and the employers’ decisions do not influence the
workplace representation election vote percentage in favor of the employer; or

•

The null hypothesis is false, indicating that statistically significant data shows
how precisely unusual it would be to obtain our sample if the null hypothesis
were true (see Rogerson, 2011).

A correlation coefficient analysis was conducted on 305 elections to determine if
the independent variables involved shorter election periods and whether elections
contested or stipulated covary with the percentage of vote in favor of the employer.
Informed by the review of the literature as described in Chapter Two, identification and
then analysis of certain independent variables (IVs) existing within the described
governmental database (specifically, 305 elections contained therein) was conducted. It
should be noted here that certain IVs of possible influence on workplace representation
election outcomes for which data was not available within the 305 elections database
were addressed separately, through the design of the original survey entitled Voice of the
Employer Survey©, as discussed below in the section on survey research.
The dataset of the 305 elections provided by the National Labor Relations Board
is presented in categorical variables (see https://www.nlrb.gov/reportsguidance/reports/
election-reports, among them importantly one continuous dependent variable and 3
continuous independent variables within the dataset. As further detailed below, Percent of
the Vote in Favor of the Employer was the dependent variable for this study. The
independent variables selected for assessment of their relationship to that dependent
variable were:
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•

Election Period, the cycle time or duration of the election campaign leading to
the vote,

•

Number of Eligible Voters, a measure of the unit size in the workplace, and

•

Turnout, the percent representing of the Number of Eligible Voters that voted.

Dependent Variable
Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer. The named dependent variable for
this study’s quantitative analysis of the NLRB dataset—Percent of Vote in Favor of the
Employer—is the principal objective of the employer involved in the election, and the
sole determinant of success for a party’s campaign messaging efforts. The question
presented to voters is whether the voting worker seeks to be represented by the
petitioning union; the voting worker is only presented with a single choice: Yes or No.
The dependent variable is mathematically determined by dividing the total
number of NO votes by the total number of all votes cast. This dependent variable is used
to assess the strength of its relationship to the independent variables, those variables
influencing the dependent variable. The practical significance of the Percent of the Vote
in Favor of the Employer, to unions, employees and employers, is one threshold
determination: whether the petitioning union obtains a majority of the vote. If so, the
petitioning union wins the election and the right to represent the workers; conversely, the
employer loses the election. In other words, an employer victory in an NLRB election
only occurs when the employer receives as many, or more, votes than the petitioning
union.
The significance of an employer election loss manifests itself in financial costs
and continued conflict, as the petitioning union along with workers seek to exert power to
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influence the employer to agree to the union’s contractual negotiations. Additionally,
while the conflict between the union and the employer may continue or even escalate, it
is important to remember that the overwhelming majority of elections contain differences
of opinions among the workers themselves on whether union representation is desired in
the workplace. Thus, whether the employer wins the election or not (as measured by the
Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer) is one of the most substantive variables a
worker or employer will encounter in their career.
Independent Variables
This study’s quantitative analysis of the data for the described 305 elections in the
NLRB database sought to assess the strength of influence of the following independent
variables on the described dependent variable.
The Election Period. This independent variable is simply the elapsed time
between the date on which the union files its petition for an election and the date on
which the vote occurs. This independent variable is measured in number of days. As
noted in the literature review, the duration of the election period is a strong predictor of
whether the employer will lose the election. The less time an employer has to campaign
with its messaging on why workers should reject union representation, the smaller will be
of the Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer. As noted in the literature review, if
the petitioning union can obtain an Election Period of 14 days or less, the union has a
near 90% win rate; conversely the employer wins only 10 % of the time when the
election period is 14 days or less in length. The Election Period length thus is perhaps one
of the most controversial variables in an NLRB election and it is the variable that affected
parties most seek to change to create advantage.
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Number of Eligible Voters. The independent variable Number of Eligible Voters
is colloquially known as Unit Size; it is the number of workers in the voting unit. Often
this is a portion of a department, a location, or even an entire company. It is simply
measured in number of people eligible within the workplace to vote. Most understand the
simple concept that it is easier to obtain a consensus of a few rather than to obtain a
consensus among thousands of workers. Analysis of this variable in the database of the
305 elections addressed the relationship strength to election outcome of size in number of
votes cast, as discussed in Chapter Four.
Turnout. This independent variable is measured as the percent of the Number of
Eligible Voters who submit a ballot to vote. Historically NLRB elections have high
turnout; it is an objective of the employer to convince employees of the importance of
their vote. A correlation coefficient analysis of this independent variable in comparison to
the dependent variable Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer was conducted to
yield the extent to which these two independent variables covary when changes occur in
turnout.
In response to research questions RQ1 and RQ2, results of the quantitative
analysis of the 305 elections listing the relationship between the dependent and three
independent variables discussed are presented in Chapter Four.
Survey Research Methodology
Unions view the workplace representation election as the mechanism for taking
power away from management (Bradbury, Brenner, & Slaughter, 2016). From the
perspective of the employer, the workplace representation election system presents
conflict involving whether to utilize election campaign messages and communication
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tactics in an attempt to retain power and prevent having it seized by a union. In turn
employees are affected to varying degrees by the employer’s campaign messaging and
communication tactics, such as through website statements, social media, letters to
homes, and other means of communication.
Because information on certain independent variables (IVs) with possible
influence on the outcome of workplace representation elections were not available within
the 305 elections database, the researcher addressed those IVs through the design of an
original survey entitled Voice of the Employer Survey©, discussed below.
Survey Population and Sample
The Voice of the Employer Survey© instrument was designed to be administered
to employers who participated in a workplace representation election during the research
period. The survey population and sample size were the same for this methodological
component of the study as it was for the study’s correlational research component
previously described: 305 employers experiencing a workplace representation election in
NLRB Regions 10, 12, 15, and 16 during the research period of April 1, 2015 through
May 1, 2017.
Pilot Test. In the course of the Voice of the Employer Survey© instrument’s
design and before its administration to identified employer representatives for the 305
elections, pilot testing of the instrument was a methodological necessity. As Litwin
(2003) noted in Pilot Testing –The Survey Kit: How to Assess and Interpret Survey
Psychometrics, “pilot testing is a necessary and important part of survey development”
(p. 58). It enables the researcher to identify the context and process by which subjects
will understand and provide responses (and thereby data) to the researcher’s instrument.
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Litwin suggests the pilot test is among the most critical steps in assessing the practical
application of the instrument. In Pamela Alreck and Robert Settle’s (2004) The Survey
Research Handbook, the authors noted that the advantages of a pilot survey include the
ability to understand the degree of variance and confidence intervals that can be expected
from the actual survey. They also observed that the pilot survey “need not even use the
same data collection method as that for the main survey, and [pilot surveys] can often be
completed easily, quickly and inexpensively” (p. 69).
To conduct the pilot study, three subject matter experts were selected from
program speakers on the topic of labor relations and workplace representation elections at
recent industry and professional conferences during 2018; one such conference is
reflected below in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Fall 2018 CUE conference flyer.
Source: https://www.cueinc.com/fall-2018-cue-conference-powerful-and-resilientensuring-success-together/
The advantage of such an approach is the validation of the subject matter experts’
knowledge as recognized by their peers within the industry or profession. Each of the
three individuals was contacted by phone requesting their review of the drafted

93
instrument (Appendix B). The subject matter expert was asked to complete the survey as
a would-be respondent while on the phone with the researcher. The objective of the pilot
test of the instrument was not data collection but rather testing of the instrument. This
then enabled the researcher to accomplish the objectives of the pilot study, which
included:
•

observe the completion of the sample survey under controlled conditions;

•

identify the elapsed time to complete the survey;

•

identify any misunderstandings of the wording, context, or operational
definitions within the items; and

•

identify any problematic format design choices.

The input provided by three different iterations of the pilot test of the survey instrument
reinforced the utility and understandability of the instrument as drafted (Appendix B).
Procedures for Recruitment and Data Collection. The final version of the survey
is included in Appendix C. The accompanying packet of information included a
welcome, definitions of the independent variables, an explanation of participant rights,
and a thank you letter unique to each survey recipient (Appendix D).
The survey itself was administered utilizing traditional paper and pencil
methodology. While it is understood that this surveying methodology is atypical of
modern research, there are distinct advantages to using the traditional paper and pencil
method. The chief benefit is that the survey respondent has an immediate understanding
of the complexity and time required to complete the survey. An additional benefit of
using a paper and pencil survey was the ability to brand the survey to increase the
likelihood of an employer’s response.
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Employers received the survey instrument mailed through the U.S. Postal Service
inquiring about their specific election experience. A traditional mail survey can expect no
better than a 20% response rate when no response incentives are provided (Bourque &
Fielder, 2003). The 32 respondent employers considered for analysis within this study
have a significant vested interest in the study results. Access to a model of winning
employer campaign messaging and communication tactics would be particularly
beneficial to employers and no doubt influenced some or all to volunteer for this research
study by submitting their election experience and information. The response rate and data
obtained are addressed in greater detail in Chapter Four.
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable identified to assess its relationship
to the independent variables was defined as the Percentage of the Vote in Favor of the
Employer. This dependent variable importantly indicates the election outcome,
specifically whether the employer won or lost. This was measured by the percent of the
votes obtained by the employer. An employer victory in a representation election
supervised by the NLRB occurs when the employer receives more votes than the
petitioning union or when the vote is a tie. In other words, the petitioning union must
receive most of the votes for the employer to lose the election.
Independent Variables. Below are the operational definitions of the independent
variables that the literature review anticipated to be the best predictors of the election
outcome, namely the percent of the vote in favor of the employer that is determinative of
either winning or losing the election. These independent variables were the subject of
inquiry for the survey instrument design.
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As noted in Chapter Two, in his book Total Victory! The Complete Management
Guide to a Successful NLRB Representation Election, Donald Wilson (1998) chronicled
and defined typical employer communication messages and tactics (e.g., meetings,
letters, posters, Facebook, Twitter). Wilson described many of the independent variables
that were determinative of employers’ election success. The book was published after a
long career of providing consultation to employers both directly and indirectly in 3,500
elections. Drawing on his extensive experience, Wilson highlighted the recommended
messages and communication tactics most predictive of the vote in favor of an employer.
Unfortunately, his book has not been updated nor generated repeated published studies
since its initial 1998 release. This mixed methods research study expanded upon and may
be compared with Wilson’s research, as well as with other studies included within the
literature reviewed addressing the contemporary election environment faced by
employers during the 2015 – 2017 timespan covered by the 2015 election revisions.
Chief amongst Wilson’s (1998) identified independent variables determinative of
employer’s election success are the following, providing guidance for the independent
variables used in this study.
Posters. Wilson (1998) defines a poster as literature displayed conspicuously
throughout the workplace. Typically, such employer campaign posters include no more
than a few words and can be easily understood, require only a moment to read, and are
posted in the workplace for only a short time – one or two days. Such posters vary
significantly in tone and purpose (cf. Appendix E). A rather benign but thematically
integrated poster might include a photo of a bowling ball and bowling pins with the
phrase “only this kind of strike is fun” (Wilson, 1998, p. 167). For this study measures of
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the independent variable posters included asking employers if posters were used in their
campaign, and if so to identify the total number of posters used: 0-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16+.
Captive Audience Meetings. The captive audience meeting is simply a gathering
of employees in which management conveys its position or persuasive communication
supporting its position in the workplace representation election. Such meetings are
facilitated by the employer’s management and conducted “on the clock” (paid time),
often in small groups of typically 10 or less employees. In his book Total Victory Wilson
(1998) referenced the experience of over 3,500 representation elections. He suggested
there is a direct correlation between the number of captive audience meetings and the
likelihood that management will win the representation election. He stated that his
company, Labor Relations Institute, has shown a correlation between the number of
captive audience meetings conducted by the employer and the prediction that
management will receive more of the vote, a greater chance that management will win
the election. His data provided an excellent operational measurement and inquiry for the
employer regarding number of captive audience meetings held: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5+.
Wilson’s (1998) data showed the following operational link to the chance that
management will win the election, as reproduced below in Table 3.
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Table 3
Captive audience and employer win rate (Wilson, 1998, p. 198)
Number of Captive Audience Meetings
5+

Chance Management Will Win
Representation Election
92.7%

4

79.6%

3

69.5%

2

58.9%

1

45.2%

0

32.1%

However, given the importance and predictive ability of captive audience
meetings, the use of such a communication tool is the subject of ridicule by unions.
Figure 12 presents an image that is a recent example of the International Association of
Machinists’ Facebook page; it provides the union’s viewpoint of captive audience
meetings in a campaign communication for its February 2019 election.
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Figure 12. Union campaign poster, Walgreens 2019 election.
Source:
wwww.facebook.com/goiamwalgreens/photos/a.840379849334575/2448496711856206/?
type=3&theater
Letter to Employees’ Homes. To reach not only the employee but also influential
members of the employee’s family, employers often will mail letters to employees’
homes communicating the employer’s position. Such an independent variable lent itself
to a simple measure of the number of different types of letters mailed to employees
during the campaign. This independent variable provided an operational measurement for
the employer’s use of different types of letters mailed to employees’ homes: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
5+.
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The Strike Calculator. A common employer message centers upon the extent and
context for unions’ use of strikes to pressure employers at other companies. A strike is
one of the more effective tools that unions can use to influence and impact the
employer’s bargaining position. However, strikes can have a significant financial and
economic impact upon employees of the employer. During a strike, employees do not
receive pay and often do not receive benefits. During representation campaigns
employers often use a strike calculator to illustrate the amount of money an employee
would lose from a strike. The calculation is based upon their wages and a potential wage
increase, along with the estimated strike duration, which then yields a calculation of how
long it will take to recover the lost income. This dichotomous independent variable was
measured simply by whether it was used or not.
Use of Attorney, Consultant, or Paid Persuader. The use of an attorney,
consultant or paid persuader was amongst the chief independent variables identified by
the subject matter experts as most predictive and impactful upon the percentage of the
vote in favor of the employer. The use of an attorney, consultant or paid persuader
represented three different dichotomous variables.
The operational definition for attorney includes the hiring of a licensed
professional to provide legal advice and guidance for the employer’s strategy and
decisions made throughout the workplace representation election. The attorney’s chief
asset is the knowledge and use of the employment and labor law. The operational
definition for a consultant includes that person who chiefly guides the strategy and
decisions made throughout the campaign. The chief difference between an attorney and a
consultant is that a consultant’s chief asset is experience during campaigns, which may or
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may not include legal expertise. Finally, the operational definition for a paid persuader
includes an individual who is chiefly hired to speak directly to employees to persuade
employee votes. The chief asset of paid persuaders is their experience in campaigns and
ability to relate to the voting employees.
Notably, consultants and paid persuaders are not inexpensive; $3,000 per day fees
plus travel and expenses are common charges. To illustrate, the government issues reports
called LM-20 reports, in which consultants and persuaders are required to disclose the
scope of their services and their fee to each client employer (Greenhouse, 2016). An
example of such a report is reproduced in Appendix F. The LM-20 report reflects the
consultancy fees ($3,000 per consultant per day, plus travel expenses) charged the
employer for the Walgreens workplace representation election in February 2019 in
Jupiter, Florida; Walgreens won the election, with 280 votes cast in favor of Walgreens
and 210 votes cast in favor of voting for union representation by the International
Association of Machinists union.
Each of the aforementioned dichotomous independent variables was measured by
whether the employer utilized any of these three types of campaign experts. Descriptive
statistics were conducted to describe each of the independent variables. It should be noted
that the use of descriptive analyses can create methodological limitations and such
representations may yield correlations and yet not represent causal relationships
(Mondore et al., 2011). These were then presented in the form of frequency tables
including measures of central tendency and dispersion when applicable to each variable,
as further discussed in Chapter 4.
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Qualitative Methodology
To collect qualitative data for this study’s mixed methods approach seeking
answers to the identified research questions, the researcher first reviewed all available
and applicable prior studies; Chapter Two contains extensive information on prior studies
regarding employers’ use of messaging and communication tactics during NLRB
elections. The researcher then utilized a specific and highly informative qualitative
research methodological tool, the semi-structured interview, to inform, supplement, and
complement this study’s collected quantitative survey data about said messaging and
communication tactics. A thematic analysis was conducted on the semi-structured
interview data following the method outlined by researchers Virginia Braun and Victoria
Clarke (2006), as detailed in Chapter Four. As next discussed, the specific population and
sample of subject matter experts provided information critical to a fuller understanding of
the conflict topic that is this study’s focus.
Participant Selection Rationale
For the qualitative component of this mixed methods research study, purposive
sampling criteria was based upon choosing participants who are recognized as subject
matter experts by virtue of their selection as industry or professional conference
presenters on the topic of this research study. Bernard (2006) defines this purposive or
judgment sampling as “you decide the purpose you want informants to serve, and you go
out and find some” (p. 189). The seven employer representative interviewees selected
have significant experience in numerous workplace representation elections; each
participant was a speaker at one or more professional conferences on the subject of
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workplace representation elections. Each has numerous campaign elections in their career
experience and is recognized in the labor relations profession as a subject matter expert.
To participate in this study each of the seven subject matter experts was provided
the Interview Respondent Participation Agreement (Appendix G). During the interviews
each expert reflected upon their experience and actively shared the rationale for decisions
they had employed regarding campaign messaging and communication tactics with the
ability to influence the named dependent variable, the Percent of the Vote in Favor of the
Employer.
While the database and survey quantitative research portions of this study
collected information from employers and their representatives, the qualitative interviews
with the described seven subject matter experts provided a third and complementary
methodological component for triangulation (see Creswell, 2013, p. 251) of data to more
fully describe a conflictual topic or phenomenon: employer decisions regarding the
selection of election campaign messaging and communication tactics. The subject matter
experts themselves have used or considered using each of the independent variables listed
in the survey, and thus were uniquely capable of responding to this study’s remaining
three research questions:
RQ3 – What type of messages result in an increase of the vote in favor of the
employer in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections?
RQ4 – What modalities of communication tactics result in an increase of the vote
in favor of the employer in NLRB elections?
RQ5 – Does relying on a campaign consultant increase the vote in favor of the
employer in NLRB elections?
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The subject matter experts commented on each of these three research questions
that were the primary focus of the interviews and their qualitative analysis. The resulting
collective responses were synthesized into a unified statement for each of the foregoing
research questions, as discussed in Chapter Four.
Structured Interviews: Participation & Instrumentation
While there are numerous qualitative approaches available to study the
phenomenon of workplace representation election messaging and communication tactics,
Creswell (2013) recommends the researcher starts with the outcome: what the approach is
attempting to accomplish. For workplace representation election messaging and
communication tactics, it was important to enhance the researcher’s understanding of the
quantitative analyses conducted on both the database and the survey administered to
employers. Semi-structured interviews provided a tremendously useful additional
qualitative research tool to fulfill this study objective.
Researchers Barriball and While (1994) noted that the semi-structured interview
method is “well suited for the exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents
regarding complex and sometimes sensitive issues and enables probing for more
information and clarification of answers” (p. 330). The conflict within the NLRB election
system is fraught with complexity and nuances, thereby rendering the semi-structured
interview as an ideal methodology for capturing the opinions of the subject matter
experts.
When presented with the opportunity to inform this study all seven subject matter
experts yielded 100% participation. Each was contacted by email or phone and presented
with the Interview Respondent Participation Agreement (Appendix G). The format of the
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guide prompted the researcher to confirm each participant’s understanding of the study,
their receipt of the agreement as well as their understanding of voluntary participation
and their ability to terminate the interview at their discretion, and finally that their
identity would be coded and anonymous in order to facilitate open, forthright comments.
The subject matter experts’ knowledge and experience, along with their availability and
willingness to share perspectives on their historical use of NLRB election campaign
messaging and communication tactics, were all crucial factors satisfying the purposive
judgment sampling criteria for this research study (see Bernard, 2006, pp. 189-190).
The researcher determined that conducting structured interviews by telephone
would be highly conducive to successful aea cquisition of information. Telephone
conversations naturally follow an agenda‐driven format that is initiated by the caller,
similar to the process followed in semi‐structured interviews. Cachia and Millward
(2011) found that the telephone medium and the semi-structured interview modality are
complementary. Notably, the previously discussed introductory statements provided to
participants remained separate and apart from the subsequent interview questions (see
Appendix H; see also Frey, Fink, & Oishi, 1995). For these initial portions of the
interview the researcher used a smooth conversational tone for instructions, probes, and
prompts. As Frey, Fink, and Oishi (1995) noted, the interview’s beginning establishes the
tone for the entire interview, creating a “rapport effect” (p. 100) that builds trust and
enhances willingness to participate in the interview.
With the participants’ approval, the interviews were audio recorded and
transcribed. The interviews lasted approximately 15 to 25 minutes in duration. Each of
the interviewees were assigned a participant number in order to maintain confidentiality
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and eliminate the possibility of potential harm from their participation in this research
study, in accordance with ethical obligations as discussed below. However, as a subject
matter expert each interviewee was known to the researcher, and all interviewees know
each other well. Each of the interviewees was offered and each requested a copy of the
final research study.
In conducting the participant phone interviews, it was important to establish a
degree of comfort between the researcher and participant. This was accomplished by
asking how long the participant had been involved in campaign messaging and
communication tactics, and then proceeding afterward with the other focal points of
inquiry. Depending upon the interviewee’s response, follow-up inquiry followed
Moustakas’ (1994) technique of inquiry, asking open-ended questions such as “How
successful did you feel each campaign messages or communication tactics were at the
time you typically decided on its use? How has the campaign messaging and
communication tactics experience affected how you feel about your involvement in
workplace representation elections?”
Role of the Researcher. Qualitative research required a commitment to ethics and
reflexivity on the part of the researcher, with particular attention paid to the subjective
nature of this study.
Researcher as Observer. Given this researcher’s experience serving as both a
former union member as well as the employers’ representative in numerous NLRB
elections, a reliance upon document review, database analysis, and the opinions of
subject matter experts was critically important to ensuring the reliability and validity of
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the instant research. The researcher’s role in this study was solely that of an observer; the
researcher did not participate in any election included within this research study.
Relationships Between Researcher and Research Participants. The researcher is
known within segments of the employers’ labor relations community; he is known to
each of the subject matter experts, who also are acquainted with each other. However, the
researcher maintains no contractual relationships with any of said participants.
Researcher Bias. As noted previously, this researcher was a union member for
years; he has served as employer representative in over twenty NLRB elections. For
several years before and during the course of this research study, the researcher served on
the Labor Relations Expert Panel of the Society for Human Resources Management and
participated in several other labor relations-oriented professional organizations. The
researcher is an adjunct full professor and teaches labor relations for an international
university. He has published articles on the subject of labor relations and is a frequent
speaker at conferences on the subjects of labor relations and NLRB elections. For all the
foregoing reasons it was critically important that the researcher recognize and evaluate
his own assumptions and biases, in order to most objectively support the research and
findings in this mixed methods research study.
To recognize, assess, and maintain awareness of researcher bias, the researcher
engaged in a collaborative reflexivity exercise with fellow researcher Bruce Lilyea, PhD,
whose expertise resides in qualitative methodology involving organizational conflict. The
reflexivity exercise acknowledged the researcher’s participation in over 20 workplace
representation elections, along with the researcher’s involvement in selecting messaging
and communication tactics to influence the percent of the vote in favor of the respective
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employers. The exercise included a review of the researcher’s career history,
participation in election messaging and communication tactics, and teaching experience
on the subject of NLRB elections, as well as an exploration of the researcher’s biased
assumptions based upon prior experience. The objective of the exercise was to reflect and
maintain an awareness of the existing bias in order to design and evaluate the qualitative
data collection from an objective perspective. Understanding the need to periodically
review the result of the reflexivity exercise, the following bracketing statement was
created to guide the data collection and analysis:
The researcher will reflect upon and eschew preconceived rationale for the use
and efficacy of all campaign election messaging and communication tactics for
the design, collection, and analysis of qualitative data obtained from subject
matter experts.
The researcher reviewed this bracketing statement prior to each interview of the seven
subject matter experts, to carefully and deliberately eschew the influence of his own
readily available perspectives stemming from personal experience in numerous
workplace representation election campaigns.
The focus of the qualitative portion of this study was not on the subject matter
expert individual participants but rather on their experiential representative comments, in
order to add insight to the obtained employer survey responses previously discussed.
Each interview supported an understanding of the collective experience of the subject
matter experts. The net result of the qualitative portion of this study was generation of a
meaningful narrative to enhance the understanding of the quantitative survey employer
response and generate a triangulated response to the research questions.
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Ethical Procedures
The researched complied with all requirements of ethical research training as
mandated by Nova Southeastern University, completing CITI Program training for the
protection of human subject research participants on May 27, 2018. Further and as
detailed above, the researcher carefully acknowledged and complied with ethical
requirements in the wording, instrumentation, and conduct of the interviews with each
participant, and used bracketing to avoid the influence of researcher bias.
Record Retention and Audit Facilitation
To support the credibility of the quantitative survey analyses and qualitative
structured interview study findings, it was necessary to apply the highest standards of
organization and structural record retention to facilitate post-research audits and avoid
duplication of results. The organization and format for this record retention included the
preservation of:
•

the study’s bracketing statement;

•

notes of all interviews;

•

interview notes of identified horizons;

•

all documents in which the horizons were coded and categorized into thematic
clusters;

•

all analytic memos;

•

the textural descriptions written for each participant; and

•

copies of all drafts, along with the final dissertation study research report.
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All of the foregoing described procedures followed for each methodology described in
this mixed methods research study was approved by the Nova Southeastern University
Institutional Review Board (IRB) on May 9, 2019, and on February 25, 2020.
Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 3 described the three-part mixed methods approach of this research study.
The three research components included:
•

a quantitative research design for a governmental database of 305 NLRBsupervised elections,

•

a survey of employer representatives involving 32 elections, and

•

semi-structured interviews with seven subject matter experts, supplemented
with thematic analysis of content data.

These three critical quantitative and qualitative research components were designed to
contribute to a triangulated view of the relationship between the percent of the vote in
favor of the employer and several independent variables. The investigator’s correlational
research, analysis of the survey of employer messaging and communication tactics, as
well as the thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) of the subject matter expert semistructured interviews—detailed next in Chapter Four—achieved the triangulation
(Creswell, 2013) so useful in the mixed methods approach.
Chapter Three addressed the researcher’s role and personal experience involving
NLRB elections, outlining steps taken to maintain the reliability and validity of this
research study’s analyses and findings through the utilization of bracketing techniques to
mitigate the researcher’s biases, paradigms, and assumptions. The chapter also described
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steps taken to comply with the ethics protocol of Nova Southeastern University’s
Institutional Review Board.
The quantitative and qualitative analytical processes applied to each of the three
foregoing described and approved data sources along with the researcher’s resultant
findings are presented in Chapter Four, with implications and recommendations regarding
workplace representation elections from the perspective of the employer following in
Chapter Five.
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Chapter 4: Presentation of the Research Findings
The objective of this study was to develop a model to assist employers for what is
arguably the most contentious conflict that can exist in the American workplace: a
workplace representation election, supervised by the National Labor Relations Board.
The intent of a workplace representation election is to determine whether a petitioning
union has sufficient support to unionize a unit of employees within a workplace. This
mixed methods research study sought to develop a model to assist employers in assessing
the efficacy and success of election-related messages and communication tactics, in order
to achieve an increase in votes in favor of the employer and a successful election
outcome.
The developed model is the product of a triangulation between three analytical
research components of the study: 1) quantitative analysis of an existing dataset of 305
elections, 2) quantitative analysis of results obtained for the researcher’s survey of 32
elections, and 3) qualitative research thematic analysis of interviews of seven NLRB
subject matter experts. These analyses were conducted to gain understanding and answers
for the study’s five research questions:
RQ1 – Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in
NLRB elections?
RQ2 – Do contested or stipulated elections favor employers in NLRB elections?
RQ3 – What type of messages result in an increase of the vote in favor of the
employer in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections?
RQ4 – What modalities of communication tactics result in an increase of the vote
in favor of the employer in NLRB elections?
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RQ5 – Does relying on a campaign consultant increase the vote in favor of the
employer in NLRB elections?
Correlational Quantitative Research Methodology: 305 Elections
In this first portion of the study’s research, 305 elections in four NLRB Regions
as represented in an existing governmental database were analyzed to extract and better
understand their numerous descriptive and demographic characteristics. Through this
descriptive data many portions of the research questions were answered. The statistical
analysis of the database below included scatterplots and the production of a correlation
coefficient table. The results of the correlation analysis are presented to assess the
relationship of the percentage of the vote in favor of the employer in comparison with
three independent variables available in the original 305 elections database.
As is apparent in the literature reviewed, an NLRB election is one of the most
contentious conflicts that occurs in the workplace. There is a tendency to frame the
workplace representation election conflict as one of labor unions versus management.
However, it is important to remember that the elections are determined by the workers,
the employees themselves. More often than not the employees themselves are at odds, in
conflict with each other on whether unionization is desired for their respective workforce.
The 305 elections studied for this research reflect the decisions of 19,519 employees who
voted in those 305 NLRB elections. Of these 305 elections studied, only 55 or 18% of
these were decided by a unanimous vote of the employees. Of these 55, the employer
received zero votes in an overwhelming 53 of these 55 elections. In only two of the
elections did the employees unanimously reject union representation. The remaining 250
(350-55) elections decided by non-unanimous vote illustrate organizational conflict
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existing not only between the employer and union but also among the employees, since
some portion wanted union representation and some portion did not. Thus in those 250
elections with less than 100% of the vote in favor of either the employer or the union, a
total of 19,134 employees were in conflict with each other, as there was disagreement
among employees on the question of union representation.
The 305 elections included within this research occurred between 2015 and 2017
in four Regions of the NLRB, in what are known as the Right to Work states. In a study
of all elections across the United States in the first half 2018, employers on average won
31% of the workplace representation elections. This rate was a slight increase in
comparison to the 2017 employer win rate of 29% (Combs & Cinquegrani, 2018). In this
study of 305 elections, the employer won 32.7 percent of the 305 elections studied for a
total of 100 elections. The minimum percent of the vote in favor of the employer is 50%
and in these 100 elections where the employer won, the largest percent in favor of the
employer is 100%. The mean percent of the vote in favor of the employer in the 100
elections when the employer won the election was 65.35%. The median was 63.1% and
the most frequent percent of the vote in favor of the employer was exactly 50%, as can be
seen in the histogram below in Figure 13. With over one-third of the workforce in
disagreement with the election results, workforce representation elections understandably
are rife with conflict.
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Figure 13. Vote in favor of employer in 100 elections.
The mean percent of the vote in favor of the employer in all of the 305 elections
held in the four NLRB Regions was 35%, as illustrated in Figure 14 below.

Figure 14. Vote in favor of employer in 305 elections.
A review of the dataset of the 305 elections revealed categorical variables
appropriate for this study’s focus of inquiry, most importantly a dependent variable and
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three continuous independent variables included within the dataset provided by the
National Labor Relations Board. Notably these selected variables include:
•

Dependent Variable: Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer;

•

Independent Variable: Turnout, which is the percent of the number of
eligible voters which vote;

•

Independent Variable: Election Period, meaning the cycle time or duration
of the election campaign leading to the vote; and

•

Independent Variable: Number of Eligible Voters (Unit Size), a measure
(known as the unit size) of the employees eligible to vote in the workplace.

Field (2013) noted that outliers can bias estimates of parameters such as the mean.
A review of the 305 elections in the database indicated 5 elections were outliers because
of their extended election period (exceeding 200 days). After removal of the 5 outliers the
mean for the election period of the remaining 300 elections averaged 29 days in length.
Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables
Before assessing the strength of the relationships between the dependent and
independent variables, the researcher assessed whether a correlational analysis was
appropriate. Laerd Statistics, a publisher of SPSS Statistics guides, publishes seven
assumptions necessary for the use of the Pearson r statistic used to assess the relationship
of two variables. Each of these seven assumptions must be satisfied in order to utilize the
Pearson r statistic or it becomes necessary to utilize a different statistic. The seven
assumptions address: level of measurement, related pairs, absence of outliers, and
linearity. The chart below summarizes the seven assumptions, each of which was met by
the data within this study.
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1. Data is measured on a continuous scale;
2. Each case has two values [data points], one for each variable;
3. There is an independence of cases, meaning there are two observations for
each single case;
4. There is a linear relationship between the two measured continuous variables;
5. Both continuous variables follow a bivariate normal distribution;
6. Homoscedasticity exists as the variances along the line of best fit remain
similar throughout the line; and
7. There are no univariate or multivariate outliers. (Laerd Statistics, 2020)
To assess the strength of the association between any two variables researchers
utilize descriptive labels to represent this continuum. Generally, the strength of
association is represented as a small, medium, or large correlation. While researchers
sometimes vary slightly in their designations, this researcher utilized the Laerd Statistics
model for designating the strength of correlation as indicated below in Table 4.
Table 4
Correlation strength of association continuum
Coefficient, r
Positive

Coefficient, r
Negative

Small

.1 to .3

-0.1 to -0.3

Medium

.3 to .5

-0.3 to -0.5

Large

.5 to 1.0

-0.5 to -1.0

Strength of Association

Source: https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/pearson-correlation-coefficientstatistical-guide.php
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A correlation matrix of the three identified continuous independent variables for
the 300 elections revealed relationships as illustrated in Table 5. A review of the Pearson r
correlations indicates there is a small positive correlation between the dependent variable
Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer and each of the three identified independent
variables. Specifically, there is a small though highly significant relationship with the
Number of Eligible Voters (Unit Size) with an r = .200, p = .000; a small though
significant relationship with Turnout having an r =.136, p = .019; and lastly a small
though not significant positive correlation for Election Period with an r= .074, p = .204.
Table 5
Correlations: Study's dependent variable with 3 independent variables
Correlation Coefficients for the 300 Elections: Study Variables
1
2
3
Variable
1. Percent of Vote in Pearson
1
Favor of Employer Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
2. Turnout (Percent
of eligible voters
who voted)

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.136*

3. Election period
(Duration of the
election
campaign)
4. Number of Eligible
Voters (aka Unit
Size)

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.074

-.066

.204

.257

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.200**

-.004

.040

.000

.950

.492

4

1

.019

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

1

1
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Below are results of the analysis of each independent variable. The order that the
independent variables are reported here was determined by, and corresponds to, the
ascending significance of each one’s relationship to the dependent variable.
Consequently, Turnout is addressed first, Election Period second, and last—but most
importantly—Number of Eligible Voters, which is also known as Unit Size.
Turnout. An important part of the employers’ campaign is to encourage
employees to vote when provided the opportunity (Wilson, 1998). Correlating the Percent
of the Vote in Favor of the Employer with Turnout yields a Pearson r of .136, which is
statistically significant at p = .019. As illustrated in Figure 15, ambivalence about voting
is a rarity in these workplace representation elections.

Figure 15. Turnout for 305 elections.
On average 87.5% of eligible employees voted in the 305 elections studied, which had a
median 92.8% of the employees voting in the election. The most frequent turnout
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(voting) percent is 100%, thus illustrating the importance of the election to the voting
employees.
Election Period (Elapsed Cycle Time of the Election). Many of the complaints
that employers had regarding the 2015 revised NLRB election rules centered upon the
shortened election period (Hayes, 2018). Prior to the 2015 election changes, nationwide
workplace representation elections averaged 38 days. However, the 2015 revised
regulations resulted in an average cycle time of a mere 23 days (see Becker & Rhinehart,
2018, p. 3; Hardie & Murphy, 2016, p. 1; National Labor Relations Board, 2019).
Employers were adamant that a mere 23 days was an insufficient period of time for
employees to make the most important decision of their career (Hayes, 2018).
It is for this reason that this study asked the important research question:
Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in National Labor
Relations Board elections? The null hypothesis states that no difference exists; therefore,
any positive or negative correlation will result in a rejected null hypothesis. The resulting
correlation indicates a positive relationship between the dependent variable, Percent of
the Vote in Favor of the Employer, and the independent variable Election Period, with r =
.074, p = .204. While not statistically significant there is practical significance in the
positive relationship between the variables.
Table 6 below is a frequency chart of the number of calendar days, also known as
the cycle time for each of the 305 elections studied. As predicted by employers, at least
one election occurred in as little as 10 days (Yager, 2015). In that election of 11
employees only one voted in favor of the employer. Table 6 reveals at least 5 of these
elections exceeded over 200 days and are certainly outliers to the most frequent election
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period with a mode of 21 days. These 305 elections illustrate that over one half of the
elections occurred in 24 or less days. Within these 305 elections, over 11,047 days were
spent in election conflict.
Table 6
Frequency chart of the election period in 305 elections
Frequency Chart of Election Period for 305 Elections

Valid

10

Frequency
1

Percent
.3

Valid Percent
.3

Cumulative
Percent
.3

12

1

.3

.3

.7

14

2

.6

.7

1.3

15

2

.6

.7

2.0

16

8

2.4

2.6

4.6

17

9

2.7

3.0

7.5

18

4

1.2

1.3

8.9

19

7

2.1

2.3

11.1

20

13

3.9

4.3

15.4

21

37

11.1

12.1

27.5

22

27

8.1

8.9

36.4

23

29

8.7

9.5

45.9

24

26

7.8

8.5

54.4

25

10

3.0

3.3

57.7

26

8

2.4

2.6

60.3
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Frequency Chart of Election Period for 305 Elections

27

Frequency
14

Percent
4.2

Valid Percent
4.6

Cumulative
Percent
64.9

28

15

4.5

4.9

69.8

29

7

2.1

2.3

72.1

30

7

2.1

2.3

74.4

31

6

1.8

2.0

76.4

32

1

.3

.3

76.7

33

3

.9

1.0

77.7

34

2

.6

.7

78.4

35

4

1.2

1.3

79.7

36

9

2.7

3.0

82.6

37

5

1.5

1.6

84.3

38

6

1.8

2.0

86.2

39

1

.3

.3

86.6

41

2

.6

.7

87.2

42

10

3.0

3.3

90.5

43

2

.6

.7

91.1

44

2

.6

.7

91.8

45

3

.9

1.0

92.8

47

1

.3

.3

93.1

48

1

.3

.3

93.4
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Frequency Chart of Election Period for 305 Elections

50

Frequency
1

Percent
.3

Valid Percent
.3

Cumulative
Percent
93.8

52

1

.3

.3

94.1

54

1

.3

.3

94.4

57

1

.3

.3

94.8

59

2

.6

.7

95.4

63

1

.3

.3

95.7

79

2

.6

.7

96.4

136

1

.3

.3

96.7

139

2

.6

.7

97.4

144

1

.3

.3

97.7

171

1

.3

.3

98.0

179

1

.3

.3

98.4

202

1

.3

.3

98.7

264

1

.3

.3

99.0

363

1

.3

.3

99.3

670

1

.3

.3

99.7

724

1

.3

.3

100.0

Total

305

100.0

100.0

A better illustration of the impact that the allotted Election Period has on
Percentage of the Vote in Favor of the Employer is a comparison of the shortest elections
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with the longest elections. To accomplish this, the percentage of the vote in favor of the
employer for the 30 shortest elections was compared with the 30 longest elections. In the
30 longest elections, employers received 50% or more of the vote in 27 of the 30
elections for a 90%-win rate. In contrast, in the 30 shortest elections employers received
50% or more of the vote in only four of the 30 elections, for a win rate of only 13%. A
review of these 60 elections strongly demonstrated and validated employers’ concerns
that the shorter the election cycle, the smaller the percent of the vote in favor of the
employer. Consequently, the employer acts in its own interests by lengthening the
election cycle time and providing employees as much time to interpret campaign
messages prior to voting on whether to unionize or remain union-free.
Thus, the answer to the following research question is distinctively clear: Do
shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in National Labor
Relations Board elections? Yes, shorter election periods result in less employer victories
in National Labor Relations Board elections.
In 5 cases within the 305 database elections cases (see Table 7 below) the election
period exceeded 200 days; their distinction from the other 300 elections warranted
excluding each as an outlier (Field, 2013) and the correlation output which included those
five was not significant.
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Table 7
Descriptive election period data for 305 elections (including outliers)
Descriptive election period data: 305 elections
(including outliers)
N

Valid

305

Mean

36.22

Std. Error of Mean

3.589

Median

24.00

Mode

21

Std. Deviation

62.685

Variance

3929.468

Skewness

8.610

Std. Error of Skewness

.140

Kurtosis

84.142

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.278

Range

714

Minimum

10

Maximum

724

Sum

11047

Removal of outliers left 300 elections for study (see Table 8) to further assess the
relationship between the independent variable Election Period and the dependent variable
Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer, as shown below in Table 9.
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Table 8
Descriptive election period data for 300 elections (excluding outliers)

N

Valid

Descriptive election period data for 300 elections
(excluding 5 outliers)
300
Mean

29.41

Std. Error of Mean

1.156

Median

24.00

Mode

21

Std. Deviation

20.016

Variance

400.631

Skewness

4.979

Std. Error of Skewness

.141

Kurtosis

29.097

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.281

Range

169

Minimum

10

Maximum

179

Sum

8824
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Table 9
Descriptive election period and employer win data for 300 elections
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
29.41

Std. Deviation
20.016

N
300

34.69%

26.23%

300

Election Period
Percent of Vote in Favor of
Employer

As can be seen in Table 10 below illustrating the correlation between the election
period and the percent of the vote in favor of the employer for the 300 elections, the
relationship of the variables remained skewed by the outliers. However, there was a
positive correlation of .074 between the Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer and
the Election Period, though it was not statistically significant with a p value of .204.
Table 10
Correlations: Election period and employer win data, 300 elections

Election Period

Pearson Correlation

Election Period
1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Percent of Vote in Pearson Correlation
Favor of Employer
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Percent of Vote in Favor
of Employer
.074
.204

300

300

.074

1

.204
300

300

A histogram of the frequency of election period or duration of the election
campaign illustrates the extent that outliers exist, as seen in Figure 16 below.
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Election Period and Percent of the Vote in favor of the Employer for 300 elections

Figure 16. Histogram: Election period and percent of the vote in favor of the employer
data, 300 elections.
A scatterplot illustrates the impact of the correlation and illustrates six outliers skewing
the relationship, as seen below in Figure 17.

Figure 17. Scatterplot: Election period and percent of the vote in favor of the employer
data, 300 elections.
Excluding only 11 outliers of the 305 elections enabled a study of all remaining
294 elections with an election period of 80 days or less. The most frequent election
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period remained at 21 days with a median of 24 days and a mean of 26 days. The 294
workplace representation elections in Table 11 represent over 7,900 days spent in election
conflict.
Table 11
Descriptive election period data, 294 elections (excluding 11 outliers)
Election Period
N

Valid

294
Mean

26.93

Std. Error of Mean

.560

Median

24.00

Mode

21

Std. Deviation

9.606

Variance

92.274

Skewness

2.057

Std. Error of Skewness

.142

Kurtosis

6.365

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.283

Range

69

Minimum

10

Maximum

79

Sum

7916
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There was virtually no correlation between the dependent variable Percent of the
Vote in Favor of the Employer relative to the independent variable Election Period due to
the continued inclusion of outliers; consequently the data set was further reduced to
exclude any outliers beyond 60 days. The resultant exclusion of 14 outliers resulted in
291 elections, again with the most frequent election period lasting 21 days. The mean was
26 days with a median of 24 days. These 291 elections in Table 12 below represent nearly
7,700 days of workplace representation election conflict:
Table 12
Descriptive election period data, 291 elections (excluding 14 outliers)
Descriptive Election Period Data for 291 Elections
(excluding 14 outliers)
N

Valid

291

Mean

26.44

Std. Error of Mean

.490

Median

24.00

Mode

21

Std. Deviation

8.355

Variance

69.806

Skewness

1.373

Std. Error of Skewness

.143

Kurtosis

2.012

Std. Error of Kurtosis

.285

Range

49
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Minimum

10

Maximum

59

Sum

7695

A scatterplot of the correlation for 291 elections between the dependent variable Percent
of the Vote in Favor of the Employer and the independent variable Election Period is
presented as Figure 18 below.

Figure 18. Scatterplot: Election period and percent of the vote in favor of the employer
data, 291 elections.
As employers might expect, there was a positive (though very small) relationship
(a Pearson r of .063) between the election period and the corresponding percent of the
vote in favor of the employer, as shown below in Table 13. However, this relationship
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was not statistically significant at .287, even though there was a slightly positive slope
evident in the fit line in the Figure 18 scatterplot above.
Table 13
Correlations: Election period and employer win data, 291 elections

Election Period

Pearson Correlation

Election Period
1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Percent of the Vote Pearson Correlation
in Favor of
Employer
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Percent of Vote in Favor
of Employer
.063
.287

291

291

.063

1

.287
291

291

The encouraging observation for employers is that once notified by the formalized
filing of a petition for election that a union organizing campaign has begun, an employer
can influence the election outcome by negotiating with the union and the NLRB for an
extended rather than shortened election cycle time.
Unit Size or Number of Eligible Voters. After notification of the filing of a
petition for workplace representation election, the employer can also influence the size of
the unit by negotiating with the union and the NLRB regarding which job titles are to be
included within the unit of eligible voters. A review of Table 14 below illustrates the
important impact of the decision regarding how many should be eligible to vote in a
workplace representation election.
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Table 14
Correlations: Unit size and percent of the vote in favor of the employer data, 300
elections

Percent of Vote in Pearson Correlation
Favor of Employer
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Number of Eligible Pearson Correlation
Voters (aka Unit
Size)
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Percent Vote Favor Number of Eligible
of Employer
Voters
1
.200**
.000
300

300

.200**

1

.000
300

300

The Number of Eligible Voters and its corresponding relationship with the election
outcome, the Percent of The Vote in Favor of the Employer, indicates that Unit Size is the
most influential independent variable of those studied. The relationship of these two
variables, with a Pearson r of .200—although a small strength of association indicates a
change in the unit size—is a statistically significant covariant with the percent of the vote
in favor of the employer (r =.200, p = .000).
Survey Research Methodology
Once the employer has negotiated the number of eligible voters as the appropriate
size of the unit and the duration of the election period, the employer and union commence
their respective campaigns in earnest (Bergeron, 2008). Employers begin their campaign
by selecting communication tactics to both communicate messages of the campaign as
well as messages that persuade employees. This chapter describes the Voice of the
Employer Survey© instrument used to collect additional information from 32 of the
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identified and previously discussed a database of 305 elections regarding messaging and
communication tactics employers used during their NLRB elections. This section
presents the process for survey instrument design, identification of respondents,
collection of survey data, and the analysis of results obtained.
Instrument Design and Data Collection
There are many communication and messaging tactics options available to
employers facing workplace representation elections; Don Wilson’s (1998) book, Total
Victory! The Complete Management Guide to a Successful NLRB Representation
Election, detailed many of those options. Although only one of numerous sources
reviewed in the literature, the book was instrumental in identifying the independent
variables used for development of this researcher’s Voice of the Employer Survey©
submitted to employers and their representatives in the 305 elections (as referenced in
this chapter’s previous section on database research methodology). The survey sought to
determine whether messages or communication tactics identified through the literature
review were used and if so, how influential they were perceived to be at the time of their
use. This information enabled greater understanding of the election results in an employer
win or loss outcome.
In the process of developing the researcher’s Voice of the Employer Survey©, a pilot
study was conducted to assess the appropriate parameters regarding comprehension and
time completion for this original instrument. This allowed the researcher to identify the
context and process under which subjects best could provide response data to the
researcher’s instrument (Litwin, 2003). Three subject matter experts were identified from
their involvement in presentations at professional conferences, as described in chapter 3.
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Each subject matter expert completed the survey while on the phone with the researcher.
The researcher’s focal points for the pilot survey included:
•

observing the completion of the instrument under controlled conditions;

•

identifying the elapsed time to complete the survey;

•

identifying any misunderstandings of the wording, context, or operational
definitions within the items; and

•

identifying any problematic format design choices.

(Litwin, 2003). The resulting input from three iterations of the pilot test of the Voice of
the Employer Survey© instrument reinforced the utility and understandability of the
instrument as drafted, and further contributed to ensuring the reliability and validity of
the final survey instrument (Litwin, 1995). The measured time for completion of three
pilot study iterations ranged between six and seven minutes, thereby enabling the
researcher to allow comfortably a six-minute time for survey completion by potential
respondents.
In the second quarter of 2019, the survey was mailed to the 305 identified
employers and their representatives at the physical addresses listed by the National Labor
Relations Board on the 305 elections dataset utilized for this study. Follow-up reminder
phone calls were made to available non-respondents throughout the third and fourth
quarter of 2019. Both methodologies resulted in a combined total response rate of 32
elections, or 11% of the election database population of 305. The value of the 32 surveys
is that it provided information regarding the employer representative’s knowledge of the
messaging and communication tactics used during their election. As noted in Chapter
Three, no more than a 20% response rate was anticipated given the average for written
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surveys distributed through the mail to individuals without awareness or anticipation of
the forthcoming survey. Nonetheless, certain descriptive insights into employer
messaging and communication tactics were obtained from the sample 32 responses and
are next discussed.
Results
Given the 11% response rate that yielded information on 32 elections, the number
of responses was insufficient to conduct inferential statistics on the data. However, the
responses received did supply information about employer messaging and
communication tactics. When compared to all elections held during the same time period,
the percent of the vote in favor of the employer for the 32 elections subset compared
similarly. For example, in the studied 305 elections employers won 32.7%% of the time;
in the 32 survey responses, employers were slightly more successful, winning 39% of the
time. This 39% win rate became the baseline for comparison of the efficacy of a
particular campaign message. Those messages which yielded a 39%+ win rate therefore
were deemed practically and descriptively important for purposes of this study.
Before reviewing the messaging and communication tactics, descriptive statistics
characterizing the 32 elections for this study’s three identified independent variables
(Turnout, Election Period, and Unit Size) and their relationship to the dependent variable
(Percent of the Vote in Favor of the Employer) are each here addressed, in the order of
their significance as identified in the larger database of the 305 elections. Tables 15 and
16 below respectively display the descriptive statistics derived from the database for the
32 employer representative respondents and for the 305 elections in the database.
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Table 15
Dependent variable and 3 independent variables, 32 elections

Percent of the
Vote in Favor of
Employer
Turnout
No. of Elections
32
32

Election period No. of Eligible Voters
32
32

Mean

38.9%

92.2%

38.2

171.2

Median

43.4%

94.4%

26.5

50.5

Mode

0.0%

100.0%

28

59

Table 16
Dependent variable and 3 independent variables, 305 elections

Number of
Elections
Mean

Percent of the
Vote in Favor
of Employer Turnout
305
305

Election
period
305

No of Eligible Voters
305

34.9%

87.5%

36.2

73.3

Median

33.3%

92.8%

24.0

31.0

Mode

0.0%

100.0%

21

4a

a. Multiple modes exist as 10 elections each had 4, 6, 8, & 15 voters. In the chart the
smallest number of voters at 4 is shown.
With regard to the percent of the vote in favor of the employer for the 32 elections
surveyed, the 38% mean compared similarly with the 34% mean for the 305 elections
population. The 43% median for the 32 responding elections was higher than the 33%
median for the 305 elections. In both the 32 responding elections as well as the 305
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elections, the most common percent of the vote in favor of the employer was 0% of the
voting employees.
In reviewing the turnout of the 32 survey responses, the mean 92% turnout
compared favorably with the 87% mean for the 305 elections population. The 94%
median turnout for the 32 responding elections compared favorably to the 92% median
for the 305 elections. In both the 32 responding elections as well as the 305 elections, the
most common turnout of voting employees in the elections was 100%. That complete
participation by voting employees once again represents the extent of engagement by
employees on the decision whether to unionize or remain union-free.
In reviewing the election period of the 32 survey responding elections, the mean
38-day election period compared favorably with the 36 day mean for the 305-election
population. Given the long duration of two outlier elections included in both datasets, a
better measure of the election period was the median duration of the campaign period,
which is 26 days for the 32 responding elections. This compared favorably with the
slightly shorter election median election period of 24 days for the 305 elections. The most
common election period of the 32 responding elections was 28 days, although the second
most common (in 3 of the 32 elections) occurred in just 24 days. Both of these periods in
the 32 responding elections compared favorably with the 21-day mode for election period
in the 305 elections.
Reviewing the number of eligible voters, also known as the unit size, of the 32
survey respondents, the mean unit size of 171 was significantly larger than the 73
employee unit size mean for the 305 elections population. For the 32 responding
elections, the median unit of 50 voting employees was still larger than the 31 median
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voting employee unit size for the 305 elections. For the 32 responding elections the most
common unit size was 59 eligible voters, as compared to the multiple modes identified
for the 305 elections database, the largest of which was only 15 votes (see Table 16, note
a).
Campaign Messages: 32 Elections. The primary value of the 32 elections survey
dataset of responding employers was the information obtained regarding employer
messages and communication tactics, when compared to the net result: a win or loss of
the election for the employer. As mentioned above, 13 of the 32 respondents won their
elections, a 39%-win rate.
The Voice of the Employer Survey© identified messages used by both employers
that won their elections and employers that lost. The administration of the survey enabled
a comparison of these two groups, thereby adding insight into employer strategies for
messaging and communication tactics as well as responding directly to the research
questions. The variables for comparison include the following independent variables
measured within the Voice of the Employer Survey©, as listed in Table 17 below.
Table 17
Voice of the Employer Survey© independent variables
Winning
Independent Variables

Used

Losing

Not Used

Used

Not Used

Campaign Messaging
What is/Definition of a Union
What is Collective bargaining? May
include gambling with and realities of
bargaining
Benefits you have now

9

3

13

5

10
9

2
2

16
10

2
6
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Winning
Independent Variables
The Union is a business and needs your
dues
Layoffs at union companies/Job
security
Comparing existing company
benefits/wages with union's contracts
elsewhere
Analysis of the unions constitution
/Bylaws
Unions strike history
Calculators showing how much dues
costs or amount lost in a strike
Give us [employer] another chance
Get out the vote/You need to vote
Communication Tactics
Captive Audience/Group meetings of
employees (How many with different
themes)
Posters posted in the work areas (How
many with different messages)
Letters to employees' homes (How
many letters with different themes)
1 on 1 meetings (Manager with
Employee) to discuss election issues
Videos to persuade employees
A Website to persuade employees
Text Messaging to employees as
company election communication tool
Facebook as company election
communication tool
A podcast featuring company election
messages
Online/conference calls to employees
at remote locations with campaign
messaging
Twitter for communicating persuasive
campaign messages
Demographics for Company &
Election

Used

Losing

Not Used

Used

Not Used

8

3

13

5

6

6

13

5

6

5

9

7

8
7

3
4

8
7

10
11

7
6
11

3
5
1

10
11
15

8
7
3

11

1

14

3

6

5

5

11

8

3

8

9

7
2
1

4
9
9

5
8
4

10
10
14

1

9

2

16

1

9

1

15

0

9

0

16

0

9

2

14

0

10

1

15
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Winning
Independent Variables
Was this the first election at this
company location?
Is the company unionized at other
locations?
Is the company unionized at portions of
this location?
Did the company hire a consultant to
guide the company's election strategy?
Did the company hire an attorney to
assist in the company's election
strategy?
Did the company hire a persuader to
communicate directly to employees?
Did the company contest the union's
petitioned for unit of employees? (e.g.
have a hearing to decide the unit)
Did the company implement a pay
increase to employees during the
election?
Did the union file challenges to the
election result?

Used

Losing

Not Used

Used

Not Used

4

5

12

4

9

2

15

2

3

8

5

12

4

8

6

13

9

2

16

1

4

7

6

12

3

7

3

14

0

11

0

17

1

10

2

14

With a 39%-win rate among the 32 election respondents, it was important to
evaluate any messages that yielded a win rate outperforming the overall 39% employer
win rate. A review of the chart in Table 17 indicated that six of the 11 messages inquired
about in the survey had a win rate which exceeded the 39% overall win rate. These
winning messages and their respective win rate included:
•

Analysis of the union’s Constitution/Bylaws (50%)

•

Union’s strike history (50%)

•

Benefits you have now (47%)

•

Get out the vote/ You need to vote (42%)

•

Calculators showing how much dues costs or amount lost in a strike (41%)
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•

Comparing existing company benefits/Wages with union’s contracts elsewhere
(40%)

A review of the chart in Table 17 indicated that all of the independent variables included
in the surveys were used in more than half of the elections, with the exception of the
message labeled “union’s strike history,” which was used in only 48% of the elections but
yielded a 50% win rate for the employer, outperforming the 39% overall win rate by
25%.
Communication Tactics: 32 Elections. A review of the communication tactics
used by the 32 election respondents indicated there were four communication tactics most
frequently used among the 32 elections. Each of the four will be addressed below in the
order of their frequency of use rather than their possible contribution to a win or loss;
their frequency of use is shown in Table 17 above.
With 86% of the 32 elections, by far the most frequently used communication
tactic was group meetings of employees, often referred to as “captive audience”
meetings. Although most frequently used, employers only won 44% of their elections
using this communication tactic.
The second most frequently used communication tactic was the use of letters to
employees’ homes in order to convey the employer’s election campaign message. Of
those elections featuring letters to employees’ homes, the success rate was 50-50.
Literally half of the elections featuring letters to employees’ homes resulted in victories
for the employer and half of the time resulted in employer losses.
The third most frequently used communication tactic involves a manager meeting
one-on-one with an employee to discuss the employer’s campaign messaging and election
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issues. While this communication tactic was only the third most frequently used
communication tactic, employers who used it in the 32 elections won in 58% of those
elections. Of all of the communication tactics examined, this proved to be the most
successful.
Lastly posters were used to communicate the employer’s campaign messages in
40% of the 32 responding elections. Those employers utilizing posters in their campaigns
won 55% of the responding elections. The effectiveness of this communication tactic as
measured by the win rate at 55% outperformed and exceeded the overall 39% win rate.
Included among those communication tactics found to have been used
infrequently were numerous social media platforms. For example, just a single winning
employer employed a website while one other used text messaging. In these cases,
although seldom used at just 17% and 10% respectively of the 32 responding elections,
the corresponding win rate for employers was just 20% and 33% respectively. Similarly,
as popular as Facebook is among the general population, only two employers used
Facebook as a communication tactic within their elections. The resulting success outcome
was literally 50-50, with one employer winning and the other losing. What is clear is that
social media had not been adopted as a campaign communication tactic among the 32
responding elections. None of the employers surveyed who responded utilized Twitter, a
podcast, or online conference calls to communicate campaign messaging.
Survey & Database Quantitative Research: Research Questions
1. What type of messages result in an increase of the vote in favor of the
employer in National Labor Relations Board elections? The following six
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messages and their win rate outperformed the 39% win rate of the studied 32
responding elections:
a. Analysis of the union’s Constitution/Bylaws (50%)
b. Union’s strike history (50%)
c. Benefits you have now (47%)
d. Get out the vote/ You need to vote (42%)
e. Calculators showing how much dues costs or amount lost in a strike (41%)
f. Comparing existing company benefits/Wages with union’s contracts
elsewhere (40%)
2. What modalities of communication tactics result in an increase of the vote in
favor of the employer in National Labor Relations Board elections? The four
communication tactics which outperform the overall win rate for all 32
elections studied included:
a. Group meetings of employees, often referred to as “captive audience”
meetings (44%)
b. Letters to employees’ homes in order to convey the employer’s election
campaign message (50%)
c. A manager meeting one-on-one with an employee to discuss the
employer’s campaign messaging and election issues (58% )
d. The use of posters in the workplace to visually communicate the employer
campaign messaging (55%)
3. Does relying on a campaign consultant increase the vote in favor of the
employer in National Labor Relations Board elections? The survey was very
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clear in distinguishing between consultants, attorneys, and persuaders and
provided unique definitions for each. Among the 32 elections, attorneys were
hired by employers nine out of every 10 elections. However, employers won
only slightly over one third of those elections. While just nearly a third of the
employers hired a persuader to speak directly to employees during the
campaign, the use of a persuader resulted in winning 40% of the surveyed
elections. Clearly persuaders outperformed their usage. Lastly, consultants
were hired in just over one third of the elections and resulted in winning 40%
of the elections. The data obtained raises the possibility that survey
respondents did not distinguish between the definition of consultant and
persuader. It is possible that survey respondents viewed persuaders as also
consultants. Regardless both types of resources outperformed their usage.
Consequently, the research question was answered in the affirmative.
4. Do shorter election periods result in more or less employer victories in
National Labor Relations Board elections? Yes. As previously noted, the data
from the NLRB database of 305 employer’s resoundingly answers this
question in the affirmative: shorter election periods result in fewer employer
victories in NLRB elections. As expected by employers there is a very slight,
though positive relationship (Pearson r of .063) between the election period
and the corresponding percent of the vote in favor of the employer; however,
this relationship was not statistically significant at .287.
5. Do contested or stipulated elections favor employers in National Labor
Relations Board elections? The data indicated that contesting the unions’
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petitioned-for unit favors the employer. In 22% of the responding elections,
the employer contested the unions’ petitioned-for unit of employees. Of that
22%, half of the employers won their elections and half lost their elections.
Since a significant reason for contesting the union’s petitioned-for unit of
employees is to expand and enlarge the size of the unit, it was important to
analyze whether the number of eligible voters would increase the percentage
of the vote in favor of the employer. Among the 305 elections within the
NLRB database, the correlation between the Number of Potential Voters
(a.k.a. Unit Size) and the Percent of The Vote in Favor of the Employer
revealed the most significant independent variable impacting the percentage
of the vote in favor of the employer, at a Pearson r of .200; it is statistically
significant at .000. Therefore, the NLRB database of 300 elections indicated
very clearly that the larger the size of the unit, the greater the percent of the
vote in favor of the employer. Conversely the smaller the unit size, the smaller
the percent of the vote in favor of the employer.
Qualitative Method: Semi-structured Interviews
In order to triangulate the information obtained from the large NLRB database of
305 employer elections and from the 32 election respondents to the Voice of the Employer
Survey©, it was necessary to interview subject matter experts to provide insight and
interpretation of the quantitative data.
Demographics
Seven subject matter experts were selected from conference speakers on the
subject of NLRB elections. These seven subject matter experts are frequent speakers at
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industry and professional association conferences. Each subject matter expert has directly
participated in numerous NLRB elections, collectively amounting to over 150 elections.
Four have also advised employer representatives contractually in a significant number of
elections as a consultant or persuader. This study’s group of consultants and persuaders
included a mix of five men and two women.
In keeping with the interview participant agreement and in order to protect the
anonymity of each of the interview subject matter experts, each subject’s identity was
coded. Without regard to a participant’s gender, each was assigned a name from the 2020
hurricane season (Farmers’ Almanac, n.d.). Each subject matter expert was assigned the
name of a hurricane alphabetically based upon the order in which each was interviewed.
For example, the very first subject matter expert interviewed is coded as Arthur, without
regards to the actual gender of the subject matter expert. The coded list of names for the
subject matter experts included:
•

Arthur

•

Bertha

•

Cristobal

•

Dolly

•

Edouard

•

Fay

•

Gonzalo

Data Collection
Interviews of the subject matter experts were conducted in the first quarter of
2020. Given the prominence of each subject matter expert, and since the subject matter

147
experts are known to the researcher as well as to each other, there was a risk of
coordination among the interviewees. In order to prevent coordination or collaboration
amongst interviewees, it was necessary to conduct one interview after another in
relatively quick sequence to minimize the potential for collaboration amongst the
interviewees. All interviews were conducted within a four-day period; in only one
circumstance was an interviewee aware that another subject matter expert had been
interviewed. In that case when questioned it was discovered that the subject matter expert
was only aware an interview had taken place; the content of the interview had not been
discussed among the subject matter experts.
At the request of two of the seven subject matter experts, the interview was
conducted in person; the remaining five interviews were conducted over the telephone.
Each interview lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. Each interview conversation was
recorded on a handheld recorder and transcribed thereafter. The researcher maintained
copious notes during the interview in order to inform the transcribed conversation as well
as to account for any technological recording mishap.
Immediately prior to each interview, the researcher reviewed the reflexive
exercise and bracketing statement discussed in Chapter 3. At the beginning of each
interview it was confirmed the subject matter expert had read and consented to the
interview participant agreement, understood participation was voluntary, and further that
they could terminate the interview at any point (see Appendix G). Each subject matter
expert agreed, and all completed their interviews.
Each interview was conducted utilizing the semi-structured interview guide of
subject matter experts in NLRB election campaigns (Appendix H) containing eight
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interview questions designed to add insight to the quantitative data findings and to help
answer the five research questions.
Data Analysis
In “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology” researchers Braun and Clarke (2006)
outlined a six-phase process for conducting thematic analysis of transcribed interviews to
a full qualitative report. That analytical six-phase process was followed for this study’s
methodology, as described below.
PHASE 1: Familiarizing yourself with the data. Braun and Clarke (2006)
emphasized that in this phase that it is vital to immerse oneself in the data in order to
maintain familiarity with the depth and breadth of the content. It requires a repeated
reading of the data while searching for meetings and patterns. It is a time-consuming
process; the researchers suggested it is the bedrock for the other phases of thematic
analysis. In order to accomplish this first phase the recorded interviews were transcribed,
printed on paper, and read and reread in order to achieve the awareness necessary for the
next phases.
PHASE 2: Generating initial codes. After familiarization of the data from Phase
1 it was necessary to produce initial codes from the data, in essence organizing the data
into meaningful groups. Braun and Clarke (2006) noted that the organizing occurring
during this phase is not the development of themes, which are often broader. To
accomplish Phase 2 the printed transcripts from Phase 1 were again each reviewed, in the
order in which the interviews occurred. Each of the major operative points of the first
interview were highlighted, noting a descriptive phrase for each within the margin. All
subsequent interviews similarly underwent the same process. While coding each of the
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seven interviews this researcher did not attempt to limit the potential themes annotated as
the full spectrum of potential categories would not emerge until the last interview was
completed.
PHASE 3: Searching for themes. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggested this phase
requires the sorting of the different codes into potential themes. It is in this phase that an
analysis of the data begins as it is necessary to consider how the different codes can
combine to form a more generalized set of themes. The net outcome of this phase of
coding the data from the seven interviews was the collection of candidate themes.
The coded data of the seven subject matter interviews was sorted into the
following codes:
•

Academia is biased and distrusted by business

•

NLRB is biased

•

NLRB database may list front-line supervisors, not campaign decision-makers

•

Employers must protect their brand

•

It is logistically easier to obtain the experience from a small group of
organizers

•

Antagonize a union with which they have an existing relationship

•

Campaign messaging has a more positive emphasis

•

Standard messaging in a campaign

•

Collective bargaining process

•

Each election is unique

•

Elections are emotional/personal

•

Trust
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•

Factual information

•

Face to Face

•

Communication tactics

•

Family and spouses

•

One-on-one meetings

•

Junk mail

•

Frontline supervision

•

It’s complicated and expensive to challenge the unit

•

Compromise

•

Educate not persuade

•

Credibility as former union organizers

PHASE 4: Reviewing themes. In this phase it is necessary to refine the candidate
themes from Phase 3. It is in this phase in which it is important to evaluate the themes’
subject and essence in relationship to each other. This often results in a thematic map,
although in this particular research endeavor a map was deemed unnecessary given the
influential nature of the research questions upon the interview questions. At the end of
Phase 4 the emergent themes became evident.
The major themes identified within this phase included:
•

Sourcing employer data

•

Communication messaging

•

Communication tactics

•

To stipulate or not to stipulate

•

Hiring a consultant or persuader
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PHASE 5: Defining and naming themes. After having identified the relationship
between themes from Phase 4 it became necessary to “define and refine” in order to
identify the “essence” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 99) of each theme, what it is that is
interesting about each theme and why. The net outcome of this phase was to clearly
define the identified themes as well as to identify respective comments for each theme
included in the Phase 6 report below.
PHASE 6: Producing the report. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggested that this
phase creates the story that consists of the collection of the data accompanied by selected
vivid examples; for this study relevant quotations from subject matter experts were
included in the results below.
Results
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-step analysis resulted in the following summarized
themes and sub-themes from the interviews of seven subject matter experts, as shown in
Table 18.
Table 18
Themes and Sub-themes from Subject Matter Expert Interviews
THEME
1. Sourcing employer data

•
•
•
•
•
•

SUB-THEME
Academia is biased and
distrusted by business
NLRB is biased
NLRB database may list
supervisors, not campaign
decision-makers
Employers must protect their
brand
It is easier to obtain the
experience from a small group of
organizers
Antagonize a union with which
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2. Communication messaging

•
•

3. Communication tactics

4. Stipulate or not stipulate
5. Hiring a consultant or persuader

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

they have an existing
relationship
Campaign messaging has a more
positive emphasis
Standard messaging in a
campaign
Collective bargaining process
Each election is unique
Elections are emotional/personal
Trust
Factual information
Face to Face
Communication tactics
Family and spouses
One on ones
Junk mail
Frontline supervision
It’s complicated and expensive
to challenge the unit
Compromise
Educate not persuade
Credibility as former union
organizers

The developed five major themes outlined above in Table 18 are described in detail with
accompanying comments below.
Theme 1: Sourcing Employer Data. In this theme respondents provided their
speculations and understanding about why researchers typically do not collect
information from employers. The subject of bias was frequently mentioned by nearly all
respondents, explaining that both academia as well as the NLRB are not to be trusted, due
to their pro-labor sentiments. As Gonzalo put it: “When you’re dealing with the NLRB,
you don’t know if the guy investigating you is the union steward for his unit back at the
NLRB.”
Another emergent sub-theme centered upon an employer’s interest in protecting
its brand. The subject matter experts pointed out that employers are reluctant to comment
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for fear of how the information will be used or edited. Two of the subject matter experts
noted that we in society are all busy, and that to give up time with family or work for
strangers is just not likely.
An additional sub-theme that emerged was the practical efficiency and ease of
collecting information from union organizers involved in numerous elections rather than
having to contact each individual company participating in an election. Thus, Dolly
noted: “Union organizers have a strong motivation to participate in these types of surveys
in order to explain and justify why they may have lost the election or why it was so costly
to campaign.”
Theme 2: Communication Messaging. Based upon their numerous prior NLRB
election experience the subject matter experts relayed their guidance for selecting
campaign messaging to increase the vote in favor of the employer. Among the seven there
was a wide variety of opinions regarding overall strategies and the tone of campaigns. All
subject matter experts indicated that there is typically a standard set of communication
messaging. Arthur indicated there are approximately 10 standard messages and named
some: “…definition of a union, the union is a business and needs your dues, analysis of
the union’s constitution and bylaws, what you have now may not be what you end up
with, analysis of the union’s existing collective bargaining agreements…”
Subject matter expert Edouard uses only three to five major themes or messages
in a campaign, stating: “It’s important to listen to the employees and respond to their
request. I also focus significantly on the realities of collective bargaining, especially that
workers can get more, less, or stay the same. Often employees don’t understand 8d
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[Section 8d of the National Labor Relations Act] that neither party can be compelled to
agree with the other party.”
Most of the subject matter experts commented to various degrees upon the
importance of including trust in the major themes and specifically in messaging for the
employer. Each mentioned the importance of rebuilding trust, as the election decision by
employees is an emotional decision. Bertha commented that ultimately the employees
have to decide “who can you trust the most – the company or the union?” Cristobal
added, “the campaign starts with acknowledging the loss of trust in the employer. The
employer has to reacquire that trust by supporting its assertions with facts during its
campaign messaging.” Edouard stated, “It’s not that the standard messaging isn’t
important, but people want to trust their company. The employer, though, has to win back
the trust of the employees.” Dolly summed up the subject matter experts’ reliance and
emphasis on the use of messages involving trust:
We used a lot of the standard messaging and lost elections. Once we shifted our
messaging to rebuilding trust, before we could ever provide the facts about
unionization we saw a shift to remaining union-free and winning elections. The
union is not the solution to the lack of trust in the workplace.
Only one subject matter expert referenced the importance of the voting
employees’ happiness after the conclusion of the election, which is ultimately the
intended consequence of the NLRB election. Edouard noted: “It’s also important to
provide factual information on how the relationship changes once a company is
unionized. I showed them their own satisfaction data from our surveys that illustrate a
significant difference in job satisfaction between the unionized portion of the workforce
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and the union-free portion of our company. Union members are vastly less satisfied in
their work.”
In conversation subject matter experts were quick to add that reliance solely on
traditional or standard messaging in a campaign is unartful and not likely to lead to
success. A common phrase used among the subject matter experts was “each election is
unique” and dependent upon the campaign issues, company culture, and the relationship
between the workers and management. Over half of the subject matter experts, however,
had a specific messaging each felt was critical to campaign success for the employer.
Most of the interviewed participants felt it is the responsibility of the employer to
accurately describe the realities of collective bargaining, with a description of the
logistics, legal requirements of the participants, and possible outcomes. This was summed
up in a statement by Fay:
Many employers focus on the tried and traditional messaging that I no longer use.
They’ll talk about strikes, union corruption, the salaries of the union leaders,
super seniority, and on and on. And I no longer discuss those because I view them
as ineffective. I think what employees want to hear about is whether they can trust
their management, what their leaders are feeling, and it’s especially important that
they understand the intricacies and nuances and frankly, the realities of collective
bargaining.
Theme 3: Communication Tactics. In discussing the subject of communication
tactics, or how messages should be delivered to the employees who will vote on whether
to unionize or, it was not surprising that the subject matter experts were quite animated
and opinionated. All subject matter experts conveyed that face-to-face communication is
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the single most effective communication tactic available to the employer. One suggested
it is the only way management can be present when the message is delivered to the
employee.
Without prompting, several of the subject matter experts referenced the
importance of utilizing front-line supervisors to communicate factual information
regarding the union experience. Edouard said, “You’ve really got to use every
communication method available in today’s world. Social media is an excellent method
of communicating to employees’ families. But the bottom line is you can’t run a
campaign by flyers alone.”
However, two of the interview participants cautioned that if frontline supervision
is not committed to remaining union-free, “you’re going to end up losing the election”
(Fay). Gonzalo also felt that frontline supervision is not as committed to remaining
union-free as it has been historically.
Only a couple of the subject matter experts referenced the importance of
maintaining a website, and only Edouard referenced the importance of social media. Both
experts’ comments seem to center on the importance of including the familial impact of
the employee’s decision on whether to unionize or remain union- free. Bertha noted, “It’s
very important to communicate to the family and spouses, so we sent postcards to
employees’ homes that also included the website address so the entire family could see
our messaging.”
Arthur relied upon the website as foundational for all of the campaign
communications, utilizing it as a link to create integration of all messaging and to involve
the family:
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I have found websites to be very effective … using emails and text messages to
remind people to go to the website. The website was a home base for the
campaign communication and other communication tactics were designed to send
people to the home base website. Once we used this hub and spoke
communication method, we found our website hits went up dramatically.
Theme 4: To Stipulate or Not to Stipulate. The importance of this theme cannot
be understated. It is the first of the decisions an employer is required to make once it
becomes aware that a petition for election has been filed with the NLRB. The stipulation
decision involves two major subcomponents: the size of the unit, meaning the number of
employees eligible to vote, and the opportunity to negotiate a duration for the election,
meaning the time period for which employees will be able to campaign amongst each
other and the duration that the employer will be allowed to deliver campaign messaging
to employees. It is the initial decision an employer makes in the campaign, and it must
decide first whether or not to accept, to stipulate to the size and scope of the unit/group of
employees who the union believes should be eligible to vote on representation by the
union. Second, the employer must decide whether it wants to stipulate to the first decision
(the unit) and gain the opportunity to potentially negotiate a longer period to campaign in
the hopes that it can convince employees to remain union-free. Fay summarized this
important—perhaps the most important—employer decision of the campaign, stating: “if
they’re [the employer] stipulating to the unit, they obviously believe they’ve got a chance
at winning.”
Every single subject matter expert referenced the complexity associated with
challenging the union’s petitioned-for unit. It can be extremely expensive, as Dolly
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observed: “A community of interest may be worth fighting for, but that is, and can be, a
lot of time and money.”
As the literature review revealed, in less than 10% of all NLRB elections
employers challenge rather than stipulate to the union’s petitioned-for unit. Edouard
stated:” You can negotiate with the NLRB and the union, and obtain concessions. It’s
probably better than going to a hearing, since the NLRB is biased against employers
anyway, and an employer may not get a favorable hearing and decision.”
Theme 5: Hiring a Consultant or Persuader. As might be expected, the
consultants and persuaders among the subject matter experts believed strongly in the
value of hiring consultants and persuaders for NLRB elections. Cristobal opined: “if you
don’t use a consultant, you going to get your lunch eaten by the union because it has lots
of experience in elections.”
Several of the subject matter experts conveyed the concept that effective
persuaders do not seek to persuade but rather to educate on the union experience: “good
persuaders don’t persuade, they educate” (Cristobal). However, as evident in the literature
reviewed in Chapter 2, consultants and persuaders are not inexpensive. Thus Fay
observed: “The most important determinant of the company’s success in an NLRB
election is the company’s commitment by its senior leadership. Specifically, on whether it
wants to remain union free and whether it’s willing to incur the significant costs
associated with hiring consultants and persuaders to influence the outcome of the
election.”
There was universal agreement on the value and necessity for using consultants
and persuaders; it was also mentioned that hiring an attorney is a must, should an
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employer decide to contest the election. In Fay’s view, “Hiring an attorney, and a separate
consultant or persuader (pause)… that’s an easy answer because the NLRB election
process is so complex, highly technical, and fraught with dangers for employers whose
mistakes can be extremely costly, and have long-term ramifications for the viability of the
employer.”
Collectively the group of subject matter experts were highly opinionated and
animated; without exception each was enthusiastic to participate in this research project.
Each and every interview participant was thankful for the research study and indicated
they looked forward to receiving a copy of the project’s results.
Summary
The quantitative portion of this study analyzed a database of 305 NLRB elections
and identified three critical independent variables impacting the percent of the vote in
favor of the employer: the percentage of the voting unit of employees who turn out to
vote, the duration of the election, and lastly the size of the voting unit of employees.
While each of the three independent variables had small positive correlations, it was the
size of the unit which was statistically significant as a covariant for the percentage of the
vote in favor of the employer.
The second most covariant variable was the election duration. In the 30 longest
elections, employers received 50% or more of the vote in 27 of the 30 elections for a
90%-win rate. In contrast, in the 30 shortest elections employers received 50% or more of
the vote in only four of the 30 elections for a win rate of only 13%.
Lastly, the greater the percent of the turnout the greater the percent in favor of the
employer. Consequently, these three variables are an important part of the
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recommendations for action by employers as more fully detailed in Chapter 5: increase
the number of voters, increase the duration of the campaign, and increase the turnout of
employees voting.
The data triangulated in this study included that collected from a survey involving
32 elections, in which employer representatives provided information on the campaign
messages and communication tactics used during their election. Armed with the surveyed
election results, a practical rather than statistical comparison was conducted to evaluate
the success of different campaign messages and communication tactics.
The most frequently used campaign messaging centered upon first, the realities of
collective bargaining and an analysis and comparison of the union’s collective bargaining
agreements at other companies. A second most frequently used message for employers
centers upon the union’s strike history and the realities of a strike. The third most
frequently used message for employers was to educate employees on their current
benefits and to compare those with the benefits offered at other companies which are
unionized.
The net result of the interviews with the subject matter experts yielded
recommendations to employers on how to use the messaging and communication tactics
identified in the survey. Their practical tips and recommendations are further detailed
next in Chapter 5. A summary of the findings of the interviews of the subject matter
experts regarding employers’ campaign messaging includes: explanations of the
collective bargaining process along with examples and comparisons of the union’s other
negotiated agreements, a thorough discussion of strikes, and educating employees on
their benefits as compared to benefits offerings with other unionized companies.

161
The most frequently used communication tactic was group meetings; they were
used in 86% of the elections although their use yielded only a 44% win rate for
employers. As previously noted, these meetings are often referred to as “captive
audience” meetings. However, the most effective tactic included one-on-one meetings
with individual voting employees. The benefit these one-on-one meetings offer is to
communicate the company’s messaging as well as to answer the individual employee’s
questions. Although only 46% of the surveyed employer’s representatives used one-onone meetings, those employers which did use this tactic won 58% of the time.
The qualitative methodology portion of this mixed methods research study
contributed to a model to assist employers in assessing the efficacy and success of
election-related messages and communication tactics, in order to achieve an increase in
votes in favor of the employer and a successful election outcome. This study’s approach
of methodological triangulation integrated both quantitative and qualitative methods
yielding the results of the study (see Patton, 1990). The researcher’s resultant model is
the product of a triangulation between an analysis of a quantitative dataset of 305
elections, a survey of 32 elections, and qualitative interviews of seven subject matter
experts. This triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methodology, when combined
with the theoretical solutions involving structural violence and systems theory, will
benefit not only employers who are responding to an NLRB election but also all actors
within the NLRB election system, as further discussed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The objective of this study was to develop a model to assist employers for what is
arguably the most contentious conflict that can exist in the American workplace: a
workplace representation election, a process supervised by the National Labor Relations
Board. The intent of a workplace representation election is to determine whether a
petitioning union has sufficient support to unionize a unit of employees within a
workplace. This research study developed a model, the Voice of the Employer Model for
Winning NLRB Elections©, to assist employers in assessing the efficacy and success of
election-related messages and communication tactics, in order to achieve an increase in
votes in favor of the employer and a successful election outcome.
This research study built upon previously published findings on the topic of
conflicts inherent within workplace representation elections. While much has been
studied about why employees join unions and why unions are successful in workplace
representation elections, little research exists regarding employers’ successful strategies
during workplace representation elections. Moreover, as detailed in Chapter Two, most
research that has addressed employer strategies was not sourced from the employer but
rather from secondary, tertiary, or other far-removed sources of information. Indeed, prior
studies detailing employers’ election messaging and other tactics exclusively sourced
their data directly or indirectly from the union organizer rather than from employers.
This study analyzed a dataset of 305 NLRB elections held between 2015 through
2017 in four NLRB regions. A survey was conducted of the representatives of employers
involved in the 305 NLRB election population. That data collection instrument entitled
the Voice of the Employer Survey© resulted in identifying campaign messages and
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communication tactics used in 32 NLRB elections. In order to inform the quantitative
information contained in the study, interviews with seven subject matter experts in NLRB
elections were conducted to add insight to the quantitative information collected
regarding campaign messages and communication tactics and to directly respond to the
study’s research questions. Data obtained and analyzed from each of these three sources
provided the basis for a model detailing the multivariate influences on winning NLRB
workplace representation elections, from the important and heretofore often omitted
perspective of the employer.
Triangulation of all three data sources yielded the following key findings for
employers when confronted with an NLRB petition for election:
•

the NLRB election process is complex and complicated, and mistakes can be
extremely costly for employers;

•

NLRB elections are expensive to win and even more expensive to lose;

•

the larger the group of employees in a voting unit of employees, the greater
the percentage of votes in favor of the employer;

•

the longer the duration of the campaign, the longer employees can campaign
with each other, as well as listen to and respond to the campaign messaging of
all actors within the NLRB election system;

•

there is a wide variety of campaign election durations, and no defined
minimum campaign duration;

•

employer campaign messaging should focus first and foremost on reestablishing the trust of the voting employees;
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•

it is important that voting employees fully understand all aspects of collective
bargaining;

•

it is important that voting employees fully understand the union’s use of
strikes;

•

employees ultimately want to know whether they will get more, less, or stay
the same in their pay and benefits through unionization;

•

employees need to understand their existing pay and benefits as well as how
they compare with similarly situated employees at other companies which are
unionized; and

•

the regulations governing NLRB elections in 2015 significantly reduced the
election period, the time allowed for employer and employee campaigning.
Interpretation of the Findings

The literature review indicated that there is an absence of information which is
sourced directly from the employer. Having mailed the short six-minute survey to
employers experiencing elections during the 2015–2017 period in the four NLRB
Regions, the difficulty of obtaining information from employers was realized and
understood. The qualitative portion of this study overwhelmingly revealed that there
exists a distrust of the NLRB, academia, and others who would seek such information,
and that a perception of anti-employer/pro-union bias exists that inhibits an employer
response.
The resulting 11% survey response rate inhibited statistical findings, including a
wave analysis and other means of comparative testing. The response rate limitation
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thereby prohibited inferential statistics and generalizable comparisons beyond the scope
of this study.
However, other significant findings of the survey yielded important
interpretations for employers. For example, in order to increase the percent of the vote in
favor of the employer, this study’s research found that employers should retain an
attorney and consultant to guide campaign legal strategies and communicate with
employees. The inclusion of an attorney is critically important because the attorney has
more experience in responding to NLRB elections. The need for employers to avail
themselves of appropriate legal expertise was made clear during the course of this study’s
research process, as next described.
The literature review indicated that less than 7 percent of the private workforce is
unionized; therefore the overwhelming majority of private employers (93%) are not
unionized and lack experience in NLRB elections. The findings of this study indicated
the earliest decisions of the employer are among the most important of the whole
campaign. Once notified that a petition for election to determine whether a company
should be unionized has been filed, the employer is immediately thrust into a
circumstance in which it is likely the least experienced and adept at handling the matter at
hand, since the NLRB and unions literally handle thousands of elections. It is first
necessary for the employer to review the union’s petition to identify the group of
employees the union seeks to unionize. At this point the employer or their designee
begins discussion with the union’s leadership to accept the union’s assertion by
stipulating to the unit or negotiating a more favorable unit that represents a larger
community of interest within the employer’s operations. This decision impacts the size of
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the unit, which this study determined is the most significant variable impacting the
percentage of the vote in favor of the employer. Given the magnitude and ramification of
this decision and potential legal pitfalls and consequences, employers should hire an
attorney to handle communications with the union and the NLRB in order to negotiate for
a more favorable unit or to contest the unit in an NLRB hearing.
Should an employer contest the unit rather than stipulate, the process to adjudicate
an appropriate unit likely increases the election period. This allows more time for
employees to campaign amongst each other as well as enables the employer to distribute
its own campaign messages. Unions contend that employers who avail themselves of this
legal process to adjudicate the union are using a delay tactic. However, since unions can
determine when to file a petition for election it is likely the only people surprised by the
petition are both the employer and those employees who were not solicited by the union.
Another major finding of this study is the greater the election duration, the greater the
percentage of the vote in favor of the employer. One interpretation of this parameter is
that if employees and employers are given more time to campaign, employers have a
greater chance at winning the election.
When the campaign does occur, it is evident that at least some portion of the
workforce seeks a representative to interact with their employer on their behalf. The
resounding message from the NLRB election subject matter experts interviewed for the
study was that an employer must first and foremost reestablish trust with their employees.
It was suggested this be accomplished by ensuring that any campaign messaging and
assurances should be fact-based and supported by references which enable employees to
verify and validate the employer’s assertions.
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Another important campaign message addresses the issue of collective bargaining.
In the survey of employers in 32 elections, a key finding was that a focus on collective
bargaining is a message which wins election at slightly greater percentages than its
frequency of use. Some of the NLRB election subject matter experts asserted that
employees do not understand that the collective bargaining process can result in more,
less, or even the same pay and benefits. In one interview it was asserted that employees
believe that they will simply get more as a result of unionization. Consequently, it is
important in any NLRB election that employers thoroughly explain the collective
bargaining process to voting employees.
A collective bargaining process is intended to result in a collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and the union. This study found that it is important to
provide voting employees with examples of union contracts and comparisons of their
own pay and benefits with similarly situated employees at other unionized companies.
Again this is a message which was the most frequently used in 87% of the 32 elections
and it resulted in exactly 39% employer election wins.
This study also found it important that employer campaign messaging explain
why unions engage in strikes and most importantly the resulting impact on striking
employees.
In order to communicate campaign messaging, this study found employers should
utilize group meetings paired with one-on-one meetings featuring a persuader or
supervisor communicating directly with employees to answer employees’ questions.
The foregoing recommendations are graphically illustrated in the model below in
Figure 19.
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• HIRE ATTORNEY FOR LEGAL
TASKS
• HIRE CONSULTANT FOR
CAMPAIGN MESSAGING

GET HELP

CAMPAIGN
MESSAGING

CONTEST UNIT

• ENLARGE COMMUNITY OF
INTEREST
• LENGTHEN CAMPAIGN
DURATION

COMMUNICATION
TACTICS

• ESTABLISH TRUST USING FACTS
• EXPLAIN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
• COMPARE CURRENT PAY/BENEFITS
WITH OTHER UNIONIZED
COMPANIES
• EXPLAIN UNION'S USE OF STRIKES

• CONDUCT GROUP MEETINGS
• SEND LETTERS TO HOMES
• MEET ONE-ON-ONE: SUPERVISOR
& EMPLOYEE ANSWERING
QUESTIONS

Figure 19. Voice of the Employer - Winning NLRB Elections© model.
Limitations of the Study
While this study generated a conceptual model for employers responding to
NLRB elections, the research itself was not without limitations. First, the focal period of
this study of workplace representation elections was limited to April 14, 2015 to May 1,
2017. As noted, this period represents the major portion of the effective period of the
2015 election rule, before the announced Dec 18, 2019 revisions to the election system,
effective May 31, 2020.
Second, the database of 305 elections provided no information regarding
employer messaging and communication tactics. This researcher does not foresee that
such information will likely be contained on the NLRB database and makes no such
respective recommendation.
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Third, to collect information regarding employers’ use of campaign messaging
and communication tactics in NLRB elections it was necessary to conduct a survey.
Unfortunately, the survey yielded only an 11% response rate. While this response rate
was sufficient for the practical and descriptive comparisons included within this research,
it was limited by the 11% response rate which prohibited statistically significant findings
and the ability to represent these results beyond this study. As a result, the findings of this
research are limited to the data and election information included within the scope of this
study and are not generalizable to predict or forecast elections outside the scope of this
study.
A fourth limitation is that revealed by the interviewed seven NLRB election
subject matter experts, who consistently theorized that employers elected not to
participate in this study’s survey questionnaire due to distrust of academic organizations
as well as their own perceived inability to control the data or messaging included in the
study. Employers were reluctant to reveal information the use of which they could not
control; the basis for their concern was damage to their employer brand.
Lastly, another important limitation of this study is the researcher’s own
background and biases in support of employers. Through reflection and bracketing, a
self-awareness was maintained throughout the data collection, data analysis, and
interpretation phases of the study. This bias was addressed in an effort to limit
subjectivity and to increase reliability and validity.
Recommendations
This study validated the difficulty in obtaining employers’ input and willingness
to discuss or reveal the messaging and communication tactics used in NLRB elections.
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Interviews with the NLRB election subject matter experts consistently theorized that
employers elected not to participate due to distrust of academic organizations as well as
an inability to control the data or messaging to be included in the study. It is
recommended that future research should resolve this limitation through a sponsorship or
direct involvement by an employer association such as the Society for Human Resource
Management or any other supportive labor relations-related employer association.
Additional future research should attempt to ascertain the rationale regarding
employers’ practice of stipulating to the unit petitioned for by the union. There is likely
benefit in greater transparency on the benefits and costs of the stipulate or contest
employer decision.
Most importantly, after the NLRB regulations published in December 2019
become effective, future studies should assess the impact on all parties of the NLRB
election system. While there is a tendency to view the actors in the NLRB election
system as participants in a conflict of management versus labor, there is another forgotten
voice, that of the employee. Future research should study representative samples of those
employees involved in NLRB elections who did not support unionization, in order to
learn of their lived experience.
When an employer receives the notice that a petition for election has been filed
with the NLRB to decide whether its workers will unionize or remain union-free, it must
decide first whether to stipulate and agree to the unit of employees the union seeks to
represent. This decision is perhaps the most significant finding of this study and perhaps
the most valuable recommendation for employers. The larger the unit the greater the
percent of the vote in favor of the employer.
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Implications
While many of the theoretical recommendations included within Chapter Two
have been proposed by the National Labor Relations Board since the initiation of this
research study, the December 2019 revisions with planned implementation in 2020 are
subject to litigation. In March of 2020 the AFL-CIO filed litigation arguing the NLRB
violated administrative law by issuing a substantive rule without going through the full
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. The labor federation also filed a preliminary
injunction to block the rule (Opfer, 2020, p. 1; Iafolla, 2020c). The National Labor
Relations Board has responded to the litigation by delaying any changes to the April 2015
NLRB election regulations until May 31, 2020. As of the conclusion of this study, the
court on June 7 struck down a limited portion of the 2020 regulations (AFL-CIO v.
NLRB, 2020; see also Kanu, 2020c; Kanu, 2020d; National Labor Relations Board,
2020).
There is a lack of transparency in the NLRB election process as a petitioning
union can file a petition at any point of the year without prior notification to either the
employees in the petitioned for unit or the affected employer. The NLRB should require
transparency.
Unionization is determined by whether a majority of voting employees elect to
unionize rather than a majority of the unit of employees. Since all of the unit of
employees will be bound by the result of those who vote, a system theorist would expand
the requirement that unionization is determined by all of the unit employees rather than
just those who voted.
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The employer’s decision on whether to stipulate or to contest the unit can expedite
or potentially extend the campaign duration. The effect of the decision carries numerous
implications. The first decision an employer makes in a campaign conveys its willingness
to agree with the union. A decision whether to stipulate or contest may reveal the
employer’s negotiation posture, or even whether the employer will contest the unit in
favor of a larger group with a greater community of interests. The data in this study
indicates that a company which does not expand the number of eligible voters is
minimizing its opportunity to win the election. The National Labor Relations Board’s
most recent data indicates employers contest the union’s petitioned unit size in
approximately only one of 10 elections (NLRB, 2019).
An understanding of the correlations of the 305 elections would prompt unions to
focus upon lobbying for rules which enable unions to petition for smaller and smaller
units of voters. Conversely employers should lobby regulatory bodies in order to inhibit
smaller units of employees.
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to capture the voice of the employer regarding its
messaging and communication tactics in response to the conflict associated with an
NLRB election. Results of this study indicated there are practical steps included within
this research model that are available to any and all employers faced with responding to
an NLRB election.
This triangulation of a quantitative (database and survey) and qualitative (semistructured interviews) methodology, when combined with theoretical solutions involving
structural violence and systems theory, will bring transparency: greater opportunity for all
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actors in the NLRB election system to freely participate and benefit from the discourse
and messaging made possible by longer election periods.
The most important statistical finding of this study is that with one decision
employers can increase the percent of the vote in favor of the employer. The employer
can increase the size of the unit and increase the duration of the election—either through
negotiations with the union and the NLRB or through contesting the unit in order to gain
a unit that logically has a larger community of interests. Given the complexity of such
negotiations as well as the potential pitfalls associated with contesting the petitioned-for
unit, hiring an attorney is strongly recommended. After the employer obtains the NLRB
decision on the size of the unit and duration of the election the campaign will begin in
earnest (Bergeron, 2008). Figure 19 above provides a summarized result, a graphical
model that is directed by the answers to the research questions in Chapter Four and meets
the objectives of the study.
Despite a dismal 31% national employer win rate in NLRB elections, employers
are not without options to win. This study—informed by the voice of employers who
have won and lost such elections—provides an evidence-based path to victory.

174

References
AFL-CIO v. NLRB. No. 20-cv-0675 (KBJ). (D.D.C. 2020, June 7).
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2020cv0675-36
Alreck, P. L., & Settle, R. B. (2004). The survey research handbook. McGraw-Hill.
Barriball, K. L., & While, A. (1994). Collecting data using a semi-structured interview: A
discussion paper. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19(2), 328–335.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2648.1994.tb01088.x
Becker, C., & Rhinehart, L. (2017, December 22). Submission of the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations in response to
request for information concerning the rules governing representation cases.
AFL-CIO.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2
ahUKEwitybmt19HfAhXwT98KHdOPBnMQFjAAegQIABAB&url=https://ww
w.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/webform/uploads/nlrb_rfi_aflcio_submission_4-1818.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0bjWvRGdZWpDm-VRGxO4xP
Bergeron, P. J. (2008). Union proof: Creating your successful union free strategy. Dog
Ear Publishing.
Bernard, H. R. (2006) Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative
approaches (4th ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bernstein, S., & Vickery, L. (2019, December 16). NLRB curtails AGC-opposed “quickie
election” rule. Associated General Contractors of America (AGC).
https://www.agc.org/news/2019/12/16/nlrb-curtails-agc-opposed-quickie-electionrule

175

Bloom, H., Rosen, P., & Walsh, T. (2018, April 28). Jackson Lewis responds to NLRB
request for information on election rules. JDSupra.com.
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/jackson-lewis-responds-to-nlrb-request41443/
Bloomberg Law. (May 14, 2020, 2:23pm). Case: Labor Relations/Elections (N.L.R.B.).
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/search?query=marked%20ballot
Boston Teachers Union. (n.d.). Job description: Boston Teachers Union director of
organizing. Retrieved February 15, 2019, from https://btu.org/wpcontent/uploads/BTU_DirectorOfOrganizing_Job_Description.pdf
Bourque, L. B., & Fielder, E. P. (2003). How to conduct self-administered and mail
surveys. SAGE Research Methods. https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412984430
Bradbury, A., Brenner, M., & Slaughter, J. (2016). Secrets of a successful organizer.
Labor Notes.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative
Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77-101.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
Bronfenbrenner, K. (n.d.). Faculty profile. Cornell University School of Industrial and
Labor Relations. https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/people/kate-bronfenbrenner
Bronfenbrenner, K. (1991a). Successful union strategies for winning certification
elections and first contracts: Report to union participants (Part 1: Organizing
survey results). [Electronic version]. Cornell University ILR Digital Commons.
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/46/

176

Bronfenbrenner, K. (1991b). Successful union strategies for winning certification
elections and first contracts: Report to union participants (Part 2: First contract
survey results). [Electronic version]. Cornell University ILR Digital Commons.
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context
=reports
Bronfenbrenner, K. (1994, January 1). Employer behavior in certification elections and
first-contract campaigns: Implications for labor law reform [Electronic version,
2001]. In S. Friedman, R. Hurd, R. Oswald, & R. Seeber (Eds.), Restoring the
promise of American labor law (pp. 75-89). Cornell University ILR Press.
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fcd9/44acea2130ded5c2f3a96b40a71d2a337c23.
pdf
Bronfenbrenner, K. (1997). The role of union strategies in NLRB certification elections.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50(2), 195. doi:10.2307/2525082
Bronfenbrenner, K. (1999). Organizing for keeps: Building a twenty-first century labor
movement [Electronic version]. Cornell University ILR Digital Commons.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/560
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2001, September 3). Changing to organize: Unions know what has
to be done. Now they have to do it [Electronic version]. Cornell University ILR
Digital Commons. https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/556/
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2003). Hard bargaining. Labour / Le Travail, 52, 361.
doi:10.2307/25149437 https://www.jstor.org/stable/i25149381

177
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2005). What is labor’s true purpose? The implications of SEIU's
unite to win proposals for organizing. New Labor Forum, 14(2), 19-26.
doi:10.1080/1095760590934670
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2006). Comprehensive strategy: The key to successful organizing
[Electronic version]. In The state of the union report for the Ohio Education
Association (pp. 10-27). Ohio Education Association.
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2006). The American labour movement and the resurgence in union
organizing [Electronic version]. In P. Fairbrother & C. A. B. Yates (Eds.), Trade
unions in renewal: A comparative study (pp. 32-50). Continuum.
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144981614.pdf
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2009a, May 20). No holds barred: The intensification of employer
opposition to organizing (Briefing paper no. 235). Economic Policy Institute.
https://www.epi.org/publication/bp235/
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2009b, June 3). A war against organizing [Electronic version]. The
Washington Post. https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/563/
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2016). Election timing, employer free speech, and unfair labor
practice occurrence: Whose rights are at risk?
https://equitablegrowth.org/people/kate-bronfenbrenner/
Bronfenbrenner, K., Friedman, S., Hurd, R. W., Oswald, R. A., & Seeber, R. L. (Eds.)
(1998). Organizing to win: New research on union strategies. Cornell University
ILR Press.

178

Bronfenbrenner, K., & Hickey, R. (2004). Changing to organize: A national assessment of
union organizing strategies. In R. Milkman & K. Voss (Eds.), Rebuilding labor:
Organizing and organizers in the new union movement (pp. 17-60). Cornell
University ILR Press. https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/54/
Bronfenbrenner, K., & Juravich, T. (1994). The impact of employer opposition on union
certification win rates: A private/public sector comparison (Working paper no.
113). [Electronic version]. Economic Policy Institute.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/19
Bronfenbrenner, K., & Juravich, T. (1998). It takes more than house calls: Organizing to
win with a comprehensive union-building strategy [Electronic version]. In K.
Bronfenbrenner, S. Friedman, R. W. Hurd, R. A. Oswald, & R. L Seeber (Eds.),
Organizing to win: New research on union strategies (pp. 19-36). Cornell
University ILR Press. http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/187/
Bronfenbrenner, K., & Warren, D. (2007). Race, gender, and the rebirth of trade
unionism. UNLF New Labor Forum, 16(3), 142-148.
doi:10.1080/10957960701636760
Cachia, M. and Millward, L. (2011). The telephone medium and semi‐structured
interviews: A complementary fit. Qualitative Research in Organizations and
Management, 6(3), 265-277. https://doi.org/10.1108/17465641111188420;
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/17465641111188420/full/h
tml?journalCode=qrom

179

Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by the
multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56(2), 81–
105. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0046016
Coalition for a Democratic Workplace (2018, May 31). Press release: CDW files
comments on ambush election RFI. https://myprivateballot.com/c/issues/ambushelection-rule/; see also https://www.msci.org/coalition-for-a-democraticworkplace-asks-nlrb-to-rescind-ambush-elections-ruling/
Combs, R. (2020, March 3) Analysis: Deceleration defines 2019 state of the unions.
Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-lawanalysis/analysis-deceleration-defines-2019-state-of-the-unions
Combs, R., & Cinquegrani, G. (2018, August 30). Unions outpacing 2017 in new member
recruitment. bna.com. https://www.bna.com/unions-outpacing-2017n73014482166/#!
Creswell, J. W. (2008). Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating
quantitative and qualitative research (3rd ed.). Pearson Education.
Creswell, J. W. (2012). Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating
quantitative and qualitative research (4th ed.). Pearson Education.
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five
approaches (3rd ed.). SAGE Publishing, Inc.
Davis, C. (2019). Trump NLRB modifies Obama board's union election case regulations.
Ogletree Deakins. https://ogletree.com/insights/2019-12-13/trump-nlrb-modifiesobama-boards-union-election-case-regulations/

180

Denzin, N. K. (1977). The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological
methods. MGraw-Hill.
Deshpande, S., & Stamper, C. (2004, May 1). Predicting union certification elections in
the hospitality industry. Cornell Hotel & Restaurant Administration Quarterly,
45(2), 196-208. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0010880404263909
DeSilver, D. (2018, August 30). Most Americans view labor unions favorably, but few
belong to one. Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/08/30/union-membership-2/
Detrick, H. (2017, September 26). A new Republican majority on the NLRB may start
undoing Obama-era labor laws. Fortune. http://fortune.com/2017/09/26/nlrblabor-workers-rights-william-emmanuel/
Devinatz, V. G. (2015). Right-to-work laws, the southernization of U.S. labor relations
and the U.S. trade union movement’s decline. Labor Studies Journal, 40(4), 297318. doi:10.1177/0160449x15622702
Dowd, T. (2012, May 1). Pick up the pace: New NLRB regulations force employers to
respond more quickly to election petitions. Insight. http://www.littler.com/pickpace-new-nlrb-regulations-force-employers-respond-more-quickly-electionpetitions
Elite Lawyer (n.d.). National Labor Relations Board attorney overview.
https:elitelawyer.com/federal-employment-law-attorney/national-labor-relationsboard-nlrb

181

Estreicher, S. (1985). Policy oscillation at the Labor Board: A plea for rulemaking.
Administrative Law Review, 37(2), 163-181.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40709289
Farber, H. (2015, July 9). Union organizing decisions in a deteriorating environment: The
composition of representation elections and the decline in turnout. ILR Review,
68(5), 1126-1156. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0019793915592623
Farmers’ Almanac (n. d.). 2020 Hurricane names for the season.
https://www.farmersalmanac.com/hurricane-names-31223
Ferguson, J. (2018, April 17). Report: Assessing the impact of the April 2005
amendments to the NLRB representation case procedures. nlrb.gov.
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/webform/uploads/nlrb_rfi_aflcio_expert_report_4-18-18.pdf
Field, A. P. (2013). Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics (4th ed.). SAGE
Publications. Ltd. ISBN: 978-1-4462-4917-8.
Fletcher, B., Jr., & Hurd, R. W. (1998). Beyond the organizing model: The
transformation process in local unions [Electronic version]. In K. Bronfenbrenner,
S. Friedman, R. W. Hurd, R. A. Oswald, and R. L. Seeber (Eds.), Organizing to
win: New research on union strategies (pp. 37-53). Cornell University ILR Press.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/322/
Fossum, J. A. (2012). Labor relations: Development, structure, process (11th ed).
McGraw-Hill Education.
Frazier, T. P. (1984). Consultants, unions, and NLRB elections (Unpublished doctoral
dissertation]. The American University.

182

Frey, J. H., Fink, A., & Oishi, S. M. (1995). How to conduct interviews by telephone and
in person. SAGE Publications.
Galtung, J. (1967). Theories of peace: A synthetic approach to peace thinking.
International Peace Research Institute.
Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3),
167-191. https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336900600301
Greenhouse, S. (2015, June 8). How Walmart persuades its workers not to unionize. The
Atlantic. https://theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/how-walmartconvinces-its-employees-not-to-unionize/395051
Greenhouse, S. (2016, March 24). US businesses attack new labor rule aimed at curbing
union-busting tactics. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/mar/24/us-labor-department-new-union-busting-rule
Griffin, Jr., R. (2015, April 6). Memorandum GC 15-06: Guidance memorandum on
representation case procedure changes effective April 14, 2015. nlrb.gov.
Retrieved April 6, 2015, from https://www.nlrb.gov/news-publications/nlrbmemoranda/general-counsel-memos
Gruenberg, M. (2016, January 21). Labor experts ask NLRB: Give unions equal voice,
time at ‘captive audience meetings.’ People’s World.
http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/labor-experts-ask-nlrb-give-unions-equalvoice-time-at-captive-audience-meetings/

183
Hardie, J.B.. & Murphy, T. P. (2016, April 29). First year of NLRB’s new election rules
– Employers deflecting union ‘ambush.’ Hunton, Andrews, Kurth, LLP.
https://www.huntonlaborblog.com/2016/04/articles/nlrb/first-year-of-nlrbs-newelection-rules-employers-deflecting-union-ambush/
Hayes, B., Duffield, T., & Kisicki, M. (2018, May 31). CDW files comments on ambush
election RFI. Center for a Democratic Workplace.
https://myprivateballot.com/2018/04/18/cdw-files-comments-ambush-election-rfi/
Hemphill, T. A. (2008). Demonising Wal-Mart: What do the facts tell us? The Journal of
Corporate Citizenship, 31(Autumn), 26-30. http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~sdcamp/urp584/index.html
Higgins, Jr., J. E. (2012). The developing labor law: The board, the courts, and the
National Labor Relations Act (6th ed.). Bloomberg BNA. ISBN-13: 9781570187780
Higgins, Jr., J. (Ed.). (2019). Developing labor law (7th ed., Vol. 1). Sections 9.1 -10.99.
Bloomberg BNA.
Hurd, R. W., & Uehlein, J. B. (1994). Patterned responses to organizing: Case studies of
the union-busting convention [Electronic version]. Cornell University ILR Press.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/320/
Hurd, R. W. (2004). The rise and fall of the organizing model in the U.S. [Electronic
version]. Cornell University ILR Digital Commons.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/301/

184

Iafolla, R. (2018, November 9). Proposed changes to union election rules on tap at
NLRB. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/proposed-changes-to-union-election-rules-on-tap-at-nlrb
Iafolla, R. (2020a, January 3). More labor law charges possible under NLRB union
election rule. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/more-labor-law-charges-possible-under-nlrb-union-election-rule
Iafolla, R. (2020b, March 4). NLRB readying proposal for more union election changes:
Chairman. Bloomberg Law.https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/nlrb-readying-proposal-for-more-union-election-changes-chairman
Iafolla, R. (2020c, March 9). Legal challenge to union election rule may turn on
substance. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/legal-challenge-to-union-election-rule-likely-turns-on-substance
Iafolla, R. (2020d, March 20). NLRB delays contested election procedure changes by 45
days. Bloomberg Law. https://ne ws.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/nlrbdelays-contested-election-procedure-changes-by-45-days
Kanu, H. A. (2018a, January 26). Labor Board extends time for comments on union
election rules. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/labor-board-extends-time-for-comments-on-union-electionrules?context=article-related
Kanu, H. A. (2018b, October 17). Union election rule changes likely far down the line.
Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/unionelection-rule-changes-likely-far-down-the-line-1

185

Kanu, H. A. (2020a, May 5). Union elections proceed by mail despite employer calls for
pause. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/unionelections-proceed-by-mail-despite-employer-calls-for-pause
Kanu, H. A. (2020b, May 13, 14). Stray marks on ballot mean union loss, new NLRB
precedent. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/stray-marks-on-ballot-mean-loss-for-union-set-nlrb-precedent
Kanu, H. A. (2020c, May 30). Court strikes down major part of NLRB election rules.
Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/court-strikesdown-major-parts-of-nlrb-union-election-rules
Kanu, H. A. (2020d, June 1). NLRB to put in place some union election changes after
ruling. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/nlrbto-put-in-place-some-union-election-changes-after-ruling
Kelle, U., Kühberger, C., & Bernhard, R. (2019) How to use mixed methods and
triangulation designs: An introduction to history education research. History
Education Research Journal, 16(1), 5–23. https://doi.org/10.18546/HERJ.16.1.02
Keller, E. G. (2013). Whole Foods CEO John Mackey calling Obamacare fascist is tip of
the iceberg. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/us-newsblog/2013/jan/18/whole-foods-john-mackey-fascist
Knuth, B. (2017) Do authorization cards ever expire or are they valid indefinitely?
Cornell University Graduate School. http://gradschool.cornell.edu
Kuhn, T. S., & Hacking, I. (2012). The structure of scientific revolutions. The University
of Chicago Press.

186

Labor Relations Institute (LRI). Union win percentage by campaign days, elections 20042014. LRI.com. https://lrionline.com/elections-review-report/
La Botz, D. (1991). A troublemaker's handbook: How to fight back where you work – and
win! Labor Notes. ISBN 13: 9780914093046
Laerd Statistics. (2020). Pearson product-moment correlation. Laerdstatistics.com.
https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/pearson-correlation-coefficientstatistical-guide.php
Lepie, J. (2014). Is there a winning formula for union organizing? Employee
Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 26(2), 137-152.
https://vdocuments.mx/download/is-there-a-winning-formula-for-unionorganizing
Levitt, M. J., & Conrow, T. (1993). Confessions of a union buster. Crown. ISBN 0-51758330-5
Litwin, M. S. (1995). How to measure survey reliability and validity. Sage Publications,
Inc. https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781483348957
Litwin, M. S. (2003). Pilot testing. The survey kit: How to assess and interpret survey
psychometrics (pp. 58-67). SAGE Publications, Inc.
https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412984409
Logan, J., Johansson, E., & Lamare, R. (2011, June 29). New data: NLRB process fails to
ensure a fair vote. UC Berkley Center for Labor Research and Education.
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/new-data-nlrb-process-fails-to-ensure-a-fair-vote/

187

McAlevey, J. (2018, October 10). Three Lessons for Winning in November and Beyond.
The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/opinion/unionsdemocrats-organizers-midterms.html
Mann, J. (2012, September 22). Win more union organizing drives. CreateSpace
Independent Publishing Platform. ISBN-13: 978-1479198382
Mayhew, R. (2019, April 2). The advantages of labor relations to an organization. Small
business - Chron.com. https://smallbusiness.chron.com/advantages-laborrelations-organization-20869.html
McConville, T. M. (2015, June 18). Ambush at the NLRB: Unions winning over 60% of
elections under new rules. The National Law Review.
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ambush-nlrb-unions-winning-over-60elections-under-new-rules
McNicholas, C., Poydock, M., Wolfe, J., Zipperer, B., Lafer, G., & Loustaunau, L. (2019,
December 11). Unlawful: U.S. employers are charged with violating federal law
in 41.5% of all union election campaigns. Economic Policy Institute.
https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-electioncampaigns/
Meadows, D. H., & Wright, D. (2008). Thinking in systems: A primer. Chelsea Green
Publishing. ISBN-13: 978-1603580557

188

Mehta, C., & Theodore, N. (2005, December). Undermining the right to organize:
Employer behavior during union representation campaigns. Center for Urban
Economic Development, University of Illinois at Chicago.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228799876_Undermining_the_right_to_
organize_Employer_behavior_during_union_representation_campaigns
Menegus, B. (2018, September 26). Amazon's aggressive anti-union tactics revealed in
leaked 45-minute video. Gizmodo.com. https://gizmodo.com/amazons-aggressiveanti-union-tactics-revealed-in-leake-1829305201
Milkman, R., & Voss, K. (2004). Rebuilding labor: Organizing and organizers in the
new union movement. Cornell University ILR Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-8902-090000. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Rebuilding-labor-%3Aorganizing-and-organizers-in-the-MilkmanVoss/afc4cdc185c015430855920ef11e2547b03793d9
Mondore, S., Carson, M., & Douthitt, S. (2011). Business focused HR: 11 processes to
drive results. Society for Human Resource Management. ISBN-13: 9781586442040
Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. SAGE Publications, Inc.
ISBN-13: 978-0803957992
Multinational Monitor. (2003). Declining unionization, rising inequality: An interview
with Kate Bronfenbrenner. Multinational Monitor, 24(5), 21-24.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cbpubs/19/
National Labor Relations Board. (n.d.) NLRB election reports. nlrb.gov.
https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/reports/election-reports

189

National Labor Relations Board. NLRB Graphs and data. nlrb.gov.
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data
National Labor Relations Board. (n.d.). NLRB Regional Offices. nlrb.gov.
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices
National Labor Relations Board. (2017, January). NLRB casehandling manual - Part 2:
Representation proceedings. nlrb.gov.
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node1727/CHM%20Part%20II%20Jan%202017.pdf
National Labor Relations Board. (2019, December 18). Representation case procedures:
A rule by the National Labor Relations Board. Retrieved December 18, 2019,
from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-12-18/pdf/2019-26920.pdf
National Labor Relations Board. (2015, April). NLRB representation case- Procedures
fact sheet and comparison of current/ new procedures. nlrb.gov.
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-publications/publications/fact-sheets/nlrbrepresentation-case-procedures-fact-sheet
National Labor Relations Board. (2016, July 1). NLRB Operations management memos.
nlrb.gov. Retrieved July 1, 2016 from https://www.nlrb.gov/reportsguidance/operations-management-memos

190

National Labor Relations Board. (2020, June 1). NLRB to implement rule changes
unaffected by court ruling. nlrb.gov. https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/newsstory/nlrb-to-implement-all-election-rule-changes-unaffected-by-courtruling#:~:text=NLRB%20to%20Implement%20All%20Election%20Rule%20Cha
nges%20Unaffected%20by%20Court%20Ruling,Office%20of%20Public&text=WASHINGTON%2C%20DC%20%E2%80%93%
20The%20National%20Labor,recent%20U.S.%20District%20Court%20order.
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Svcs., Inc. 406 U.S. 272 (1972, May 15).
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/272/
Newhouse, S. H. (2014, February 4). And you call this f-ing leadership?- A case study on
leadership chronicling the demise of FedEx National LTL. CreateSpace
Independent Publishing Platform. ISBN-13: 978-1483917870
Opfer, C. (2020, March 6). AFL-CIO sues Trump administration over union elections
rule. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/afl-ciosues-trump-administration-over-union-elections-rule
Patton, M. Q. (1990) Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2nd ed.). Sage
Publications, Inc. ISBN-13: 978-0803937796
Public Laws. (1959). Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29
U.S. Code, Secs 401-531. https://www.congress.gov/public-laws/93rd-congress
Reclaim Democracy. (2012, September 12). Internal documents of Wal-Mart stores, Inc.
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/walmart-internal-documents/

191

Rogerson, P. (2001). Hypothesis testing and sampling. Statistical methods for geography
(pp. 43-64). SAGE Research Methods.
https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781849209953.n3
Samoff, B. (1968). NLRB elections: Uncertainty and certainty. U. Pa. L. Rev., 117(2),
228-253. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol117/iss2/2/
Schwartz, R. M. (2003). The labor law source book: Texts of federal labor laws. Work
Rights Press. ISBN-13: 978-0945902133
Seeger, Pete. (1967). Which side are you on? (Florence Reese, composer, 1931). Pete
Seeger’s Greatest Hits. New York, NY: Columbia Records.
http://www.traditionalmusic.co.uk/seeger/which_side_are_you_on-crd-peteseeger.htm
Sherk, J. B. (2009, May 21). What unions do: How labor unions affect jobs and the
economy. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/jobs-andlabor/report/what-unions-do-how-labor-unions-affect-jobs-and-the-economy
Sherk, J. B. (2015, January 26). Unions charge higher dues and pay their officers larger
salaries in non–right-to-work states. The Heritage Foundation.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/unions-charge-higher-dues-andpay-their-officers-larger-salaries-in-nonright-to-work-states
Slater, R. (2003, June 2). The Wal-Mart decade: How a new generation of leaders turned
Sam Walton's legacy into the world's #1 company. Portfolio. ISBN-13: 9781591840060

192

Sternburger with Fries Blogspot. Dave Regan loses another NLRB election.
http://sternburgerwithfries.blogspot.com/2015/02/seiu-uhws-dave-regan-losesanother-nlrb.html
The Federalist. (2015, October 26). James Sherk explains how labor unions are like
cartels. http://thefederalist.com/2015/10/26/james-sherk-explains-how-laborunions-are-like-cartels/
Troy, L. (2004). The twilight of the old unionism. M.E. Sharpe Publishers, Inc. ISBN 07656-0747-6
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020, January 22). Union members summary.
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
Wallender, A. (2018, October 22). Eyewear maker Luxottica defeats union bid in
Georgia. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/eyewear-maker-luxottica-defeats-union-bid-in-georgia
Wallender, A. (2019, January 23) LA teachers union, fresh off strike, hit with dues
lawsuit. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/lateachers-union-fresh-off-strike-hit-with-dues-lawsuit
Wallender, A., & Smith, P. (2019, January 31). Brady wears Super Bowl's union label
while hourly workers don't. Bloomberg Law.
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/brady-wears-super-bowlsunion-label-while-hourly-workers-dont

193

Walsh, T. V., & Rosen, P. B. (2015, January 15). Faster votes, but few more union wins A surprising look at 'quickie election' rules at year-end. Jackson Lewis, PC.
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/faster-votes-few-more-union-winssurprising-look-quickie-election-rules-year-end
Wheeler, H. N., & McClendon, J. A. (1991). The individual decision to unionise. In G.
Strauss, D. G. Gallagher, & J. Fiorito (Eds.), The state of the unions. Industrial
Relations Research Association.
Wilmot, W. W., & Hocker, J. L. (2011). Interpersonal conflict. McGraw-Hill Education.
Wilson, D. P. (1998). Total victory! The complete management guide to a successful
NLRB representation election (2nd ed.). Labor Relations Institute, Inc. ISBN13: 978-0963855411
Yager, D. (2015, January 29). NLRB's final expedited election rules will curtail
employees' ability to make a fully informed decision on union representation. HR
Policy Association. https://www.hrpolicy.org/downloads/2015/1509_PB_NLRB_Expedited_Elections.pdf
Youngblood, S., DeNisi, A., Molleston, J., & Mobley, W. (1984). The impact of work
environment, instrumentality beliefs, perceived labor union image, and subjective
norms on union voting intentions. Academy of Management Journal, 27(3), 576 590. DOI: 10.2307/256046
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270137233_The_Impact_of_Work_Env
ironment_Instrumentality_Beliefs_Perceived_Labor_Union_Image_and_Subjecti
ve_Norms_on_Union_Voting_Intentions

194
Zickar, M. J. (2004, February 1). An analysis of industrial-organizational psychology’s
indifference to labor unions in the United States. Human Relations, 57(2), 145167. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0018726704042925

195

Appendix A: Glossary of Labor Relations Terms
Many terms listed below can be found at the website maintained by International
Brotherhood of Teamsters at http://www.teamster.org/join/glossary.htm
Accretions: Employees added to the bargaining unit once a union is certified as a
representative of the bargaining unit.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A civil service appointee of the National Labor
Relations Board who conducts unfair labor practice hearings in the region where such
cases originate
Area Standards Picketing: A form of picketing with the purpose of encouraging an
employer to observe the standards in that industry in that locality. This kind of picketing
has legal restrictions.
Authorization Card: A union card filled out by pro-union workers during a
representation campaign. The card usually specifies the union as a collective bargaining
agent of the employees and must be dated and signed. The National Labor Relations
Board will accept 30% of the employees signatures on cards or petitions as the sufficient
“showing of interest” required to conduct an election. Usually unions will not file for an
election unless a majority of the bargaining unit members have signed authorization
cards.
Bargaining Agent: Union designated by a government agency, such as the National
Labor Relations Board, or recognized voluntarily by the employer, as the exclusive
representative of all employees in the bargaining unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining.
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Bargaining Rights: The rights outlined in section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
Rights of workers to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment through their
chosen representatives. The bargaining agent is designated by a majority of the workers
in a bargaining unit to represent the group in collective bargaining.
Bargaining Unit: A group of workers who bargain collectively with the employer. The
unit may include all the workers in a single location or in several locations or it may
include only the workers in a single craft or department. Final unit is determined by the
National Labor Relations Board, or agreed to jointly by the union and the employer.
Blocking: A National Labor Relations Board decision not to proceed with an election in
a bargaining unit where there are unresolved Unfair Labor Practice charges.
Boycott: A concerted refusal to work for, purchase from, or handle the products of an
employer. Where the action is directed against the employer directly involved in the labor
dispute, it is termed a primary boycott. In a secondary boycott, the action is directed
against a neutral employer in an attempt to get him/her to stop doing business with the
company with which the union is having a dispute. Secondary boycotts are illegal under
the Taft-Hartley Act.
Business Agent (B.A., Union Representative): A full-time representative of a local
union whose job is to represent members in the local.
Campaign Consultant or Persuader: Individuals or businesses utilized by employers
for their expertise and sophistication in guiding the strategy, tactics, and messages to
respond to the conflict inherent within a workplace representation election.
Canvass: A method of talking individually to every member of a bargaining unit to either
convey information, gather information on the survey, or plan for united action.
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Canvass Coordinator: A term sometimes used for the person at the top of a member to
member action network. Other terms include “network coordinator” or “campaign
coordinator”. This person is responsible for establishing the one on one network and for
planning and scheduling activities of the network.
Captive Audience Meeting: Typically, a union term for a meeting held on company
time and property, between employees and the employer’s representative to explain the
benefits of maintaining a direct relationship between employees and the employerwithout the influence of a party unaffected by the success or failure of the employer or its
employees. In other words the purpose of the meeting is to persuade employees to vote
against union representation.
Card Check: Procedure whereby signed authorization cards are checked against the list
of employees in a prospective bargaining unit to determine if the union has majority
status. The employer may recognize the union on the basis of this card check without the
necessity of a formal election. Often conducted by an outside party, e.g. a respected
member of the community.
Certification: Official designation by the National Labor Relations Board of a labor
organization entitled to bargain as the exclusive representative of employees in an
appropriate unit
Certification Bar: The National Labor Relations Board and many public sector agencies
will prohibit another election in a bargaining unit for one year after a union has been
certified following a workplace representation election.
Certified Union: A union designated by the National Labor Relations Board as the
exclusive bargaining agent of an appropriate unit of employees.
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Check-Off: A contract clause authorizing the company to deduct union dues from
paychecks of those members who so authorize deductions. The company then transfers
the money to the union.
Collective Bargaining: A process which employees, through their bargaining committee,
deal as a group to determine wages, hours and other conditions of employment.
Normally, the result of collective bargaining is a written contract which covers all
employees in an appropriate unit.
Communication Tactics: For employers engaged in the conflict of a workplace
representation election, communication tactics are the modalities, or methods by which it
will communicate its messages to the voting members of the bargaining unit. Such
communication tactics can include captive audience meetings typically held on the
employer premises while employees are on the clock, posters, home mailings, websites,
social media platforms and applications, as well as other communication modalities.
Company Union: An employee organization, usually in one company, that is dominated
by management. The National Labor Relations Act declared that such employer
domination is an Unfair Labor Practice.
Complaint: Formal papers issued by the National Labor Relations Board to start an
Unfair Labor Practice hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The complaint states
the basis for the National Labor Relations Board’s jurisdiction and the alleged Unfair
Labor Practice.
Concerted Activity: The rights, protected by the National Labor Relations Act, of two or
more employees acting in concert to form, join, or assist labor organizations to affect
their wages, hours or work or working conditions.
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Consent Election: An election for union representation agreed to by management,
employees, and the union. The National Labor Relations Board oversees the election
Corporate Campaign: The use of strategic pressure on an employer’s weak areas to
gain leverage during a contract campaign or organizing drive. These campaigns involve
analyzing an employer’s social, financial, and political network and mobilizing union
members and community members in a comprehensive approach which does not rely on
the strike alone as the basis of the union’s power.
Decertification: Withdrawal by a government agency, such as the National Labor
Relations Board, of a union’s official recognition as the exclusive bargaining
representative. The National Labor Relations Board will withdraw certification if a
majority of employees vote against union representation in a decertification election.
Double Breasted Operation: A condition where an employer operates two closely
related companies – one with the union contract and one without. Under such operation,
the employer will normally assign most of the work to the non—union segment of his
two companies.
Duty of Fair Representation (DFR): A union’s obligation to represent all employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit as fairly and equally as possible. This requirement applies
both in the creation and interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. A union is
said to have violated its Duty of Fair Representation when a union’s conduct toward a
member of a collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. A
union steward, for example, may not ignore a grievance which has merit, nor can that
grievance be processed in a perfunctory manner. It should be noted, however, that the
employee in the bargaining unit has no absolute right to have a grievance taken to
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arbitration. The union is obligated to give fair representation to all union members, and
also to collective bargaining unit members who have not joined the union in right– to–
work states or in public service units.
Excelsior List: Established in the case of “Excelsior Underwear”, the list of names,
addresses and other personal information of employees eligible to vote in a union
election. It is normally provided by the employer to the union within 10 days after the
election date has been set or agreed upon at the National Labor Relations Board. NOTE:
The requirements of this list, now referred to as a Voter List after the 2015 changes to the
election system, must be provided to the union within eight days of the petition for
election.
Exclusive Bargaining Rights: The right of the union which is been certified by the
National Labor Relations Board or other government agency to be the only union
representing a particular bargaining unit.
Exempt Employee: An employee who is not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
and is therefore not eligible for time-and-one-half monetary payments for overtime.
Exempt employees are generally paid a salary rather than an hourly rate.
Fact Finding: Investigation of labor – management disputes by a board, panel, or
individual. A report is issued by the panel describing the issue in dispute, and may make
recommendations for a solution.
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): The 1938 federal Wage –Hour Law which
establishes minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for industries engaged in
interstate commerce. The law also prohibited the labor of children under 16 years of age.
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Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS): Independent agency created by
the Taft – Hartley Act in 1947 to mediate labor disputes which substantially affect
interstate commerce.
Field Examiner: An employee of the National Labor Relations Board whose primary
duties are to conduct certification elections and carry out preliminary investigations of
Unfair Labor Practices.
Free Riders: Used in an open shop to refer to non—union members who receive all the
benefits derived from collective bargaining without paying union dues or equivalent fees.
Good Faith Bargaining: Negotiations in which two parties meet and confer at
reasonable times with open minds and the intention of reaching agreement over a new
contract.
Housevisits, Homecalls and Housecalls: Terms used to describe visits by union staff,
volunteers, or organizing committee members to the homes of employees they are
attempting to organize. Such visits give organizers an opportunity to discuss the union
and answer questions of unorganized employees in a relaxed and secure atmosphere.
Industrial Union: A union whose membership includes all employees in a particular
industry, regardless of the particular skills the employee exercises.
Informational Picketing: Picketing done with the express intent not to cause a work
stoppage, but to publicize either the existence of a labor dispute or information
concerning the dispute. Picketing done with the express intent not to cause a work
stoppage but to publicize either the existence of a labor dispute or information concerning
the dispute.
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Injunction: A court order which either imposes restraints upon action, or directs that a
specific action be taken and which is, in either case, backed by the court’s power to hold
disobedient parties in contempt.
Inside Strategy: The use of mass grievances, working to rule, rolling sick outs,
informational picketing, and other forms of resistance designed to pressure an employer
to meet the union’s demands without the union resorting to a strike.
Intervenor: A union which wants to be on the ballot when another union has already
petition for an election.
Job Action: A concerted activity by employees designed to put pressure on the employer
without resorting to a strike. Examples include: wearing T shirts, buttons, or hats with
union slogans, holding parking lot meetings, collective refusal of voluntary overtime,
reporting to work in a group, petition signing, jamming phone lines, etc.
Jurisdiction: The specific industry, craft and/or geographical area which a local union is
chartered to organize or represent.
Jurisdictional Dispute: A conflict involving a dispute between two unions over which
union shall represent a group of employees in collective bargaining or as to which
union’s member shall perform a certain type of work.
L-M Reports: The annual financial statement of income and expenses submitted to the
Department of Labor’s Office of Labor Management Standards. The reports include the
salaries of union officers and staff. Unions are required by law to file annually.
Mass Picketing: Patrolling by large numbers of people in close formation, often
preventing access to company premises.
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Member-to-Member Network: A communication system designed to allow the leaders
of a local union to communicate rapidly and personally with the members. A coordinator
at the top of a pyramid communicates with approximately 10 leaders, each of whom
communicates with approximately 10 members, each of whom may communicate with
10 other members, etc. See also Canvass.
Messages: The statements and themes used by employers in order to respond to the
conflict within the workplace representation election. Messages are intended to persuade
the employees to accept and support the employer’s position.
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA): Federal law guaranteeing employees
the right to participate in unions without management reprisals. It was modified in 1947
with the passage of the Taft – Hartley Act, and modified again in 1959 by the passage of
the Landrum – Griffin Act.
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB): Agency created by the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, and continued through subsequent amendment whose functions
are to define appropriate bargaining units, to hold elections, to determine whether a
majority of workers want to be represented by a specific union or no union, to certify
unions to represent employees, to interpret and apply the Act’s provisions prohibiting
certain employer and union Unfair Labor Practices, and otherwise to administer the
provisions of the Act.
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA): The law which authorizes the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration agency to set standards, obligates
employers to provide a safe workplace, and provides for enforcement of the standards.

204

The law encourages the states to develop their own safety laws which displace the federal
law.
Open Shop: Where employees do not have to belong to the union or pay dues to secure
or retain employment in a company, even though there may be a collective bargaining
agreement. The union is obligated by law to represent members and non—members
equally regardless of whether it is an open shop or a union shop.
Organized Labor. As defined by the National Labor Relations Act, organized labor is
the organization elected by employees to represent their interest and to engage in
collective bargaining with their employer, also known as a union.
Organizing Committee: The employees in a non—union shop who are designated to
represent their co – workers during the representation campaign. Organizing committee
members, among other things, usually sign up their coworkers on authorization cards or
petitions, hand out leaflets, attend meetings and visit employees at home to gain support
for the union effort.
Organizing Model of Unions: The concept that the primary function of a union’s
officers and staff is to organize members to exert collective power to solve problems.
This is in contrast to the Service Model of Unions.
Pattern Bargaining: Collective bargaining in which the union tries to apply identical
terms, conditions, or demands to several employers in an industry although the employers
act individually rather than as a group.
Permanent Replacements: Under current labor law, when employees engage in an
economic strike, the employer has the right to hire permanent replacements. After the
strike has ended, if there is no back to work agreement reached between the union and the
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employer, employees replaced during the strike are put on a preferential hiring list and
must wait for openings to occur.
Phone Banking: The organized telephoning of large numbers of members to inform
them of a union policy or action or to gather information. This is often done by
volunteers who come into the union hall and telephone members during a certain time
period.
Phone Tree: A network of volunteer members in which one member calls a list of
members, each of whom calls another list of members, etc.
Raiding: A union’s attempt to enroll employees belonging to or represented by another
union.
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): Federal law
allowing the federal government to place in trusteeship organizations which are convicted
of being dominated by racketeers of organized crime. The U.S. Department of Justice
filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the RICO Act, and
this lawsuit was settled by the 1989 Consent Decree.
Rank and File: The members of a union.
Recognition: Employer acceptance of the union as the exclusive bargaining
representative for all employees in the bargaining unit.
Recognition Picketing: Picketing to pressure or coerce an employer to recognize a union
as a bargaining agent for the employees. Recognition picketing is subject to certain
restrictions under the amendments to the National Labor Relations Act.
Replacement: Workers hired to replace employees on strike. In the case of economic
strikers, the strikers retain their employment status while on strike; However,, the
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company may hire permanent replacements, and may legally refuse to reinstate strikers
who have been permanently replaced. In this situation, if there are permanent
replacements, economic strikers are generally entitled to reinstatement when the
replacements leave. In the case of unfair labor practice strikes, the strikers must be
reinstated with few exceptions.
Representation Election: Election conducted to determine by a majority vote of the
employees whether they want to be represented by a union. Whether to vote or not is
voluntary and the employee must mark a paper ballot with an “X” on a square for yes or
no.
“Right to Work” States:

States which have passed laws prohibiting unions

from negotiating union shop clauses in their contracts with employers covered by the
National Labor Relations Act. Unions often refer to these as “right to work for less”
states.
Runaway Shop: A plant transferred to another location, usually another city, to destroy
union effectiveness and evade bargaining duties. The best block to a Runaway Shop is
unambiguous contract language which prohibits any move or relocation of a plant.
Secondary Activities: Strikes, picketing, boycotts, or other activities directed by a union
against an employer with whom it has no dispute, to pressure that employer to stop doing
business with, or to bring pressure against another employer with whom the union does
have a dispute.
Service Model of Unions: The concept that the primary function of the union, its staff,
and its officers is to service the members or solve the member’s problems for them. This
is in contrast to the Organizing Model of Unions.
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[Sufficient] Showing of Interest: A requirement by the National Labor Relations Board
that must be met by the union when a union wishes to represent a group of employees.
There are several showing of interest requirements used by the National Labor Relations
Board. A) A petitioning union needs 30% of the eligible members in the unit. B) Where a
union has petitioned and another union wishes to intervene, the second union must have
30% of the unit it seeks. C) Where a union petitions and another union wishes to
intervene in the same unit to the extent of blocking a consent election agreement, it must
have 10%. D) Usually, a showing of one or two cards is enough for a second union to
intervene only to have their name on the ballot or to participate in a hearing. E) A current
or recently expired contract is also a criterion for showing of interest.
Sitdown Strike: A work action which is currently illegal in which strikers refuse to leave
the employer’s premises.
Strike Force: A group of volunteer members who have agreed to help picket or leaflet in
support of an organizing drive, strike, or other campaign which the local has initiated.
Struck Work: A term to define a product which is produced by an employer during the
period of a labor dispute with its employees. An employee who refuses to handle struck
work is engaged in a sympathy work action. Employees who refuse to do the work of
employees engaged in a strike may be replaced; However,, they generally cannot be
discharged. A struck work clause in some collective bargaining agreements protects the
rights of employees not to handle goods of a struck employer. There are limitations on
such clauses in section 8( e ) of the National Labor Relations Act.
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Successor Employer: An employer which has acquired an already existing operation and
which continues those operations in approximately the same manner as the previous
employer, including the use of the previous employer’s employees.
Supervisor: Those employees who have management rights such as the right to hire, fire,
or recommend such action. The employees who are defined as supervisors under the
National Labor Relations Act are not permitted to become members of the bargaining
unit at the work location. In organizing campaigns, most employers will try to enlarge the
ranks of their supervisory personnel. The employer will try to keep a certain group of
supervisors as an anti—union workforce for future labor disputes.
Taft-Hartley Act or Labor Management Act of 1947: An amendment of the National
Labor Relations Act which added provisions allowing unions to be prosecuted, enjoined,
and sued for a variety of activities, including mass picketing and secondary boycotts.
Unfair Labor Practices: Those employer or union activities classified as “unfair” by
federal or state labor relations acts. Under the National Labor Relations Act, an employer
Unfair Labor Practices include employer threats against protected concerted activity,
employer domination of unions, discrimination against employees for collective activity,
and employer failure to bargain in good faith with union representatives. Union Unfair
Labor Practices include failure to represent all members of the bargaining unit and failure
to bargain in good faith, and secondary boycotts. The Railway Labor Act and many state
and public sector labor laws contain definitions of unfair labor practices which are similar
to the National Labor Relations Act definitions.
Union Buster: A professional consultant or consulting firm which provides tactics and
strategies for employers trying to prevent unionization or to decertify unions.
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Union Shop: A form of union security provided in the collective bargaining agreement
which requires employees to belong to or pay dues to the union as a condition of
retaining their employment. It is illegal to have a close shop which requires workers to be
union members before they are hired. The union shop is legal, except in right-to-work
states, because it requires workers to join the union or pay dues within a certain time
period after they are hired.
Volunteer Organizing Committee (VOC): A term sometimes used to describe union
members who volunteer for the union during organizing campaigns. Volunteers may
donate their time and/or be compensated for lost wages while they assist the campaign by
visiting workers at their homes, distributing leaflets, and attending meetings, etc.
Wildcat Strike: A strike undertaken without official union authorization. Although not
necessarily illegal, they are not necessarily protected by the National Labor Relations
Board.
Workplace. The physical and abstract environment represented by the employment of
employees within a company.
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Appendix B: Pilot Study Participation Agreement
Each participant in the pilot study will be required to agree to a participation letter
for the research study entitled: Reducing Organizational Conflict: A Quantitative Study
of the Multivariate Determinants of Employer Workplace Representation Election
Success.
The agreement provided to research participants will include the following
information:
What is the study about?
This study will develop a mathematical model to identify winning campaign
themes and messages as well as communication tactics which lead to an employer victory
in workplace representation elections supervised by the National Labor Relations.
The researcher postulates that the results of this study can direct employers’
financial allocations during the highly contentious and costly workplace representation
election for optimal success. While there is significant anecdotal and qualitative
guidance that employers rely upon to expend significant financial resources in this
conflict, there is not a quantitative model in existence. There is a whole industry of
consulting and persuasion that exists to exploit and profit from an employers’ inability to
rely upon a quantitative model for responding to workplace representation elections
supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. This dissertation will bring clarity to
heretofore ambiguous and ill-defined significant employers’ financial decisions that
increase organizational conflict within the workplace.
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Why are you asking me?
You are identified as a subject matter expert in workplace representation elections
from your selection as a speaker at industry and professional organizations and
conferences. As a result, your participation in this research is critically important to and
will be instructive to both the researcher and all other employers may face similar
elections in the future. Your participation in this research and survey is strictly voluntary
and is greatly appreciated again by this researcher and all other employers who will face
such an election in the future.
Your role is simply to complete the pilot study of the drafted survey instrument to
aid in assessing participants ability to understand and complete the instrument. This pilot
study asks no questions about you or your experience but is instead limited to the
completion of the survey instrument. The pilot study is expected to last less than 15
minutes of your time.
What will I be doing if I agree to participate in this study?
As a participant in this research you will complete a pilot survey instrument and
provide information regarding the extent you understood the questions or had any
difficulty navigating the instructions or instrument. Your participation entails a phone call
expected to last less than 15 minutes.
Will there be audio or video recording of the focus groups?
The conference call with the pilot study participant will not be recorded, though
research notes will be taken in order to incorporate any potential changes to the survey
instrument.
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Are there dangers to the research participants?
No, participation is voluntary and there is no foreseeable danger to the participant.
Any pilot test participant may refuse to participate and can withdraw from the study at
any time.
What if I have questions about the research?
If you have any questions about the research, your research rights, or have a
research related injury, please contact this researcher or the IRB contact numbers listed
above to learn more about your research rights.
Will I be paid or receive other for benefits participating in this study?
No pilot study participant will be paid. Results of this study will be compiled and
reported in academic and professional publications. Participants name and contact
information will not appear in the study. Participants will receive a copy of the report and
summary findings upon request.
How will you keep my information private?
The confidentiality of the pilot study participants is of the utmost importance. All
information obtained in this pilot study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is
required by law. However, the Internal Review Board regulatory agencies and or may
review the handwritten research records if deemed necessary.
All printed notes and material will be maintained under lock and key. Should any
pilot study research participant choose to withdraw from the study, their information will
be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and not included within the reported results.
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Acknowledgement
I have thoroughly read this consent form and by my own admission without being
coerced, acknowledge my voluntary participation in this research project.
______________________________________________________________
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE AND DATE
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Appendix C: NLRB Election – Voice of the Employer Survey©

NLRB Election- Voice of the Employer Survey©
Campaign Themes
For each of the campaign themes listed below, indicate whether or not your company used this theme during the
campaign.
Then, IF YES, please indicate how impactful you believe the theme was towards influencing the outcome of the election.
Did your company
IF YES, how influential was this theme at the
use this theme?
time it was used?
Yes

No

Don't
know

Not
Slightly
Influentia Influentia
l
l

Neutral

Strongly
Influentia
Influentia Not sure
l
l

Not
Slightly
Influentia Influentia
l
l

Neutral

Strongly
Influentia
Influentia Not sure
l
l

What is/Definition of a Union
What is collective bargaining? (may include gambling with and
realities of bargaining)
Benefits you have now
The Union is a business and needs your dues
Layoffs at union companies/Job security
Comparing existing company benefits/wages with union's
contracts elsewhere
Analysis of the union's Constitution/Bylaws
Union's strike history
Calculators showing how much dues costs or amount lost in a
strike
Give us [employer] another chance
Get out the vote/ You need to vote

Please write any other major themes you used that are not listed above,
and indicate how influential this was at the time the theme was used.
Write-in message 1

Write-in message 2

Write-in message 3

Communication Tools
Indicate whether or not your company used each of the following tools to communicate with employees during the
campaign.
Then, IF YES, indicate how many different themes were conveyed using this tool (i.e., how many different versions of this
communication tool were used in the campaign?)
Did your company
IF YES, how many different themes were
use this tool?
involved?
Yes

Captive audience/Group meetings of employees (How many
with different themes)?

No

Don't
know

1

2

3

4

5+

Not sure
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Posters posted in the work areas (How many with different
messages)
Letters to employees homes (How many letters with different
themes)

Communication Tools, continued
Please indicate whether or not your company used each of the following tools to communicate
with employees during the campaign.

Did your company use
this messaging tool?
Yes

No

Don't
know

Yes

No

Don't
know

1 on 1 meetings (Mgr with Employee) to discuss election issues
Videos to persuade employees
A Website to persuade employees
Text Messaging to employees as company election communication tool
Facebook as company election communication tool
A podcast featuring company election messages
Online/ conference calls to employees at remote locations with campaign messaging
Twitter for communicating persuasive campaign messages
Other social media communication tool not listed above

Information about the company and election campaign

Please provide your email address in order to receive the study results
_____________________________________
Was this the first election at this company location?
Is the company unionized at other locations?
Is the company unionized at portions of this location?
Did the company hire a consultant to guide the company's election strategy?
Did the company hire an attorney to assist in the company's election strategy?
Did the company hire a persuader to communicate directly to employees?
Did the company contest the union's petitioned for unit of employees? (e.g. have a hearing to decide the unit)
Did the company implement a pay increase to employees during the election?
Did the union file challenges to the election result?

Thank you for completing this survey and for returning it in the SASE.
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Appendix D: Booklet Accompanying Survey Mailed to Employers

DATE:
EMPLOYER NAME: [Column H]
[Column C]
[Column D]
[Column E]
Regarding NLRB ELECTION CASE NUMBER [Column A]
DATE FILED: [Column Q]
DATE VOTE: [Column R]
VOTES IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER: [Column AB]
VOTES IN FAVOR OF COMPANY: [Column AE]
[Column H] Representative:
Thank you in advance for completing this quick survey about your company’s
experience in the NLRB election referenced above. This survey is part of a PhD
dissertation study designed to assist employers in future elections by providing a
quantitative predictive analytic model regarding election messaging themes and other
factors which influence a victory for the employer. Approximately 350 other elections are
also included as part of this study. Your name was obtained from the NLRB database as
the employer representative during the election. If someone else in your organization is
more knowledgeable of the company’s election messaging themes and other factors of the
campaign, please forward this survey to that person for completion.
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Again, thanks for your participation on this study, and all those companies who
return this survey in the self-addressed self-stamped envelope will receive a copy of the
results free of charge to the email you provide.
Should you have questions about the study or the survey instrument please feel
free in contacting me at (863) 286-7239. If you would like more information about my
research or work history, you can access my resume/CV on LinkedIn by searching for
Mark Codd, Director of Labor Relations, where you would note my role supporting
major corporations.
I sincerely thank you for helping my research and for helping other employers
faced with an NLRB election.
John Mark Codd

APPROXIMATE DESCRIPTION OF MESSAGING THEMES
NOTE: The question regarding influence refers to how influential the employer
believed the theme was at the time the message theme was delivered.
•

What is/ Definition of a Union.
A popular theme generally that can include the description of what a union
is, how it makes its revenue and the scope of union’s authority and other close
variations of this theme.

•

What is collective bargaining?
Employers often learn that employees misunderstand that collective
bargaining is simply the right of the union, and the obligation of the employer to
listen and bargain in good faith. Neither side can be compelled to agree to the
terms of the other. This theme often includes phrases like “horse trading” and
“gambling” with the benefits employees currently have.
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•

Benefits you have now.
This theme focuses on educating employees on the benefits that
employees possess without a union.

•

The union is a business and needs your dues
This theme focuses on the financial status of the union and how it both
earns and spends dues money.

•

Layoffs at unionized companies/ Job security
This theme often focuses upon the closure, or bankruptcy or layoffs at
unionized businesses as a comparison to the existing job security of the employer
in the campaign.

•

Comparing existing company benefits/wages with union’s contracts
elsewhere
Employers in NLRB elections often obtain contracts the union has
negotiated elsewhere and provide comparisons to voting employees.

•

Analysis of the union’s Constitution/Bylaws
This theme centers upon the rules that unions use to hold their members
accountable. This often focuses upon dues amounts, fines, fees, assessments and
disciplinary hearings for those members who violate union rules.

•

Union’s strike history
This theme focuses upon the union’s experience in past strikes at other
companies. This theme is not always limited to the union involved in the
campaign, but often showcases strikes by unions in general.

•

Calculators
This theme is often referred to as Dues Calculators or Strike Calculators. A
dues calculator yields the amount of dues an employee or even the group of
employees will pay over some period of time- often annually. A strike calculator
asks the employee to enter their wage, the monetary amount of raise in dispute
which prompts the strike, the duration of the strike and it calculates the amount of
time necessary to earn back the money the employee lost in the strike. This
payback period is often compared with the duration of other strikes and is often a
surprise to employees.
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•

Give us another chance
This theme recognizes the mistake of the employer’s culture and decisions
and requests that employees vote no to unionization. Since the union and
employees can file a petition for election one year from the election vote in
question, the employer seeks another chance from employees to create the culture
supporting a non-union environment.

•

Get out the vote/ You need to vote

This theme recognizes that the union is urging its own supporters to vote
and consequently the employer is prompted to urge as many of the eligible voters
to go to the poll and vote.
______________________________________________________________
APPROXIMATE DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNICATION TOOLS
NOTE: The questions ask about the number of unique themes for each
communication tool. Examples include how many different captive audience
meetings were held that included a different theme (not how many meetings of the
same theme were held).
•

Captive Audience
A union term for meetings of workers called by management and held on
company time and property. Usually the purpose of these meetings is to persuade
workers to vote against union representation.

•

Posters
Typically wall hangings in the workplace designed to communicate the
employer’s theme. Again, the question asks how many different themed posters
were used.

•

Letters to employees’ homes
Again, referencing the number of unique themes. For example, a round of
letters sent to employees’ homes showcasing the current benefits the company
offers followed later in the week with another explaining how and when to vote
would count as two letters.

•

1 on 1 meetings
Some employers task managers to campaign 1 on 1 (1 manager/1
employee) with given themes to discuss with individual employees.

•

Videos
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During meetings employers often use videos to illustrate its thematic
messaging.
•

Website, text messaging, Facebook, podcasts, Twitter are self-explanatory,
and the questions ask whether the employer used each as a communication
tool.

•

Online/conference calls include employer tools such as gotomeeting, WebEx,
and other video or conference call tools to reach remote employees during
the campaign.

Survey Respondent Participation Agreement
Reducing Organizational Conflict: A Quantitative Study of the Multivariate
Determinants of Employer Workplace Representation Election Success
What is the study about?
This study will develop a predictive analytical model to identify winning campaign
themes and messages as well as communication tools which lead to an employer victory
in workplace representation elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board.
This researcher believes that the results of this study can direct employers’ financial
allocations during highly contentious and costly workplace representation elections.
While there is significant anecdotal guidance that employers rely upon to expend
financial resources in election conflicts, there is not a predictive analytical model in
existence.
Why are you asking me?
Your organization is listed as having participated in a workplace representation
election between April 14, 2015 and May 1, 2017, the research period of this study. You
were listed as the employer representative within the NLRB database found at nlrb.gov.
As a result, your participation in this research is critically important to both the researcher
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and all other employers who may face similar elections in the future. Your participation in
this research and survey is strictly voluntary and is appreciated by this researcher and all
other employers who will face such an election in the future.
Your role is simply to enable someone familiar with the details of the election to
complete the survey. This survey asks no questions about you or your experience but is
instead limited to the company messaging themes, tools used in election communication
and general information about the employer facility. The anticipated time to complete this
survey is less than 10 minutes of your time.
Are there dangers to the research participants?
No, participation is voluntary and there is no foreseeable danger to the participant.
Any survey respondent may refuse to participate and can withdraw from the study at any
time.
What if I have questions about the research?
If you have questions about the research, your research rights, please contact this
researcher at (863) 286-7239, or the IRB contact Elena Bastidas Ph.D., Associate
Professor, Department of Conflict Resolution Studies at (954) 262-3021.
Will I be paid or receive other for benefits participating in this study?
No, survey respondents are not paid, however every survey respondent who provides an
email address will receive an electronic copy of the report and summary findings. The
results of this study will be compiled and reported in academic and professional
publications. Participants name and contact information will not appear in the study.
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How will you keep my information private?
The confidentiality of this study’s participants is of the utmost importance. All
information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is required by
law. The University’s Internal Review Board may review the handwritten research
records if deemed necessary. All printed notes and material will be maintained under lock
and key. Should any survey participant choose to withdraw from the study, their
information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and not included within the
reported results.
Acknowledgement
I have thoroughly read this consent form and by my own admission without being
coerced, acknowledge my voluntary participation in this research project as evidenced by
my completed survey submission.
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Appendix E: Election Campaign Poster Examples

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Anti-union-flyers_fig1_228799876
Below is a copied screen shot of a google search for "anti-union posters." There
are hundreds of images available to employees and employers with a simple Google
search at: https://www.google.com/search?q=AntiUnion+Posters&safe=active&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwipsvPEgJj
oAhUQQq0KHSymDaIQ_AUoAXoECAwQAw
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Appendix F: Example of Form LM-0 Report, 2015
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LM-20 reports are available on the OLMS.gov website and were also posted by the IAM
for Walgreens employees to review during the February 2019 election.
Source:
https://www.facebook.com/goiamwalgreens/photos/a.840379849334575/1334596176579
604/?type=3&theater
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Appendix G: Interview Respondent Participation Agreement
Each participant in the interview is required to receive a notice regarding their
participation for the research study entitled:
Voice of the Employer: A Mixed-Methods Study of Winning Messages for NLRB Elections
What is the study about?
This study will develop a model to identify winning campaign themes and messages as
well as communication tools which lead to an employer victory in workplace
representation elections supervised by the National Labor Relations Board.
The researcher believes that the results of this study can direct employers’ financial
allocations during highly contentious and costly workplace representation elections.
While there is significant anecdotal guidance that employers rely upon to expend
significant financial resources in election conflicts, there is not a model obtained from
employer representatives’ input in existence.
Why are you asking me?
Your organization is listed as having participated in a workplace representation
election between April 14, 2015 and May 1, 2017, the research period of this study. You
were listed as the employer representative within the NLRB database found at nlrb.gov.
As a result, your participation in this research is critically important to and will be
instructive to both the researcher and all other employers who may face similar elections
in the future. Your participation in this research and Interview is strictly voluntary and is
greatly appreciated again by this researcher and all other employers who will face such an
election in the future.
Your role is simply to consider your experience and career as an employer
representative involved in NLRB elections and to comment on the efficacy of a select
group of messaging and communication modalities. This interview asks no questions
about you personally other than to establish that you were involved in NLRB elections.
The anticipated time to complete this interview is approximately 15-20 minutes of your
time.
Are there dangers to the research participants?
No, participation is voluntary and there is no foreseeable danger to the participant.
Any interview respondent may refuse to participate and can withdraw from the study at
any time.
What if I have questions about the research?
If you have any questions about the research, your research rights, please contact this
researcher at (863) 286-7239, or the IRB contact numbers listed to learn more about your
research rights.

229

Will I be paid or receive other for benefits participating in this study?
No, interview respondents are not paid, however every interview respondent who
provides an email address will receive an electronic copy of the report and summary
findings. The results of this study will be compiled and reported in academic and
professional publications. Participants name and contact information will not appear in
the study.
How will you keep my information private?
The confidentiality of the pilot study participants is of the utmost importance. All
information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is required by
law. The University’s Internal Review Board may review the handwritten research
records if deemed necessary. All printed notes and material will be maintained under lock
and key. Should any interview participant choose to withdraw from the study, their
information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and not included within the
reported results.
Acknowledgement
I have thoroughly read this consent form and by my own admission without being
coerced, acknowledge my voluntary participation in this research project as evidenced by
my completed interview.
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Appendix H: Semi-Structured Interview Guide
_NAME_ Thank you for participating in this interview to support the research study of
the multivariate determinants of employer workplace representation election success. Did
you have a chance to review the interview respondent participation agreement?
You were selected to participate in this interview because of your prior presentations
about responding to union organizing campaigns and because you are a subject matter
expert in responding to NLRB election campaigns. I will ask a couple of very general
questions about your experience in responding to NLRB elections and follow up with
questions about specific campaign messages and different communication tactics within
campaigns.
This study seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of messages used by employers in NLRB
elections.
Q 1. Why do you think prior studies have not obtained information from employers
directly before?
Q 2. Over your career how many elections would you guess you have been involved as
an employer or employer representative? If you had to guess, what is your win/loss
ratio?
Q 3. How similar are these elections with respect to the employer’s messages and
communication tactics?
Q 5. Recent data shows employers stipulate to the unit in 92% of the elections. Why
would an employer do that? What are the advantages in challenging the petitioned-for
unit?
Q 6. What is the single most effective message an employer utilizes to influence the vote
in favor of the employer?
Q 7. Of the many different communication methods available to employers, such as
meetings, letters, Facebook, Twitter etc. which in your experience is the most effective in
increasing the vote in favor of the employer and why?
Q 8. Why should employers hire a consultant to guide the employer’s response to the
union’s campaign?
Ask whether the participant has any questions of the researcher. Then close the interview
by thanking the participant.

